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ABSTRACT
THE SHIFTING STRUCTURE OF CHICAGO’S ORGANIZED CRIME
NETWORK AND THE WOMEN IT LEFT BEHIND
SEPTEMBER 2015
CHRISTINA M. SMITH, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN- EAU CLAIRE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Andrew V. Papachristos and
Professor Donald Tomaskovic-Devey
Women are underrepresented in crime and criminal economies compared to men.
However, research on the gender gap in crime tends to not employ relational methods and
theories, even though crime is often relational. In the predominantly male world of
Chicago organized crime at the turn of the twentieth century existed a dynamic gender
gap. Combining social network analysis and historical research methods to examine the
case of organized crime in Chicago, I uncover a group of women who made up a
substantial portion of the Chicago organized crime network from 1900 to 1919. Before
Prohibition, women of organized crime operated brothels, trafficked other women, paid
protection and graft fees, and attended political galas like the majority of their male
counterparts. The 1920 US prohibition on the production, transportation, and sale of
alcohol was an exogenous shock which centralized and expanded the organized crime
network. This organizational restructuring mobilized hundreds of men and excluded
women, even as women’s criminal activities around Chicago were on the rise. Before
Prohibition, women connected to organized crime primarily through the locations of their
brothels, but, during Prohibition, relationships to associates of organized crime trumped
locations as the means of connection. Relationships to organized crime were much more
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accessible to men than to women, and consequently gender inequality increased in the
network. The empirical foundation of this research is 5,001 pages of archival documents
used to create a relational database with information on 3,321 individuals and their
15,861 social relationships. This research introduces a unique measure of inequality in
social networks and a relational theory of gender dynamics applicable to future research
on organizations, criminal or otherwise.
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CHAPTER 1
LOCATING WOMEN IN ORGANIZED CRIME NETWORKS
Vic Shaw was a woman of Chicago’s underworld for nearly 50 years. Shaw was a
successful woman in Chicago’s organized crime network before Prohibition through her
brothels located in Chicago’s red-light district, her friendships with corrupt politicians,
and her marriage to a gangster. However, as Prohibition caused the structure of organized
crime to shift in ways that excluded women, organized crime left Shaw behind. Shaw
sold booze, sex, and narcotics in isolation from the organized crime network but her
businesses suffered.
Vic Shaw arrived in Chicago at the age of 13 around the time of the 1893 World’s
Columbian Exposition.1 Her real name was Emma Fitzgerald, and she had run away from
her parents’ home in Nova Scotia. As her first job in Chicago, she became a burlesque
dancer. One night after her performance, a socialite named Ebie, whose parents were
Chicago millionaires, ran away with Shaw to Michigan where he convinced her that they
had gotten married. Ebie’s family lawyer caught up with the young couple posing as
newlyweds and informed them that they were indeed not legally married and that Ebie
had committed a crime, as Shaw was a juvenile. Upon their return to Chicago, the lawyer
arranged a large payout to Shaw in exchange for her leaving Ebie and Ebie’s family
alone.2
Shaw suddenly had more money than she knew what to do with, and her friends
advised her to use it to open brothels—so she did. In the beginning, Shaw was not a great
entrepreneur, as she was “more interested in men than the business,” but by the turn of
the twentieth century Shaw was operating two successful luxury brothels in Chicago’s
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red-light district.3 She had little competition in the luxury brothel market and good legal
and political protection arranged through her corrupt friends and organized crime
associates, Aldermen Michael Kenna and John Coughlin. According to Chicago’s
organized crime world, Shaw was their “queen.”4
Reporter Norma Lee Browning interviewed Vic Shaw at the age of 70 to reflect
on her 50 plus-year career in Chicago’s underworld.5 The Chicago Tribune published
Shaw’s interview in a three part series in 1949 just a few years before her death.6 Shaw
confessed to Browning her one regret, “‘Listen, chicken,’ [Shaw said] philosophically, ‘I
wouldn’t trade places with anybody. If I had it to do over again, I’d live every day just
the same except for one thing. The only regret I have is giving up a good man like
Charlie to marry Roy Jones.’”7 Charlie was one of Shaw’s lovers, a hotelman who bought
Shaw her brownstone at 2906 Prairie Avenue, where she ran a brothel during Prohibition
and where she spent her later years running a hotel for transients.8
When Shaw expressed regret over losing Charlie, she was referring to when she
eloped to New York City with Roy Jones, another Chicago brothel keeper. Jones was one
of several men of Chicago organized crime who married a successful brothel madam,
greatly increased his own income and influence, and eventually divorced the madam for a
younger woman—who, in Roy’s case, was a sex worker and Shaw’s employee.9
However, the case of Vic Shaw and Roy Jones is much more than a tragic tale of a man
building his career through his wife and then leaving her. Tracing Vic Shaw and Roy
Jones’s paths within organized crime highlights the particular dynamics of gender
inequality in organized crime networks during Prohibition, leaving formerly successful
women like Shaw behind. This introduction will use the contrast between Shaw and
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Jones and their relationships to organized crime to summarize the central argument of
this dissertation about organizational change and increasing gender inequality.
From 1900 to 1919, Chicago organized crime was a loose, decentralized
syndication of politicians, police officers, collectors, and gambling and prostitution
business owners. Coordinating collection of protection and bribery fees and the
corruption of legitimate offices, organized crime was largely territorial, focusing on
geographically concentrated districts of illicit businesses. Entrepreneurial women
connected rather easily to the specialized market of organized crime through the location
of their brothels. Location mattered for both Shaw’s and Jones’s early connections to
organized crime before their marriage. During their marriage, while Jones’s connections
to organized crime grew as he developed new relationships and expanded business,
Shaw’s connections shrank. She continued to draw her benefits from organized crime, but
now through Jones.10
When Illinois state’s attorney John Wayman forced the closing of the Chicago
red-light districts in 1912, organized crime shifted to opening and protecting new
unsanctioned red-light districts—a transition which included Jones, but excluded Shaw.
Structurally organized crime remained small and decentralized, and the specialized
protection market still focused on specific territories in the city. The need for protection
increased with new laws and regulations challenging the sex work economy. Around this
time, Shaw and Jones divorced. Following the closing of the red-light district and her
divorce, Shaw opened a more discreet brothel on Michigan Avenue and expanded
business into the distribution of narcotics. Shaw was unable to connect her new business
to the protection offered by organized crime and, as a result, faced regular raids by police
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and morals inspectors. During a 1914 raid on her resort led by morals inspector
Dannenberg, Shaw was so fed up with Inspector Dannenberg that she refused to leave her
bed and held a revolver threatening to shoot Dannenberg if he tried to get her.11
Meanwhile, Roy’s businesses thrived—even the ones located in a formally closed redlight district—because of his strong connections to organized crime. This transition
period slightly shifted the locations of organized crime’s territories, but women with
brothels in the new districts could still get protection and connect to organized crime.12
The major structural reorganizing that excluded many women would come in 1920 with
the passage of Prohibition.
The US Prohibition of the production, transportation, and sale of intoxicating
beverages dramatically altered the structure of organized crime. Organized crime tripled
in size, became a more centralized organization, spread geographically into the
neighboring villages, and surged in profits and influence. During Prohibition, organized
crime’s market became less territorial and less specialized. Gambling and prostitution
were still an important part of organized crime, generating even greater profits with the
additional sales of bootleg booze. At the same time, organized crime diversified its
overall portfolio to include bootlegging, labor racketeering, political corruption, and
racetracks in addition to multiple legitimate businesses.
The consequence of this restructuring was that the locations of individual
businesses mattered less as a means of connecting to organized crime. Entrée to the
restructured organization required relationships to crime bosses or associates rather than a
having a business in a particular territory. These relationships tended to be between men
and men excluded women from these relationships—a process that began with and
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produced greater gender inequality. For example, following Prohibition, Shaw moved her
own business into bootlegging where she exploited the underground passages of her
brothels to move and store booze.13 But even with her prime location in the central city,
she was not able to connect to organized crime during Prohibition. While her ex-husband
Roy ran a protected Al Capone brothel during Prohibition, Vic encountered police raids
and charges of violating Prohibition laws.14
In this dissertation I argue that from 1900 to 1919 the Chicago organized crime
network was small, sparse, and decentralized, operating a territorial and specialized
market of protecting illicit businesses through the corruption of legitimate offices. This
organizational structure provided some limited opportunities for women. During this
period, women made up a substantial portion of the organized crime network (18 percent)
when they could connect to organized crime based on the location of their illicit
businesses and ran their prostitution establishments relatively autonomously.
This all changed in 1920 when Prohibition criminalized the desired and profitable
product of alcohol. The Chicago organized crime network responded to the new
criminalized market by multiplying in size, centralizing around a core of gangsters and
politicians, and spreading geographically to villages outside the city. This revamped
market was less territorially concentrated because the demand for booze spread much
farther geographically than the boundaries of the red-light districts. This organizational
structure excluded women who dropped to only 4 percent of organized crime associates
during Prohibition—a 14 percent decrease. Connecting to organized crime during
Prohibition required relationships to organized crime associates more so than illicit small
business locations. Relations trumped locations, exacerbating gender inequality in
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organized crime because women could not access the relationships to associates like men
could. Organized crime required trusting and instrumental relationships between criminal
associates when it engaged in riskier markets, like bootlegging. Men in organized crime
sought these relationships with other men and not women. Even though the proportion of
women’s criminal establishments in booze and prostitution were increasing during
Prohibition, men excluded women from the protection offered by organized crime. The
organization had gotten too big and the market too spread out for entrepreneurial
women’s small businesses to be included.
Organizations, whether formal, informal, licit, or illicit, unequally distribute
relationships and the resources afforded by those relationships. Organizational inequality
is dynamic and can worsen when exogenous shocks force restructuring and redistribution.
In the predominantly male world of Chicago organized crime existed moments of less
and greater gender inequality; this shift in the gender gap in crime in the Chicago
organized crime network deserves interrogation. Vic Shaw and Roy Jones started at
similar points in the Chicago underworld, but once in the organized crime network
women and men did not form new relationships equally. When relationships produce
outcomes such as jobs, political affiliations, country club memberships, promotions, and
access to organized crime, we need to consider the inequality not just in the outcomes,
but also in the inequality residing between relationships.
Gender & Crime
Men dominate crime and criminal economies. According to the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 75 percent of all arrests in 2010 were men, and men accounted for 93 percent
of the prison population (state and federal).15 As gender gaps go in the US, the gender
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gap in crime is among the largest. Research shows that men and women often have
similar motivations for committing crimes—e.g., money, respect, safety, and status—but
that gender greatly impacts the various ways crimes are enacted and completed.16 For
example, research on home burglars and street robbers show that both men and women
offenders equally commit crimes for money, but gender influences their decisions on
weapons, co-offenders, targets, and risk.17
The gender gap in crime is largely a phenomenon of the past 200 years. Legal
scholars Malcolm Feeley and Deborah Little’s research on the gender gap in crime
examined 226 years of British court data from 1687 to 1912.18 They found that that 30 to
40 percent of convictions from the late 1600s to the late 1700s were women, and it was
not until the 1800s that the gender gap began increasing toward its present-day rates.
Feeley and Little argued that the dramatic gender gap in crime was largely a product of
historical and cultural shifts around the ideals of womanhood.
The gender gap in crime is also partly explained by the fact that relationships are
gendered and give differential access to crimal activities. Initiation to crime is an
interactional process between people that transfers the knowledge and skills to commit
crime and the values to support crime in contrast to the law.19 Compared to men, women
tend to be in weak criminal networks with less access to criminal initiation and less
access to relationships containing skills and influence. Men tend to access crime through
their family, peers, and mentors—almost all of whom are other men.20 When women
engage in criminal activity, research shows that women’s entrance to offending is
frequently through their husbands and romantic partners.21 Romantic partners and
husbands become the gatekeepers, or brokers, of women’s access to crime. Research on
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legitimate workplaces shows that for women to improve their positions in firms they
must rely on or borrow social capital from men in the workplace.22 Women also borrow
men’s social capital when it comes to crime. Research on co-offending shows the pattern
of women’s lack of social capital in crime: men tend to co-offend with men, women cooffend with men, but seldom do women co-offend with women.23 When criminals access
their social networks for co-conspirators, they access relationships with men and ignore
their relationships with women.
Criminology lacks a strong theory as to why criminal relationships tend to
exclude women with such regularity. One possible inequality-producing mechanism is
the trust and concealment required in these relationships, but the results from research on
crime, trust, and gender are mixed. Some research has found that men of the underworld
unabashedly admit that they think women cannot be trusted, and they categorically
exclude women from illicit economies and underworld organizations.24 Men’s accounting
for women’s exclusion relays stereotypes of women as weak, gossips, or opportunistic
gold-diggers.25 In contrast, other scholars have found that criminally involved men
consider the women in their lives, especially their wives, most trustworthy.26
Sociological and criminological research show that particular organizational
forms constrain women’s opportunities more than other organizational forms. Flat teambased organizations provide better conditions for women’s careers than large, durable,
and hierarchical institutions.27 A small but excellent literature on criminal markets and
gender consistently shows that women have greater crime opportunities when markets are
more open, flat, and decentralized rather than closed and hierarchal. This is especially the
case in drug markets.28 Patricia Adler described drug dealing and smuggling at her
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research site in the Southwest as a market of free enterprise, entrepreneurialism,
disorganization, short-term deals, and high turnover.29 Women could participate as highlevel dealers in this type of market with the knowledge and connections gained from their
dealer boyfriends and ex-husbands—although women dealers struggled if men refused to
deal with or didn’t trust them.30
In contrast, Lisa Maher found that the drug markets in New York City were
vertical hierarchies with tiers of “well-defined employer-employee relationships.”31 In
this criminal market, women, with one exception, were completely absent from the boss
and management tiers of the hierarchy, and a very small number of women worked in the
lowest levels of street dealing and only on a temporary basis.32 Instead, women found
work in the peripheral sex market, a market so intrinsically connected to the drug market
that as the drug economy grew, the profits for sex work lowered and violence against sex
workers increased.33
This gendered pattern of organizational structure is not just applicable to drug
markets as research on Chinese human smugglers finds this same pattern of women’s
increased participation in flatter organizations. Chinese human smuggling operations are
sporadic and completely decentralized, relying on a long chain of one-on-one interactions
between individuals who fill only a single role in the smuggling process.34 Women fill
some of these roles, and women’s presence alleviates some families’ concerns for safety
while negotiating the smuggling of women and children.35 If we are going to find
increased opportunities for women in criminal organizations in a society with high gender
barriers in interaction and expectations, we need to look to flat decentralized
organizations that create the structural space for women to prosper.
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Women & Organized Crime
Scholars have been debating the usefulness of the term “organized crime” for
decades.36 Criminologist Klaus von Lampe traced the history of the term’s origin and
found that the Chicago Crime Commission coined the term “organized crime” in 1919 in
reference to Chicago’s estimated 10,000 professional criminals who conducted crime in
an orderly, business-like fashion.37 The term “organized crime” went dormant for a
while, but we have Senator Estes Kefauver’s Senate Committee of the 1950s and Mario
Puzo’s 1969 novel The Godfather to thank for the more mainstream conceptualizations of
organized crime as a national hierarchical syndicate imported with Sicilian blood oaths.38
In some organized crime groups, a defining feature of organized crime by
members, especially mafia members, is its complete absence of women.39 While there
certainly is no argument against organized crime as being dominated by men, it is
illogical to assume a complete absence of women in an organization that centers on
family and kin.40 Needless to say, research, especially feminist research, complicates the
notion of organized crime as only masculine by uncovering cases of women connected to
organized crime. Women’s presence and importance in organized crime is more of a
question for the empirical networks than an abstract definition generated by mafia men.
It is no easy task for law enforcement or researchers to specify the boundaries of
the label of organized crime: on who to include and who not to include. When applying
the label, researchers’ judgment is often clouded by preconceived notions of organized
crime as only masculine, when in reality women have always been involved. Historical
research has challenged preconceived notions that women were not involved in organized
crime and instead revealed the connection between organized crime and work for poor,
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often immigrant, women at the turn of the twentieth century in New York. Alan Block
identified over 300 women in New York organized crime rings involved in prostitution,
theft, drug dealing, and managing brothels and gambling dens.41 Rona Holub’s research
uncovered an organized crime ring led by “Queen of Fences” Fredericka “Marm”
Mandelbaum, who syndicated a network of men and women thieves and amassed
approximately $1 million from stolen goods.42 Research on contemporary cases of mafialike organizations shows a range of women’s involvement from silent complicity to
collecting money for and relaying messages to their incarcerated partners.43 The
‘Ndrangheta mafia group in Milan has a kinship structure that assumes women in
leadership and work positions.44 These women in organized crime were not just
exceptions to some masculine organization rule or dismissible anecdotes.
Since the 1970s, empirical research on organized crime has focused on (a) the
social system of overlapping kinship, neighborhood, and village ties, or (b) the
coordination between illegal enterprises and legitimate society.45 For the purposes of this
research, organized crime was the largest constellation of connected criminal ties
between gangsters, politicians, law enforcement, and other associates embedded in
Chicago’s criminalized markets of protection, sex, gambling, and alcohol. At the level of
the dyads, most criminal relationships were not terribly interesting, such as co-offenses or
exchanges of money for illegal products and services. However, there were hundreds of
these seemingly minor criminal relationships that revolved around prominent actors
whose influence on these relationships imposed an organizational structure. The criminal
relationships of organized crime were not just a random smattering of co-offenses, they
contributed to the larger structure of control and access to criminal, political, and legal
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resources. I am agnostic to the theories implying a particular organized crime structure—
e.g., patriarchal patrimonialism, illegal enterprise, patron-client models—because the
network itself reveals the structure and how that structure changes over time.46
Additionally, the network reveals women’s proportions and positions in organized crime.
Generally, academics and policymakers are comfortable arguing for women’s
equality in wages or promotions within formal organizations, but this is not necessarily
the case when applying the logic of women’s equality in organized crime or equality in
offending more generally. Locating women in organized crime or identifying contexts in
which the gender and crime gap is lower is not the same as saying we need more women
criminals. For decades, feminist criminology has been dismantling the trope of “bad
girls” that equates women offenders with failed traditional gender performance.47 The
goal of research on the gender crime gap is to dismantle law enforcement, courts,
archives, and, more broadly, society’s essentializing assumptions about women as
peaceful, maternal, and pro-social. In doing so, we can interrogate if and how these
essentializing gender assumptions interact with processes of recruitment, segregation, or
exclusion in crime. If the gender gap in crime is because of women’s unequal access to
criminal relationships, then the gender gap theory is not about some difference between
men and women. It is about relational inequality. Feminist researchers should attend to
the relational preconditions, not only for exclusion, erasure, and, subordination, but also
for inclusion, prominence, and respect. Moving to the roots of unequal relationships is an
important theoretical direction for criminology.
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Research Questions
When I first began coding the early twentieth century Chicago organized crime
network, I routinely came across vague mentions of women engaged in a variety of
organized crime activities. This dissertation started from a rather simple two-part
question: Were women important to the organized crime network, and, if so, in what
ways? But this simple question did not have a simple answer. Throughout my analysis I
found notable variation in women’s participation in organized crime over time warranting
additional consideration, specifically around the changes accompanying Prohibition.
Women were more present in pre-Prohibition organized crime than during Prohibition. I
shifted the project to a more nuanced and sequential set of research questions grounded in
the theories of organizations and relational inequality: (1) What was the structure of
Chicago organized crime before Prohibition, and how did women fit into that structure?
(2) How did the shock of Prohibition, and accompanying legal changes, change the
structure of organized crime in Chicago, and how did women fit into this revised
structure? From these questions I have come to document increasing gender inequality
across the two points in time, which produced my third and final research question: (3)
Why did gender inequality increase so dramatically in organized crime? To document
change over time I needed precise measurements of organizational structure plus
measures and statistics to calculate and compare gender gaps. To understand why
organized crime and gender inequality changed so dramatically, I needed historical detail
and historical causality. I concluded that these research questions would be unanswerable
without the mixed methods of social network analysis and historical narrative.
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Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis is the growing field of theory and method that centers on
the social relationships among sets of actors and analyzes how the patterns of
relationships affect various outcomes.48 Social network research gathers, compares, and
analyzes multiple network properties at the individual, group, and system level in order to
describe organizational types, structural changes over time, and patterns of behavior,
influence, and interaction. Historians and social scientists have been plowing forward
with the tools and theories of social network analysis, but the same has not held true for
feminist scholars. Additionally, social network scholarship has tended to be weak on
gendered and intersectional analyses; the scholarship has been largely stuck on treating
gender as little more than an attribute variable failing to recognize the larger theoretical
potential of gendered relationships. Computational advances have driven many social
network research questions, but less work has rigorously applied these new methods to
classic sociological questions of inequality.
Criminologists have employed formal social network analysis to examine the
structure of street and motorcycle gangs, organized crime syndicates, narcotics
distribution, terrorist organizations, and white-collar conspiracies.49 New criminological
research is exploring the theoretical and empirical benefits of moving social network
analysis into prison research.50 In some cases, social network analysis may be the only
way to study criminal groups. Ethnographic and survey based studies require a level of
detail and personal information that is not easily tapped when studying crime. It is
comparatively easier to get information on how people are connected (e.g., wiretaps, coarrests, gang affiliation, and who is hanging out with whom) than completed surveys or
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interviews with crime-involved individuals. For example, analyses of wiretap data have
revealed many individuals who are not law enforcement targets or even known criminals
make up substantial portions of criminal communication networks, and in some cases
these non-targets hold important structural positions of reciprocity and brokerage in the
network.51 Researchers have also used relational data from police field observations to
examine young men’s risk of violence across their gang networks in Boston’s Cape
Verdean neighborhoods.52 These examples show that in contrast to cases of thin
individual-level data pertaining to the offenders, thick data on relationships has the
potential to reveal much about crime groups’ actions and outcomes.
My approach to social network analysis is to start with a classic sociological
question about gender inequality and use social network analysis to map out inequality
within an organization. The implicit assumption is that the category of difference
produces the network, but that the network perpetuates the category. This approach also
assumes that the network itself contains and distributes resources. The resources
contained in the relationships of the organized crime network are access to crooked
politicians, police officers, judges, fixers, and influential gangsters. Not being connected
to or near these individuals is a disadvantage for both women and men leading to
exclusion from the protection afforded by organized crime as well as the relatively high
income associated with this form of criminal activity.
There is an epistemological debate in social networks on context versus structure.
Emily Erikson summarized this debate as “relationalism versus formalism,” and
explained that the divide in social networks comes from differing theoretical assumptions
on issues of content, meaning, interaction, and agency.53 On the relationalism side of the
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debate, the interactions between actors situated in their historical and cultural context
generate meaning. On the formalism side of the debate, network structure predicts action
and this linkage permits generalizability, a priori categories, and theory testing. Erikson
proposed that empirical research has the potential to provoke a rich middle ground
between the two traditions.54
Given the mixed methods approach to this project, I tend to side with the
relationalism stance in this debate because it provides the intellectual room to interrogate
the meaning of the social relationships in the networks and to examine closely the
historical moment in which the networks occurred. However, I also acknowledge that
generic network processes—such as homophily, status, power, and influence—are at play
and measuring and comparing these processes can provide insight to a variety of
contexts. I adhere to a dialectical approach between the networks and the historical
narrative and context to evolve meaning and develop theory. Inherent to this is that I treat
social network analysis as a logic of discovery for a particular set of events, group of
people, and historical moment more so than a logic of proof.
Historical Methods
The task for historical research is to master a particular moment and place and
read through the records of that moment in search of interpreting events, reinterpreting
received narratives, and uncovering new perspectives.55 Historical researchers must read
records in their contexts, document and organize content, and constantly pose questions
as to the origin and purpose of the documents themselves.56 Historical research methods
are not uncommon in sociology. Criminology, in contrast, has been reluctant to adopt
historical research methods. Robert Bursik used his 2008 presidential address at the
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Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology to remind criminologists to
remember the classics, to stop reinventing the wheel, and to return to the dusty shelves of
libraries and archives.57 Historical methods allow social scientists to reveal process,
events, and even intentions, while applying the powerful analytical tool of time ordering
and causal process tracing.
Archives are not neutral spaces. They house the records of powerful families,
churches, and states, privilege institutional histories over individual and household
histories, silence historically marginalized groups, and wield the power to shape
memories and index collective histories.58 Archives have often obscured women’s history
through male-dominated archiving efforts that ignored women’s contributions, physically
separating repositories for women’s records, and women’s own consideration of their
writings as inconsequential and not worthy of storage.59 While the historical record will
always be incomplete, this is especially true for women’s histories.
Feminist historians bring a critical lens to institutional archives in order to locate
where women’s voices were intentionally or unintentionally buried. Jennifer Fronc
interrogated the records of private surveillance firms from the early 1900s in New York,
which included thousands of pages of reports written by undercover investigators.60
Fronc explains the need to read between the lines and read the silences in these reports in
order to reveal how these organizations practiced and produced surveillance that in turn
developed cultural space for a more repressive state through targeting the working class,
women, African Americans, immigrants, and anarchists.61 Cynthia Blair uncovered the
history of black women’s sex work in early 1900s Chicago through official Census
records, insurance papers, court documents, church records, city guidebooks, and songs,
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but these sources did not foreground the voices of African American sex workers.62
Blair’s critical lens on institutional archives acknowledged women’s lost voices, but
simultaneously recognized the available documentation of women’s activities.63 These
historians demonstrate that the gender problem in history is not only in what is in the
archive, but in the gendered bias in what is retrieved from them.
Data
Organized crime constitutes a hidden population. Hidden populations are hidden
because their total population is unknown to the public, and the activities of the group are
largely unknown.64 Hidden populations are difficult to study because entering institutions
as members of a hidden population, whether for medical treatment or filling out a survey,
unveils individuals’ previously hidden activities and identities. Strategies that have been
used to sample hidden populations include snowball sampling, respondent-driven
sampling, and targeted sampling.65 A snowball sample is a chain of referrals that begins
with the informant or initial seed and multiplies as referrals from referees move farther
from the informant.66 There is no population list of organized crime members from which
I could draw a truly random sample, so this project employed two snowball sampling
approaches, initially using Al Capone as the seed from which I grow the network of
affiliations. The first snowball sample was via sources and the second was via associates.
As a source-based seed, I used Al Capone as a search term to locate primary and
secondary sources, and then I coded the sources beyond their sections on Al Capone. This
is how I came across John Landesco’s Illinois Crime Survey of 1929 for example.67
While searching for archival sources pertaining to Al Capone, I located a reference to the
Illinois Crime Survey. I ended up coding this source in its entirety even though Capone
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appeared on only 40 of the 146 coded pages. This source-based snowball began with one
seed, Al Capone, but in this source I located 660 individuals other than Capone who were
also mentioned.
The origin of this project was also a source-based sample. The Chicago Crime
Commission (CCC) is a watchdog organization founded in 1919 by business leaders
concerned with corruption in Chicago. The organization still exists today and houses a
large card catalogue linking organized crime individuals through archive folders.
Requesting a random selection of consolidation files and public enemy files created a
random seed from which to start building the database. The CCC’s random selection of
files included many folders pertaining to Al Capone but also included consolidation
folders on a variety of major crime activities from the early 1900s and the CCC’s original
public enemy reports. The CCC folders contained mostly newspaper clippings, but there
were also some investigator notes, legal documents, letters to CCC members, arrest
records, and reports. This source-based snowball approach expanded the network beyond
Al Capone without having to manually locate and code every document from Prohibition
Era Chicago.
The second type of snowball sampling came via associates. For an associatebased snowball, I used the list of names generated from Capone’s archives as a starting
point for new searches. Online access to the Chicago Tribune provided a search function
for some of these names. Due to time constraints I could not exhaust the list of Al
Capone’s associates. However, I strategically targeted certain associates on the list (e.g.,
public enemies and women) and reached saturation around prominent historical events
and the individuals involved. Overall, this project required creative approaches to
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snowball sampling a hidden population because I could not ask informants for a list of
referrals, instead I snowballed within the archives chasing leads and digging through
boxes.
A major concern for sampling hidden populations is avoiding bias introduced
through the initial seed or informant. Al Capone was by no means normal in terms of his
social position in Chicago. In fact, what makes Al Capone a useful informant is that he
had hundreds of discrete documented ties. From Al Capone’s not-so-normal point of
view we get a picture of the largest organized crime network in Chicago during this
period. Using Al Capone as the informant introduces bias to the sample, but it is that very
bias that is of interest in social network research. The Al Capone bias in the data captures
the reality that friends and bootlegging partners were not random events. In traditional
statistical linear modeling, Al Capone would be an elephant-sized sampling challenge;
however, social network tools are designed for exploring non-random aspects of social
life.
If archives have obscured women’s history, this is even truer for criminal
women’s history. Locating women in the archives required a relational approach by
relying on the publicly available cases of the criminal men in their lives. In other words,
women’s criminal and noncriminal events and relationships are in the archives, but they
are filed and preserved through men’s archives. In the folders and boxes dedicated to Al
Capone, his cronies, and other public enemies, I found names of women and descriptions
of their criminal and non-criminal activities. At the Chicago History Museum, I read
young men’s life histories that occasionally referenced the women in their lives.
Returning to the CCC archives with a list of women’s names connected to organized
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crime permitted a card catalogue search and resulted in several cases of women who had
CCC investigation folders of their own.
Table 1: Primary and secondary sources
	
  
Physical Archives
1 Chicago Crime Commission
2 Chicago History Museum
3 National Archives—Great Lakes Region
4 Newberry Library
Online Archives
5 Internal Revenue Service
6 FBI FOIA Electronic Reading Room
7 Northwestern’s History of Homicide in Chicago, 1870-1930
8 Proquest Newspapers Chicago Tribune
Historical Secondary Sources
9 Asbury, Herbert. 1940. Gem of the Prairie.
10 Landesco, John. 1929. Organized Crime in Chicago.
11 Pasley, Fred. 1930. Al Capone: The Biography of a Self-made Man.
12 Reckless, Walter. 1933. Vice in Chicago.
Contemporary Secondary Sources
13 Abbott, Karen. 2007. Sin in the Second City.
15 Eig, Jonathan. 2010. Get Capone.
16 Russo, Gus. 2001. The Outfit.
17 Stelzer, Patricia. 1997. An Examination of the Life of John Torrio.
Total

Pages
2,081
178
1,072
6
86
6
130
788
172
231
23
12
3
159
45
9
5,001

To build a relational database on organized crime, I accessed files and boxes at
four physical archives located in Chicago, downloaded files from four online archives,
and coded pages from a selection of historical and contemporary secondary sources.
Table 1 presents an exhaustive list of all the sources and the distribution of the 5,001
pages of documents coded to create the database. The types of documents in the physical
and online archives vary greatly ranging from newspaper clippings and obituaries to
details of police investigations, bail bond cards, tax documents, and court testimony.
Together these documents provide an outsider perspective of organized crime that was
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recorded concurrently with the organized crime activities. For the insider perspective, I
typed 178 pages of notes from the Institute for Juvenile Research Life Histories
Collection located at the Chicago History Museum. I was unable to identify individuals
or code these life histories for relational data due to the nearly 100-year-old
confidentiality protections, but these life histories provided context and voice to some of
the activities within organized crime.
Across these sources were 3,321 individuals who were in some way connected to
organized crime in Chicago in the early 1900s, some 15,861 social relationships between
them, and 1,540 locations where they spent time. I organized these individuals,
relationships, and addresses in a relational database called the Capone Database. Most
social science lacks any information on the relationships between actors, but relationships
were central to the design of this database. The Capone Database is unique in its scope,
detail, size, and historical moment. It contains detailed information on over 100 different
types of relationships. Each relationship is linked to its original source for purposes of
triangulation and reliability. Data on criminal networks are rare, and, to the best of my
knowledge, the Capone Database is the largest and most complete database on a
historical criminal organization albeit admittedly with some missing data.
Table 2 presents counts on some of the content in the Capone Database. Note that
not every person, address, or tie in the database was part of organized crime, rather these
were the people, locations, and relations that appeared in the sources as possible
organized crime activity and its take down. Social network analysis is required to sort out
these distinctions.
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Table 2: Capone Database totals
	
  
Total
3,321
(100%)
Total
1,540
(100%)
Total
15,861
(100%)

Individuals
Men
Women
2,988
333
(90%)
(10%)
Addresses
Women Involved Ownership Missing
254
578
(16%)
(38%)
Relationships
Man and Man
Man and Woman
14,544
1,148
(92%)
(7%)

Woman and Woman
169
(1%)

Individuals in the database include attorneys, judges, police officers, and, of course,
criminals (i.e., folks who committed crimes) and gangsters (i.e. criminals who were
associated with gangs). Ten percent of the individuals in the database are women.
Addresses in the database include alcohol, prostitution, and gambling establishments, as
well as hotels and restaurants. Almost 40 percent of the addresses in the Capone Database
had no information on owners or managers, and ownership and management changed
over time. About 16 percent of the addresses in the database at some point had women
owners or managers, and this count includes women who co-owned or co-managed
properties with men. There are over 100 different types of relationships in the Capone
Database such as business associations, criminal associations, family members, romantic
partners, friendships, financial exchanges, funeral attendance, legal charges and rulings,
courtroom witnesses, travel, political associations, rivalries, union associations, and
violence. The majority of these relationships occurred during Prohibition. Each
relationship in the Capone Database counts a connection between two individuals, which
is also called a dyad. Dyads have three categories when analyzing gender composition:
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dyads that connect two men, dyads that connect a man and a woman, and dyads that
connect two women. The vast majority, 92 percent, of relationships in the Capone
Database are between two men, 7 percent of the relationships are between a man and a
woman, and 1 percent of the relationships are between two women. The gender
distribution of percentages varies depending on the type of tie.
The Capone Database is complex. Some of the ties are directed, such as paying
someone’s bail or shooting someone, while others ties are undirected, like being brothers
or traveling to the Bahamas together. Some ties are negative such as rivalries and
violence, whereas others ties are positive like friendships and political campaign
contributions. For these reasons, it would be awkward to analyze the Capone Database as
a whole. Instead, analyses require subsets from the database in order to generate samples
that are of theoretical interest.
Sample
This dissertation utilizes two subsets from the Capone Database: one on
relationships and one on addresses. In this section, I describe each subset in detail and
explain its relevance to my analysis. I extracted all of the criminal ties occurring during
two time periods for the first subset: 1900 to 1919 and 1920 to 1933. This restricted
timeline required me to drop all criminal ties that did not have approximate years from
the sample, but I attempted to approximate a year whenever possible. I also dropped other
types of relationships, such as family, friendships, legitimate ties, rivalries, violence, etc.,
from the sample in order to focus solely on the criminal network. I do rely on details from
these other types of relationships when available to contextualize individuals’ entrance
into and access to organized crime. All of the criminal relationships in this subset are
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undirected, which means that there is no distinction between who sends and who receives
the criminal tie.
Criminal ties in this subset include general criminal associations, co-owners of or
co-workers in illegitimate business, making graft or protection payments, co-arrests,
criminal mentorships, political corruption, etc. The value and variation in the criminal
ties get reduced in this analysis as I treat each criminal relationship as equal. For purposes
of the analysis, a $50 payment to a graft collector is equal to corruption of the Mayor’s
office. The benefit of flattening the criminal ties is that the value and variation arise
through the configuration of relationships within the networks, focusing on each person’s
count of criminal ties, the number of ties to central figures, and the number of
relationships that individuals brokered in the network—properties that shed insight on the
organizational structure of organized crime.
Sociologists have leveraged social networks to build organizational theory and
map organizational structure. The concepts of markets and organizations have a
tendency, in theory, to become rather abstract even though markets and organizations
would not exist without actors and their exchanges. Social networks make markets and
organizations less abstract and more social by populating them with actors and actors’
routines and interactions. For example, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey conceptualizes labor
markets as a network of employees moving between employers.68 Lazega and Pattison’s
research on a law firm finds that cooperation and exchange relationships clustered within
levels of the organization but not up the organizational chain, a cooperation pattern
consistent with the bureaucratic structure of the law firm organization.69 This type of
research assumes that organizations and markets at their core are social networks, and the
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social networks are maps of the structure of the organization. Similarly, criminal network
researchers assume this logic in mapping the structure of criminal organizations—
networks can define the structure of organizations. Wayne Baker and Robert Faulkner’s
research on price-fixing conspiracy networks is one of the best examples of this. 70 They
conceptualize the criminal organization not as the separate companies involved in the
conspiracies but as a larger conspiracy network.71
It is certainly challenging to map the structure of informal and illicit
organizations, but patterns emerge in social network data that point toward organizational
structures. In the Capone Database, a criminal relationship between two individuals, such
as an owner of a speakeasy buying booze from a bootlegger, does not equal organized
crime; this relationship is just a criminalized employment or market tie. Rather the
constellation of how these criminal relationships come together and center on particular
individuals within particular markets reveals the larger structure in which this single cooffense was embedded. To be part of the organized crime network, criminal ties had to
directly or indirectly connect to the coordinated activities between small groups of
powerful gangsters, politicians, and law enforcement embedded in Chicago’s
criminalized markets of protection, sex, gambling, and alcohol.
I have organized the Capone Database to differentiate between organized crime
and general criminal pairs or groups. Plotting all of the criminal relationships from 1900
to 1919 and 1920 to 1933 available in the Capone Database produces multiple separate
components, i.e., different pieces of a network that are not connected, as shown in Figure
1. In Figure 1 each dot represents an individual in the Capone Database and each line
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represents a criminal tie between two individuals. Each person in these two networks was
involved in some sort of crime.
Figure 1: All Capone Database criminal ties from 1900-1919 and 1920-1933

It does not require advanced training in social network analysis to notice that both of
these networks have a large discrete section connecting the majority of people.
At the center of these two arrays of relationships is organized crime—i.e., the
single section of the network connecting the greatest number of individuals including the
ties to the powerful group coordinating protection and corruption that I use to define
organized crime. Within the largest components are the relationships between crooked
politicians and law enforcement, famous mobsters and their childhood friends, and
husbands and wives. Not surprisingly, since organizations are bounded networks with
density around powerful roles, large components link many individuals and are
dominated by prominent actors with many ties. The smaller components outside the
largest components connecting just a few individuals represent co-offenses (e.g., bank
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robberies, illegitimate businesses, street gangs) that showed up in the archival searches
related to organized crime but never connected to organized crime. The lack of
connection to the largest components suggests that these criminal groups were distinct
from organized crime and had no overlapping criminal relationships with members of
organized crime. I operationalize organized crime for the purposes of this research as the
largest components of criminal relationships extracted from the Capone Database. This
definition removes all the petty criminals and smaller components that existed outside of
organized crime during the two time periods.
The largest components map the structure of the organization at two points in
time. Illicit and informal organizations comprise sets of interactions coordinating
corruption and profits beyond the walls of a headquarters building and beyond the list of
individuals on a roster, but when these criminal relationships and individuals overlap they
form the larger structure of organized crime. Analytically it is important to conceptualize
the largest component as the organization in order to speak to broader organizational
changes and to bound what is included and excluded in these changes. To these ends, I
consider the phrases “the network of organized crime” and “the organization of organized
crime” to be conceptually equivalent. Both include the cultural and historical space
containing the legal and social resources of organized crime. Throughout this dissertation
I refer to the organization or the organized crime network interchangeably, and both refer
to the largest component in my data.
The second subset I utilized from the Capone Database was address data. For this
subset, I extracted all of the sex work and alcohol related addresses that operated from
1900 to 1933 and had information on proprietors, co-proprietors, operators, or managers.
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The information on the people associated with the addresses was necessary for me to do a
gender comparison, so I dropped all addresses without information on proprietors, coproprietors, operators, or managers from the subset. These addresses include organized
crime establishments as well as establishments not related or connected to organized
crime.
I identified 500 alcohol related addresses within the 34-year time period that
included saloons, speakeasies, restaurants serving alcohol illegally, small shops and
pharmacies selling alcohol illegally, and breweries. These addresses also include
domestic spaces like blind pigs, beer flats, and domestic sales of moonshine. I identified
517 sex work related addresses within the 34-year time period that included formal
spaces such as brothels as well as cabarets, dance halls, restaurants, and saloons that
violated prostitution laws. The sex work related addresses also included the domestic
spaces of apartments and houses where women and men operated informal brothels.
These addresses provide context regarding the illicit activities within the urban space of
Chicago, but they also provide some evidence regarding the changing markets around sex
work and alcohol.
Table 3 summarizes the bulk of the evidence in this dissertation. I detail these
counts and their relevance throughout the chapters, but these are the samples on
organized crime and addresses extracted from the Capone Database that I refer to
throughout the dissertation. The first set of counts and percentages in Table 3 is
composed of the individuals in the largest components indicating the individuals in the
organized crime network. The second set of counts and percentages is a summary of the
criminal ties within organized crime. The third set of counts and percentages includes
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organized crime addresses as well as addresses outside of organized crime. In general,
men-involved addresses are the total addresses minus some, but not all, of the womeninvolved addresses because of co-ownership and co-management establishments.
Table 3: Sample totals, 1900-1919 and 1920-1933
	
  
Time 1
1900-1919

Time 2
1920-1933

267
(100%)
220
(82%)
47
(18%)

937
(100%)
899
(96%)
38
(4%)

789
(100%)
641
(81%)
122
(16%)
26
(3%)

3,250
(100%)
3,134
(96%)
109
(3%)
7
(<1%)

328
(100%)
15
(5%)

172
(100%)
46
(27%)

332
(100%)
128
(39%)

185
(100%)
88
(48%)

Organized Crime Individuals
Total
Men
Women
Criminal Relationships in Organized Crime
Total
Man and Man
Man and Woman
Woman and Woman
Illicit Establishment Addresses
Alcohol Related
Women Involved

Sex Work Related
Women Involved

I identified 47 women and their 148 criminal ties in organized crime from 1900 to 1919,
and I identified 38 women and their 116 criminal ties in organized crime from 1920 to
1933. I refer to these women and their relationships with regularity through the chapters.
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The organized crime network went from being 18 percent women to only 4 percent
women. This dramatic change in percentages was the foundation for my research
questions for this project. I answer these questions via social network analysis and
comparing relevant biographical details of these women.
I leverage the address data to understand the shifting illicit markets in Chicago in
order to test whether women’s dramatic decrease in organized crime was a more general
pattern of women’s decrease in crime during Prohibition. The address data suggest
otherwise. I find that the percent of women-involved addresses increased during
Prohibition in both alcohol related addresses and sex work related addresses. I situate the
organized crime networks within these larger market shifts in the proceeding chapters.
Chapter Outline
Good mixed methods research overcomes the weaknesses of one method with the
strengths of another. Social network analysis provides a set of tools to organize and
analyze historical relationships and organizations, but these tools also require a level of
abstraction that limits explanation. Interpreting social network results through historical
narrative methods brings the power of temporal ordering and causality back to the
analysis. This project employed social networks to organize information on over 3,000
individuals and over 15,000 relationships associated with criminal activity and its take
down in Chicago between 1882 and 1952, with the majority of these relationships
occurring during Prohibition. Analyzing these networks permits me to map out organized
crime, calculate multiple descriptive statistics, model hypotheses, and compare
organizational change and gender inequality in two different institutional contexts. In the
end I was left with a robust finding about the structural shifts of organized crime
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excluding women but with no answer as to why. Interpreting the network results through
historical narrative allowed me dig deeper in order to answer the why. Returning to the
original archival sources, I identified the conditions that connected women to organized
crime in the first place and excluded them in the next. The subsequent chapters are
technically organized by method though I intentionally obscured these boundaries by
leveraging historical data with network data in the causal explanations across the
chapters.
Chapter 2 explains the legal and geographic conditions that permitted organized
crime to develop and thrive in Chicago at the turn of the twentieth century. Organized
crime from 1900 to 1919 revolved around the exploitation and protection of sex work and
gambling, illicit urban entertainment economies accompanying Chicago’s explosive
population growth. Organized crime began in Chicago’s red-light districts as the
coordination between aldermen, police officers, and business owners exchanging tributes
for protection from police raids or legal prosecution. The organized crime network was
relatively small and decentralized with no clear group of crime bosses. Organized crime,
at this time, coordinated a specialized protection market that was territorial. This
organizational context had increased opportunities for women. Eighteen percent of the
individuals in the organized crime network were women, and women’s connections to
organized crime were almost entirely through their brothel businesses. Their locations in
Chicago’s sanctioned and unsanctioned red-light districts were part of organized crime’s
territory, so women paid in and joined accordingly to avoid raids, escape prosecution, and
fix judges. These organized crime opportunities did not require familial and romantic
relationships to organized crime men.
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Chapter 3 identifies the consequences of the exogenous shock of Prohibition on
the organized crime network and women’s subsequent exclusion from organized crime.
Prohibition shifted the legitimate production and distribution of alcohol to the criminal
economy, which produced a fundamental shift in the organizational structure of crime. In
response to the US prohibition of the production, transportation, and sales of intoxicating
beverages, the organized crime network tripled in size and became more sparse and
centralized with a clearer leadership structure at the center. The market was less
territorially concentrated as organized crime spread geographically to villages outside of
Chicago when the increased scale of production was tied to activities rather than
locations. This organizational restructuring mobilized men and excluded women. Women
made up only 4 percent of the Prohibition organized crime network even as women’s
proportion of alcohol and sex work activities and properties around Chicago were
increasing. Women entrepreneurs could not connect to the organization on the location of
their small businesses alone. Thus, relations trumped locations as the means of
connecting to organized crime, and women could not access those relationships to
organized crime as easily as men could. During Prohibition, women’s access to organized
crime came to be defined mostly by their husbands or romantic partners.
Chapter 4 employs the tools of social network analysis to map out the organized
crime networks at two points in time: 1900 to 1919 and 1920 to 1933. In the small and
decentralized structure of pre-Prohibition organized crime, women were peripheral but
they made up 18 percent of the individuals in the network and resided on 19 percent of
the criminal relationships in the network. Prohibition tripled the number of people and
quadrupled the number of relationships in the organized crime network. The network
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simultaneously became more sparse and more centralized. Similar to previous research
on women’s success and access to powerful roles influenced by organizational structure,
I find that the centralized structure during Prohibition excluded women. Women’s
participation dropped to only 4 percent of the individuals in the network and 4 percent of
the relationships in the network. This organizational shift also diminished the remaining
women’s positions in the network. Evidence for this comes from calculations of gender
gaps across multiple network positions, and my finding that gender inequality increased
in every single measure from the pre-Prohibition network to the Prohibition network.
In chapter 4, I also replicate the structural analysis with sensitivity to the role that
criminal elites had on the gender gap. Treating criminal elite men and criminal non-elite
men as conceptually different categories reveals a moment of rough gender parity before
Prohibition when all women looked like the non-elite men in organized crime in terms of
structural positions. This parity eroded during Prohibition. Not surprisingly, a large
gender gap remained between women and non-elite men because non-elite men formed
ties with elite men when women did not. Before Prohibition women and non-elite men
did not control network resources, but they had similar access to networked resources;
during Prohibition, non-elite men had better access to networked resources than women.
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a brief summary of the findings and
arguments as they relate to the three research questions presented in this chapter. I then
turn to a discussion of the limitations, contributions, and implications of this research.
The historical narratives and organized crime networks in the following pages are often
not flattering, but they revisit a historical moment and a historical organization to correct
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misconceptions about women’s locations in history and render women, even criminal
women, visible and relevant.
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CHAPTER 2
WOMEN IN CHICAGO ORGANIZED CRIME, 1900-1919
Chicago organized crime coordinated the protection and exploitation of illicit
gambling and sex work businesses with the corruption of legitimate political and law
enforcement offices from 1900 to 1919. Structurally, the organized crime network was
small, sparse, and decentralized. Organized crime’s protection market was territorial
focusing on Chicago’s red-light districts where brothels, gambling dens, dance halls, and
saloons concentrated. This organizational structure and its territorial focus provided
increased organized crime connections for women because entrepreneurial women could
access the protection market through the locations of their brothels. Women made up a
significant percentage of the organized crime network during this period when they paid
collectors and fixers, owned or managed protected brothels, or trafficked other women.
Women’s entrée to organized crime was through the locations of their brothels rather
than their relations to organized-crime-involved husbands or romantic partners.
In this chapter, I detail the legal and geographic conditions that permitted
organized crime to develop and thrive in Chicago at the turn of the twentieth century. I
begin with a discussion of the fluctuating laws, regulations, and enforcements regarding
the sex work economy that made sex work risky business even when it was technically
legal. Then I examine men and women’s ownership and management of brothels. Though
sex work was inherently women’s work, the profits of sex work were divided among men
and women. The sex work economy existed throughout the city but concentrated in the
red-light districts which were easy to locate and easy to exploit. I describe the territory of
the red-light districts where organized crime developed and focused its protection market.
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Under these conditions, politicians, law enforcement, and men and women illicit
entertainment business owners coordinated a loose and profitable syndication of graft
payments, collections, protections, and extortion. Former mayors, Chicago School
sociologists of the 1920s, and urban historians have made the connection between early
twentieth century Chicago organized crime and the sex work economy by focusing on a
few key men.1 My research goes beyond this connection and these few key men by
situating women of the sex work economy as relevant actors in the 1900 to 1919 Chicago
organized crime network.
The Laws
Illicit entertainments were risky businesses. Though not illegal, saloons and dance
halls were highly regulated by city and state statutes and frequently raided by Chicago
police and morals inspectors. Violations included unescorted women, interracial dancing
or socializing, or failure to follow closing hours. Sex work and gambling were technically
legal, but the spaces in which these activities occurred were criminalized under the 1874
Criminal Code, which prohibited the keeping or leasing of a house of ill-fame or
disorderly house that encouraged “idleness, gaming, drinking, fornication, or other
misbehavior.”2 Disorderly house laws were broad, and police and judges enforced them
irregularly. Commentators pointed out the ambiguity of the sex work laws and the
ambiguity of their enforcement; for example, Chicago Tribune journalist John Callan
O’Laughlin noted Chicago’s failure to enforce state law:
I am told an Illinois state law prohibits prostitution. This law is not enforced in the
city of Chicago. I am told there is a city ordinance so constructed that it permits
by wide interpretation the regulation of this moral crime. In Chicago vice is
neither prohibited nor is it well regulated.3
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University of Chicago sociologist Walter Reckless agreed in his survey, Vice in Chicago,
and stated, “Prostitution was never quite legalized or even tolerated in Chicago or in
other American cities. It merely had been permitted to exist (in spite of statutory law)
during a period when public discussion of it was tabu.”4
Thus, within this legally gray area of the early twentieth century, the rules and
regulations targeting brothels and sex work frequently landed women selling sex, men
buying sex, or either managing the selling of women’s sex in jail and in court. The
cacophony of sex work economy regulations prohibited solicitation from windows,
leasing property to operate brothels or “houses of ill repute,” liquor sales at brothels, and
boarding women against their will. It was not until 1915 that an amendment to the
disorderly conduct laws criminalized the solicitation of sex work, which was the first
criminal statute to impact the sex workers themselves.5
Chicago law enforcement altered the sex economy’s rules and regulations while
proclaiming themselves reformers or bowing to the pressures of the loud moral activists
of the Progressive Era.6 For example, when police arrested women assumed to be sex
workers in raids, they took the women to the police stations but would not book them
until 1:00 AM. Inspectors argued that this departmental policy kept women off of the
streets and out of the brothels as their bails would not be posted until after mandatory
citywide closing hours.7 The irony of this supposedly protective action was that women
had to complete more sex work in order to pay back their bail.
In 1909, Chief of Police Leroy Steward issued a new directive against Chicago’s
red-light districts.8 Singlehandedly, Chief Steward banned swinging doors, colored lights,
and delivery boys under the age of 18 from brothels. He banned brothels outside of the

42

	
  
segregated red-light districts, brothels within two blocks of a school, church, hospital, or
other public institution, and brothels located on Chicago’s elevated train line. Steward
also promised rigid enforcement of a ban on women entering saloons without a male
escort. Enterprising unescorted women banned from the saloons turned their attentions
toward cheap theaters where they could “sit and solicit drinks from the men in the
audience” or hired male escorts to sit with them in saloons and cafes.9 Immediately
following the three-day grace period to comply with Chief Steward’s new orders, police
made over 50 arrests of about 30 men and the rest women.10 Later in the week, 20 more
women were arrested at North Side saloons because they were without male escorts.11
The regulations meant to protect women effectively increased the criminalization of
women—sex workers or not.
Chief Steward’s regulations were a startling display of power. The regulations
caused immediate confusion among the red-light district workers who swarmed precinct
stations with questions.12 The most public opposition came from William A. Brubaker,
chairman of the Prohibition Central Committee of Cook County, in an open letter
published in the Chicago Tribune in which Brubaker admonished Chief Steward for
abusing his power:
Permit me to ask: Who clothed you with legislative powers and authorized you to
nullify the ordinances of the city of Chicago and the laws of the state of Illinois?
When and by whom was the chief of police of Chicago made superior to the
governor, the legislature, and the Supreme Court of Illinois?13
Even though Brubaker chaired a committee calling for the criminalization of sex work
and the closing of the red-light districts of Chicago, the contents of Brubaker’s letter
focused on law enforcement’s failure to follow and administer state law. Perhaps
Brubaker recognized that a rogue chief of police could not bring lasting change to the
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state of Illinois. In response, Chief Steward refused to read Brubaker’s letter or
acknowledge its contents, and he had no qualms about discrediting Brubaker’s position
on the criminalization of sex work as being unrealistic.14 Two years later, Police Chief
Steward’s order was “hailed as one of the best regulative orders that Chicago ever had
known and it worked a wonderful change in the [red-light district].”15 This legal
ambiguity and fluctuation occurring in the streets was also occurring in the courts.
Forced to respond to the changing regulations of sex work and the red-light
districts, some judges’ rulings were inconsistent with Progressive Era activists’ attempts
to save women. In 1911, Municipal Judge Walker discharged 11 women from his court
striking at the police order that banned unescorted women from saloons. He justified his
actions by saying, “A woman has as much right in a saloon as a man” and criticized the
police for not also targeting unescorted high society women at the “fine hotel cafes.”16
Judges’ rulings for greater gender equality were punitive as well. For example, Morals
Court Judge Hopkins was the first judge in the state of Illinois to charge women, alleged
sex workers from South Side brothels, with vagrancy. Reporters commented that Judge
Hopkins had “annihilated the double code of morals when he announced his intention of
punishing in equal measure men and women alike found in resorts.”17 Similar to the
reactionary regulations introduced by the police chief, judges’ inconsistencies in rulings
increased legal ambiguity around sex work.
New specialized courts in Chicago’s judicial system also added legal ambiguity to
the sex work economy. The Morals Court was a specialized branch of the Municipal
Court that processed sex work related arrests.18 In response to the Chicago Vice
Commission’s 1911 report, Chicago officials established the Morals Court, in 1913,
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which was fully operational by 1914. The Morals Court operated as a public clearing
house, records keeper, and enforcer of sex work regulation.19 The morals upheld in the
Morals Court preserved the Progressive Era ideal of white women’s femininity when
mention of sex work and women’s sexuality was taboo.20 The criminalization of moral
transgressions was largely a criminalization of women. Men booked at the Morals Court
were able to leave quickly if they could arrange bail.21 Women were held overnight in
order to undergo medical examinations and appear in court the following morning. If
women tested positive for venereal diseases, they were sent to Lawndale Hospital for
treatment.22 Judges frequently viewed the hospitalization as punishment and would
dismiss the pending cases when women were no longer infected. The moral double
standards of this court shifted slightly in 1919 when judges could hospitalize infected
men as well as women.23
Courts revived old laws and adopted new ones to discourage and suppress sex
work in Chicago. A civil case in 1912 reminded the Chicago courts of the old 1874
disorderly conduct law that implicated the landlords of properties used for “disorderly
houses.” Under the disorderly house law, private citizens could file civil cases against
property owners.24 In 1915, Illinois passed a new injunction and abatement law that could
close any property associated with sex work for one year.25 The private anti-prostitution
activist group the Committee of Fifteen aggressively investigated and filed cases against
alleged brothels and women’s homes under the injunction and abatement laws for years.26
Legal ambiguity and fluctuation made the sex work economy risky business.
Increased police raids cost brothel owners money when posting bail, and judges’
vagrancy rulings cost brothel owners money when paying legal fees and fines. New
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morals judges and morals inspectors, with their heightened convictions, were more
difficult to fix and pay off.27 All of these payments cut into profits. There was money to
be made if a protection market could undercut the price of bail, legal fees, and fines. An
elaborate syndication of protection, graft, and corruption could also force businesses into
the protection market with threats of frequent police raids. Organized crime developed in
this ambiguous legal space.
The Sex Economy
From 1880 to 1890, Chicago’s population more than doubled, making it the
second largest city in the United States with a population just over one million. By 1910,
Chicago claimed more than two million residents. Rural laborers, waves of migrants from
southern and eastern Europe, and the great migration of southern blacks all moving to
Chicago in pursuit of food, work, and money fueled urban growth. Urban entertainment
thrived on the wages of industrial capitalism. Workers’ demands for leisure redefined city
blocks, outpaced regulations, and brought together men and women from all walks of
life.
Unaccompanied young men and women were arriving in Chicago in
unprecedented numbers. In 1909, Jane Addams, charter member of the American
Sociological Society, sociology instructor at the University of Chicago, and founder of
Chicago’s Hull House, lamented the changes she observed in urban youth and young
adults:
Never before in civilization have such numbers of young girls been suddenly
released from the protection of the home and permitted to walk unattended upon
the city streets and to work under alien roofs; for the first time they are being
prized more for their labor power than for their innocence, their tender beauty,
their ephemeral gaiety. … Never before have such numbers of young boys earned
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money independently of the family life, and felt themselves free to spend it as
they choose in the mist of vice deliberately disguised as pleasure.28
While Addams’s sentiment exemplified the social movement politics of the Progressive
Era, she was also remarking on the changing social conditions for working-class women
as a growing part of the urban workforce. Some of these women had left Midwest family
farms, but many were immigrant and black working women.29 Women’s paltry wages did
not get them far in the city. Women earned about $8 a week in manufacturing or sales or
about $5 to $6 a week plus tips in waitressing, which adjusting for inflation would be
approximately $130 to $190 a week in 2015 dollars.30
Jane Addams and other Progressive activists were concerned with white women’s
exploitation in the urban labor force, but their alarm of “vice deliberately disguised as
pleasure” referred to the lucrative wages that women found in sex work. In tandem with
an increasing working population and increasing wages of industrial capitalism was a
growing urban entertainment economy of sex work, gambling, saloons, cabarets, and
dance halls. White women working at modest or midrange brothels could earn just as
much salary a week as the white shop girls and waitresses while working fewer hours and
receiving free room and board.31 Carrie Watson, with her successful brownstone brothel
on Clark Street, told British muckraker William Stead that if women had youth, health,
and good looks, their assets were valued more on Clark Street than in offices and retail
shops.32 Sex work, she explained, was “an easy lazy way of making a living” for women,
and all of her employees were each supporting three to four dependents with their
wages.33 In 1911, The Chicago Vice Commission estimated that there were 5,000 sex
workers in Chicago and $15 million spent each year in Chicago’s brothels.34 Although it
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was in the Vice Commission’s interest to inflate their figures, their claim of an influential
underground economy in which many women found work went undisputed.
Women’s work in the sex economy was not just as sex workers. Entrepreneurial
women ran brothels, employed and managed sex workers, and recruited talent. I find that
women managed and profited in the commodification of sex at rates similar to those of
men. According to my calculations of brothel and sex work related addresses, women
owned, co-owned, managed, and/or operated 28 percent of the sex economy businesses
from 1900 to 1909 and 52 percent of the sex economy businesses from 1910 to 1919. To
the best of my knowledge, there is no single historical source to validate my calculations,
but I have found a few sources with similar kinds of estimates. Historian Cynthia Blair
analyzed British muckraker William Stead’s 1894 “Black List” of some of the most
notorious brothels in Chicago’s red-light district, and she found that women owned 24
percent of the brothels on Stead’s list.35 However, Stead’s Black List did not include
information on women managers or operators, which would have increased women’s
percentage.36 The captain of the 22nd Street police station estimated in 1909 that women
owned 50 percent of the 140 brothels in his district.37 Chief of Police Steward estimated
in 1909 that women owned 75 percent of Chicago’s 400 brothels, but Steward’s count of
brothels was much lower than sociologist Walter Reckless’ 1910 count of 1,020
brothels.38 Unfortunately, Reckless did provide information on how many of the 1910
brothels were owned or operated by women, which makes it difficult to verify Chief
Steward’s estimate. Somewhere in the middle of this distribution is the rough estimate
that women made up about 50 percent of the ownership and management of the sex work
economy. The sex economy was predominantly women’s work, but the ownership and
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management shows that the profits of the sex economy were divided between men and
women.
Chicago’s most elite brothels generated such great profits that women owners
retired in comfort and luxury. On October 19, 1909, evangelical preacher Gipsy Smith
led a revival parade of hundreds marching through the segregated red-light district. His
anti-red-light district and anti-sex-work parade to save women was an unconventional
albeit effective advertisement for brothel owners. One unnamed woman who managed
one of the largest brothels in the district joked and moralized to reporters about the boom
in business that the preacher brought to her part of the red-light district:
I have been in this neighborhood more than five years, and I can truthfully say
that I never saw anything like the crowds that are coming to the houses tonight.
Several times since the parade this place has been so full that we have had to
refuse any more admittance. From a business standpoint I suppose we should be
highly pleased. However, notwithstanding all the easy money that has drifted our
way this evening, I am sorry that it happened. I am sorry for the young boys that
were attracted to the district—many of them for the first time in their lives. And
the young girls that walked along the street and gazed into the houses cannot
escape a tinge of corruption. But far be it from me to moralize. I’m here to make
the money, and it certainly is coming in fast tonight. If Gipsy Smith would lead a
few more parades down here I would soon make money enough to retire and live
on the interest of my wealth.39
Talk of profits and retiring on brothel-earned wealth were not uncommon for the
red-light districts’ most successful women brothel owners. The elite brothels of Chicago
wined and dined distinguished clients with live music, luxury furnishings, premium
champagne, and talented women. The elite and notorious Everleigh Club banished all
visitors who spent less than $50 a visit, and the women working there pocketed $100 a
week (about $2,400 a week in 2015 dollars).40 Upon the closing of the Everleigh Club,
the never-married Everleigh sisters retired to New York with their collection of luxury
items and died comfortably of old age amid their Chicago-accrued wealth.41 Bessie
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Hertzel, who had “more diamonds than any landlady on the West Side” and a serious
heroin addiction, sold her brothel in 1910 when she woke up married to Eddie Jackson.42
She made somewhere between $15,000 and $20,000 in the sale—approximately
$360,000 to $480,000 in today’s dollars accounting for inflation.43
This level of wealth was certainly not available to the majority of brothel owners.
Most men and women of Chicago never came near the startup capital necessary to open
an elite brothel in Chicago’s red-light districts. Vic Shaw went from being a burlesque
dancer to owning two elite brothels only because of the large cash bribe she received
from a Chicago millionaire family.44 Many of Chicago’s brothels were nothing more than
shanties or small apartments where men and women coordinated the selling of sex. Annie
Plummer’s brothel on 13 ½ Peoria Street was a “miserable shack” that she struggled to
keep open because of the increasing rents and her abusive ex-husband.45 Sex workers on
the West Side rented horse stalls and rooms in ruined buildings by the day for a place to
conduct their work.46 Most brothels provided homes by day and workplaces by night for
many men and women of the red-light district, but brothels varied greatly in terms of
comfort and profits.
Prices for sex work in Chicago ranged from 25 cents to $20 with black women
sex workers receiving the lowest wages.47 According to historian Cynthia Blair’s analysis
of Chicago’s 1900 Census, black women made up 17 percent of registered brothel sex
workers when they made up only 2 percent of Chicago’s population.48 Black brothel
owners and sex workers earned less than their white counterparts, but occasionally they
accessed niche markets catering to the curiosities of a white male clientele.49 Historians
have identified that much of the moral panic of the Progressive Era was in reaction to
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racial mixing when white women socialized and coupled with black men.50 The moral
panic did not apply to black women selling sex to white men as this transaction
reinforced the system of racialization linking black women to depraved sexuality.51
In their efforts to save young, poor, white women, Progressive Era activists
targeted and vilified men who profited off of women’s sex work. Activists and reverends
produced books and films that exaggerated and perpetuated enslavement and trafficking
narratives, including titles such as the 1911 book Chicago’s Black Traffic in White Girls,
the 1912 book The Vice Bondage of a Great City, the 1912 book Can Such Things Be? A
Story of a White Slave, and the 1913 silent film Traffic in Souls to name a few
examples.52 These narratives painted men, often black men, in the sex work economy as
abductors and enslavers. The narratives ignored the low-earning brothel staff positions
that men, including black men, filled in the sex work economy such as piano players,
waiters, and porters.53
In 1909, when Chief of Chicago Police Steward singlehandedly changed red-light
district regulations, one of his reform measures targeted the men profiting from the sex
economy.54 He prohibited men from owning or operating brothels, and promised to arrest
all men subsisting off the income of sex workers on charges of vagrancy.55 Progressive
Era activists were enthusiastic about this new gendered policy because it reinforced the
notion of protecting women from the “white slavers” and the male “undesirables” living
off the profits of women.56 In response to Steward’s regulation, some men registered their
wives’ as the brothel owners and some women received swift promotions to brothel
manager.57 However, the powerful men of the red-light districts were immune to
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Steward’s regulations.58 Brothel owners paying into organized crime’s protection market
avoided the raids and arrests demanded by Chief Steward.
The Chicago organized crime network from 1900 to 1919 coordinated the
protection and exploitation of illicit gambling and sex work businesses with the
corruption of legitimate political and law enforcement offices. The bulk of organized
crime activity in the network was contained within the market of protection: graft and
payment collection from brothels and gambling dens, fixing of legal cases, donations to
aldermen, and corruption of police departments. The protection market was open,
meaning that organized crime could absorb businesses wanting protection and
connections, and organized crime could exploit businesses that it wanted to protect or
close.
The protection market and the geography of Chicago required organized crime to
become territorial. Spatially, Chicago was and continues to be a large city in terms of
square miles (234 square miles), especially compared to older eastern cities such as
Boston (90 square miles) and Philadelphia (143 square miles). Though sex work occurred
throughout the city, the segregated red-light districts provided a profitable concentration
of illicit entertainment establishments. The coordination of the protection market with the
police departments and local aldermen zoomed in on the territories of red-light districts
and did not expand much beyond those territories. Women’s brothels were among the
many illicit entertainment establishments requiring protection in these districts, and
women connected to organized crime through their payments into and their benefits from
the protection market.
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The Three Levees
The segregated red-light districts of Chicago were called the Levee districts. The
earliest criminal ties in the pre-Prohibition organized crime network were located in
Chicago’s Levee districts, and the majority of the ties in the 1900 to 1919 organized
crime network occurred within and revolved around the Levees. “Levee” referred to
districts along the river ward.59 The original Levee was located just south of the central
business district, bounded by Clark Street and State Street from west to east and Van
Buren Street and 12th Street from north to south.60 In the shadows of the Loop high-rises
were Chicago’s vices of gambling, brothels, dance halls, and saloons all condensed into
several blocks. Locals, laborers, and visitors had no trouble finding their way to the
entertainments of the Levee. The Levee district was a prominent feature of central
Chicago, which the naysayers were quick to ask: “Do the people of Chicago know that
their business district, known as the ‘loop,’ can hardly be reached except by passage
through or in close proximity to infected districts?”61
The sounds, smells, and sights of the “infected district” included music, train
arrivals and departures, cigarettes, alcohol, interracial mixing, modern dancing, and a
steady traffic of clients and sightseers. Cabarets of the Levee district brought together an
unfamiliar combination of “saxophone music, fox-trotting, risqué entertainment, open
promiscuity, wholesale intoxication and cigarette smoking, prostitutes, shop girls, and
slumming society folk.”62 Dance halls called “black and tans” catered specifically and
illegally to both white and black patrons.63 A single room at the Hotel Queen would be
rented eight times in a single day, though under oath the owner explained that the eight
visitors a night were due to room changes from the insects or uncomfortable temperatures

53

	
  
rather than short visits by clients and sex workers.64 A 1909 Chicago visitor described the
Levee district and Levee lore with horror:
I have been through the red light districts of Chicago, and I am filled with a great
loathing. I have seen your dance halls, where temptation to sin is offered in the
form of lights, and music, and drink. I have seen saloons which are but the anterooms to iniquity. I have visited your vice quarters, and have been astonished at
the open traffic that exists therein. I have learned of how “white slavery” is
conducted in Chicago. I have been told of women imprisoned behind bars and
forced to do the will of their keepers. I have learned of police service to prevent
the escape of unfortunates. The condition that exists is at once heartrending and
disgusting. It is a blot upon the fair name of Chicago.65
Objectively, the Levee was a rough place with a tough reputation. It was the kind
of place where travelers to Chicago would find themselves robbed by thieving gangs of
women, such as August Bloemfon’s allegations that four women thieves at 377 State
Street stole $55 from him while he was lost in Chicago looking for his cousin.66 The
Levee provided sex workers, hobos, and drug addicts and their corresponding stigmas a
segregated place to live, hustle, and work.67 Other residents of the Levee included
working-class, immigrant, and black families renting filthy and cold rooms in dilapidated
hotels and boarding houses.68 Their children played in the streets next to soliciting
women, much to the dismay of at least some police officers.69 In 1911, the Chicago Vice
Commission calculated that 3,931 children lived in Chicago’s First Ward, which
contained the Levee district.70 Saloons functioned as the primary social service agencies,
providing warmth, toilets, stew, and bread to the residents and visitors of the Levee.71
There was a second Levee on the West Side of Chicago where brothers Mike and
Joseph Heitler owned and controlled entire blocks of shanties and flophouses, especially
along Green Street and Sangamon Street. Mike and Joseph were both connected to the
organized crime network, and Mike was one of the most powerful individuals in the
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network in terms his criminal connections and his important position as a broker. Many
organized crime activities from 1900 to 1919 centered on or include Mike Heitler. Rents
in the Heitler brothers’ West Side Levee typically would have been about $15 a month
for working-class residences, but within the prosperous Levee economy the Heitlers
could charge up to $300 a month for their shacks used as brothels or gambling dens.72
Around 1910, the Heitlers expanded into Curtis Street and Carpenter Street, buying up all
the available houses near their monopoly of properties in the West Side Levee.73 The
West Side Levee did not receive as much attention from the press, tourists, and social
reformers as the original Levee because it was farther from the central business district,
but the West Side Levee was no less important as an organized crime territory.
In 1903, the Citizens’ Vigilance Committee, an activist organization with the goal
of banishing brothels from the First and Second Wards of Chicago, complained to Mayor
Harrison of a third “encroaching” red-light district spreading Chicago’s vices farther
south to 22nd Street.74 This was not a desirable high-class neighborhood, even though the
Citizens’ Vigilance Committee claimed to represent residents and property owners.75
Historian Cynthia Blair’s research found that brothels started opening around the area
that was to become the 22nd Street Levee as early as the 1880s when brothel
entrepreneurs were attracted to the low rents of shabby houses unsuitable for workingclass families.76
Reflecting nearly 10 years later on the opening of the 22nd Street Levee district, a
Chicago police officer using the pen name Officer 666 anonymously wrote in the
Chicago Tribune, “There had been a lot of talk about the disgrace to the city of a levee
district in the shadow of the big loop office buildings. All of a sudden it was announced
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there was a new segregated district out around 22nd Street.”77 This announcement came
from Mayor Carter Harrison and his political wing in their efforts to push the Levee
district out of the south Loop to the area around 22nd Street.78 The new Levee segregated
the hobos, sex workers, drug addicts, and poor families to second-rate properties away
from the valuable streets and real estate near the Loop frequented by Chicago’s business
elite. There was also money to be made in the protection market of the brothels already
located in the area of the 22nd Street Levee, and organized crime might have had financial
interests in relocating there. The new 22nd Street Levee was a success for illicit
entertainment businesses and organized crime.
Located on the northern side of Chicago’s Black Belt, the 22nd Street Levee
included the 12 blocks between 18th and 22nd Streets from north to south, and Clark Street
to Wabash Avenue from west to east.79 These neighborhood borders were porous,
however, with brothels, saloons, and gambling dens stretching farther south deeper into
the Black Belt. By 1911, the district police captain estimated 152 resorts in the 22nd Street
Levee.80 The 22nd Street Levee district was as fascinating and grand as the original
Levee: the district was illuminated late into the night by electric lights, women wore real
diamonds at the “gilded” brothels, and when 20 states’ attorneys toured the district in
1907, they declared the “chatter of the geisha girls to be the most attractive thing of the
evening.”81 If the walls could talk, we would want to listen to the buildings of the 2000
blocks of South Wabash Avenue of the 22nd Street Levee. This was where the “grizzly
bear” dance was first introduced to Chicago, where bondsmen accompanied police
officers during raids, where love triangles ended in murder, and where illegal gambling
occurred in nearly every flat, barber shop, and cigar store.82

56

	
  
The thrill and legend of the 22nd Street Levee coalesced at Colosimo’s Café,
2126-2128 South Wabash Avenue. Jim Colosimo and his wife, Victoria Moresco, had
been successful brothel owners in the original Levee. Folks referred to Colosimo as
“Diamond Jim” for the jewels he wore on each finger and the diamonds he carried around
in his pocket to play with while sitting.83 Around 1910, Colosimo and Moresco opened an
Italian restaurant and cabaret in the 22nd Street Levee and had all intentions of running a
classy joint, but their close associations with Chicago’s criminals made their high-society
aspirations difficult to achieve. The small dining room was modestly decorated in rose
and gold, hanging laps ran down the center of the ceiling, and tables and chairs crowded
the edges of the dance floor and orchestra in the middle of the room.84 Accustomed to
being immune from legal trouble, Colosimo and Moresco violated liquor laws, paid
bribes to maintain licenses, illegally served alcohol to uniformed soldiers and sailors
during wartime, had “immoral” appearing women flirting and selling cigarettes table to
table, and managed a staff accused of beating a cigarette girl.85 When legal troubles
finally caught up with them in 1914, Jim transferred all of the properties to Victoria’s
name.86
The locals only ever knew it as Jim’s place. The reputation of Colosimo’s Café
was as large as the man himself:
‘Colosimo’s’ as ‘Big Jim made it’ wasn’t just a cabaret. It was a place of interest,
a rendezvous, an enticing lure and one of the best known in the world, a gathering
spot for men and women of all classes. … Yes, there was lure in Colosimo’s, and
thrills. Its reputation was naughty, but its character was not unnice. There seldom
was any ‘rough stuff’ there. When there was it was promptly stopped. You saw
painted women and maudlin women, and drunken men. You saw thieves and
gamblers and crooked coppers and lords and dukes of the badlands. But you could
see, too, millionaires and merchants and bankers and novelists and teachers of
kindergarten.87
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Jim Colosimo’s popular café and its tables filled with “gamblers and crooked coppers”
illuminated Colosimo’s importance in organized crime. Of all 267 individuals in the
Chicago organized crime network from 1900 to 1919, Jim Colosimo was the most central
person in the network. He has the most criminal connections within the organized crime
network, which included relationships with underworld gamblers, brothel owners,
traffickers and local ward politicians. The Colosimo Café tables that seated politicians
and police officers next to gamblers and brothel owners reflected the underworld and
upper world organized crime relationships that centered on Jim Colosimo. Victoria
Moresco, who by 1914 held the title to Colosimo’s Café, was also in the organized crime
network though she was not a central figure.
Chicago’s vices of gambling, sex work, and drinking were all satisfied within the
hotels, saloons, brothels, and cabarets of the Levees. The Levees concentrated illicit
entertainment businesses to a small territory where the organized crime protection market
provided immunity from police and moral investigator raids, a payment plan with judges
to release sex workers quickly, and ward politicians who fought to keep the Levees open.
Organized crime’s protection market did not include all of the businesses of the Levees,
nor was the protection market always good for business. Paying off organized crime cut
into profits, but there was no alternative.88
The Chicago Tribune reported, “No man in the First ward Levee opened a saloon,
started a handbook or poolroom, and no woman opened a disorderly house without first
gaining the consent of at least one of the members of the syndicate.”89 The saloon,
handbook, and poolroom businesses owners who connected to the organized crime
network were men, but the protection market of organized crime was open and made
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room for women. Women established their connections to organized crime within the
concentrated territories of the Levees.
The Corruption
In 1929, John Landesco, the only scholar of the Chicago School of Sociology who
studied organized crime, argued that the history of organized crime in Chicago went back
25 years to the early 1900s.90 Landesco’s scrupulous detailing of who was who in
organized crime revealed a legacy of immune people and untouchable places going back
to the organized prostitution and gambling rings at the turn of the twentieth century. In
response to Landesco’s research, Landesco’s advisor, Ernest W. Burgess, summarized
that “the position of power and affluence achieved by gangsters and their immunity from
punishment was due to an unholy alliance between organized crime and politics.”91 The
syndication of protection in the Levee districts laid the foundation to Chicago organized
crime, well before some of Chicago’s most influential mobsters even arrived to the city.
One of the earliest criminal ties in the 1900 to 1919 organized crime network
highlighted the integration of politics and crime in the Levees when Ike Rosen rigged
votes for Alderman Michael Kenna. Ike Rosen gained favor in City Hall during the 1900
election season by converting the back room of his Levee saloon that regularly served as
the women’s section into a boarding room. By November 1900, 34 men were registered
voters living in Rosen’s back room at 367 South Clark Street, and all of them supported
Michael Kenna for Alderman of the First Ward. Chicago police arrested Rosen for
violating state lodging laws and closed his saloon. His arrest deterred some of his
boarders from showing up to the polls, but the political alliance between Ike Rosen,
Alderman Kenna, and Mayor Harrison had been solidified. 92 The following May, Rosen
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reopened his saloon with the Mayor’s permission, and Rosen and his patrons celebrated
the defeat of the Chicago Police Department:
Greasy nickels were shoved over the bar at Ike Rosen’s saloon at 367 South Clark
Street yesterday, rough-looking men plowed their way through the sawdust
covering of the floor or lounged against the cracked-toned defaced piano, while
women gathered in the rear room, separated from the bar only by a flight of two
steps and the mere framework of a partition, waiting for someone to “buy a
drink.” Ike Rosen’s place was doing its usual daily business. This order of things
is to continue for Mayor Harrison, having restored Rosen’s license after revoking
the privilege on a report submitted through Chief of Police O’Neill, asserts that no
further action will be taken unless a “new complaint comes in.” As he served out
drinks in grimy glasses Ike Rosen did not conceal his satisfaction over his own
importance. He had won a victory over the Police department, so his followers
asserted, and this had brought proof of his position as a political power of the
levee.93
Mayor Harrison, for the most part, did not get in the way of relationships between
aldermen and saloon owners or other organized crime activities. He was not a gangster’s
politician like some Chicago mayors.
Chicago had four different mayors between 1900 and 1919; two of them had
criminal ties in the organized crime network and two did not. Mayor Carter Henry
Harrison served five terms as Chicago Mayor from 1897 to 1905 and 1911 to 1915.
Mayor Harrison’s terms were interrupted by Mayor Edward Dunne from 1905 to 1907
and Mayor Fred Busse from 1907 to 1911. Mayor Harrison’s successor in 1915 was
Mayor William Hale “Big Bill” Thompson, who served from 1915 to 1923 and 1927 to
1931.94 Mayors Harrison and Busse avoided connections to the organized crime network,
but both Mayors Dunne and Thompson had one criminal tie in the 1900 to 1919
organized crime network.
Even though Mayor Harrison was not connected to the organized crime network,
he did not interfere with organized crime activities before losing the mayor’s office in
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1905. However, in 1903, Mayor Harrison threatened to revoke liquor licenses of 17
saloons along South Wabash when attorney Louis Behan, lawyer for and manager of the
Citizens’ Vigilance Committee, presented evidence collected by his organization that all
of these saloons had all violated midnight closing hours.95 The Citizens’ Vigilance
Committee was a civilian based organization that hired private detectives to collect
inflammatory evidence to further their Progressive crusades and agendas.96 For years,
Mayor Harrison danced a very non-committal dance around Progressive Era crusaders
and the issue of segregated red-light districts, so at first glance Mayor Harrison’s threats
to revoke saloon licenses in 1903 implied that he was siding with the Citizen’s Vigilance
Committee and their tactics. However, his threats were empty as only a few weeks later
these South Wabash saloons were enjoying the crowds that the new 22nd Street Levee
district had attracted.97
Unlike Mayor Harrison, Mayor Dunne and Mayor Thompsons’ actions connected
more directly to the organized crime network. A tactic of the organized crime protection
market was to provide police departments with lists of unprotected brothels to raid and
City Hall with lists of unprotected saloons to revoke licenses. Mayor Dunne, who would
later become governor of Illinois, set a Chicago mayor record for revoking the largest
number of saloon licenses within the first 20 months of his term that began in 1905.98 The
Chicago Tribune accused Mayor Dunne of Levee district favoritism in 1906 when he
selectively revoked certain saloon owners’ licenses while ignoring flagrant law violations
by other saloon owners.99 Mayor Dunne’s term was a short two years and his organized
crime connections were mild compared to Mayor Thompson. Mayor Thompson returned
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generous campaign contributions with political favors and appointments—a trend he
started in 1917 during his first term as Mayor that he would continue into Prohibition.100
The underpaid city officials came to expect generous donations from the brothel,
saloon, gambling den, and dance hall owners of the Levees.101 Progressive Era activists
were especially keen on exposing organized crime and corrupt officials because it
provided even greater evidence for their crusade against the red-light districts.
Progressive activist Kate Adams ran the Coulter House, a reform house for sex
workers.102 She regularly testified about the system of graft payments from brothels
getting split between police officers, bondsmen, doctors, and the “higher up.” Adams was
especially vague regarding the “higher up” and she failed to name names or identify how
high up this person was.103 Chicago officials and residents assumed, however, that the
Aldermen of the First Ward were the “Lords of the Levee.”104
Aldermen Michael “Hinky Dink” Kenna and “Bathhouse” John Coughlin of the
First Ward, the ward containing the south Loop Levee and the 22nd Street Levee, drove
much of the political wing of organized crime. They were the well-known the political
bosses of the Levee “vice trust”—the syndication of graft payments and protection
between the thieves, saloons, gambling dens, and brothels in coordination with the police
and politicians.105 Kenna and Coughlin were both central figures in the organized crime
network and among the criminal elite with the top 10 percent of criminal ties. They also
persisted in the organized crime network into Prohibition though with much less
influence. Alderman Kenna owned a saloon on Clark and Van Buren Streets that catered
to a rough crowd. When Carrie Nation, the hatchet-wielding Kansas saloon smasher,
visited the Chicago Levee in 1901, she labeled Kenna’s saloon a “hell hole,” crying,
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“You are sending scores of persons to hell every day.”106 Had Carrie Nation focused her
hatchet on the broader corruption and organization of crime, she may have lodged even
stronger insults and accusations at the Alderman.
The most public moments of Aldermen Kenna and Coughlin’s influence and
connection were during their annual First Ward Democratic Balls. The balls were grand
affairs attended by 25,000 guests who were entertained by masquerade dancing, 35,000
quarts of beer, and 10,000 quarts of champagne.107 Aldermen Kenna and Coughlin’s
constituents were not the Chicago tycoons and elite; rather the First Ward voters included
thieves, saloon owners, gambling den operators, and male brothel keepers. Madams and
sex workers of the Levee were unable to vote, but required the Aldermen’s protection and
influence at keeping the lid off of the Levee. Chicago Tribune reporters writing about the
annual First Ward balls focused much of their critique on the lower class and social
standing of the majority of the guests intermixing with the political and legal arms of
Chicago, “They packed the Coliseum so full of gentlewomen of no virtue and gentlemen
attached to the aforesaid gentlewomen that if a great disaster, thorough in its work, had
befallen the festive gathering there would not have been a second story worker, ‘dip,’
thug, plug ugly, porch climber, dope fiend, or scarlet woman remaining in Chicago.”108
The reporters padded their critique of Chicago’s criminal class with fodder on
their fashion, drinking, smoking, dancing, flirting, and swearing of women attending the
ball. The balls gained the reputation of debauchery and were eventually referred to only
as “orgies” in the Chicago Tribune headlines.109 When the press threatened to report
names of public figures attending the ball, many developed elaborate alibis as evidence of
no longer attending.110
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The First Ward Democratic Club raised thousands of dollars from the balls, and
though Alderman Kenna described the educational and social services the funds would
provide to First Ward residents, it was reported and understood that the profits paid for
the Aldermen’s re-election campaigns.111 Saloon and brothel keepers purchased up to
$200 worth of tickets that they liberally distributed to their employees and customers to
increase the presence of the constituents.112 Levee business owners were expected to
purchase bottles of wine at the ball based on the size of their business.113 Even though
many of the guests and constituents did not vote or could not vote,114 the increasing
attendance and increasing profits each year were successes for the political party. In
1902, Alderman Coughlin commented on the increase of 5,000 guests from the previous
year, “The increase means just one thing—victory for the democratic ticket at the spring
election.”115 His prediction was right.
Aldermen Kenna and Coughlin had strong ties to the Mayor’s office because they
could deliver votes. Their demand in return was that the Levees were theirs to regulate. In
one instance, when a New York gambling ring operator made plans to take over a floor in
a downtown Loop hotel to expand his operations in the open city of Chicago, the
Aldermen interfered and shut him down to protect local gambling establishment
owners.116
In another instance, the Aldermen banned the “grizzly bear” dance from Chicago.
Their ban began at Frieberg’s dance hall, where they had deep financial interests. The
Aldermen found the grizzly bear dance offensive and wanted more respectable and
higher-class dances like two-steps and waltzes performed at Frieberg’s. Business at
Frieberg’s tanked as a result of the dance hall’s ban because patrons loved the ragtime
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steps of the grizzly bear dance. The grizzly bear dance originated in black dance halls,
and its movements included leaning into partners’ chests and wrapping arms around each
other. Critics of the dance considered it overtly sexual because of how closely dance
partners embraced.117 The Aldermen were among the critics, and, in the interest of
Frieberg’s, they organized a citywide ban on the grizzly bear dance calling it immoral.
Their dance hall competitors who permitted the grizzly bear dance following the citywide
ban faced so many raids that eventually one of them tore the dance floor out of his
establishment.118 Local beat police officers “winked” at the Aldermen’s protected
establishments operating in direct violation of laws and ordinances when Kenna and
Coughlin were “Lords of the Levee.”119 They staked their claim as durable members of
Chicago organized crime.
In 1911, when Mayor Harrison was re-elected to his fifth and final term as mayor,
he attempted to crack down on organized crime and police corruption by ordering an
investigatory commission.120 This marked a drastic change from his first four terms as
Mayor when his interference with organized crime was minimal. His Civil Service
Commission required the testimony of 36 police lieutenants regarding the sex work
conditions in their districts, and 35 of the lieutenants swore that Chicago was
“immaculately pure” and that they had never “seen vice in any of its manifold forms or
even discovered evidence that vice had ever existed.”121 The Commission was furious to
the lieutenants’ “blindness” and blamed Chief of Police McWeeny for spreading his lies
to his entire force.122 The boldness of the 35 lieutenants’ testimony that no vice existed
when the Levee districts were still open for business and sex work related arrests were on
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the rise speaks to organized crime’s close relationships with the legal and political arms
of Chicago.123
By the end of the Civil Service Commission’s investigations, five police officials
in the 22nd Street Levee were charged with “allowing vice to flaunt itself unrestrained in
the south side levee district, the most notorious of the Chicago ‘badlands’” as well as
“neglect of duty and inefficiency.”124 The Commission promised damaging evidence
against the “higher powers in the political world” above and beyond the district police
office, but it does not appear that the Commission was able to deliver on this promise.125
The Commission’s official report to Mayor Harrison was only able to cite police
conditions with an ambiguous reference to some “bipartisan political ring.”126
The failure to identify the “political ring” of organized crime could have been a
protective cover-up by the Commission or some higher ups to keep a lid on the organized
crime connections, but ambiguous references to organized crime bosses and political
leaders without names or clear evidence were quite common during the first two decades
of the twentieth century. What these investigators, committee members, and reporters
could not see from their perspective was that the organized crime network during this
period was flat and decentralized with no clear leadership structure.
The Vice Syndicate
The organized crime network from 1900 to 1919 was small, sparse, and
decentralized. The Lords of the Levee, Aldermen Kenna and Coughlin, were part of an
ambiguous and shifting leadership of organized crime included business owners and graft
collectors. The Aldermen placed and kept the “notoriously corrupt or notoriously
incompetent” Captain Michael Ryan of the 22nd Street police station as Chief of Police of
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the First Ward—a position Captain Ryan held until 1914 when he was transferred for
being accused of maintaining the vice conditions in the Levee.127 In addition to Aldermen
Kenna and Coughlin and their police captain, the remaining “bosses” of organized crime
were less clear. Investigators and journalists had little idea regarding the number or
names of organized crime bosses and at times referred to the “Big Three,” “Big Four,”
“Big Five,” and even the “Big Seven” of the “Vice Trust”:
While every “vice ring” is described as a wheel in a political machine, the
situation in Chicago is said to permit the carrying out of the details of the figure of
speech to an unusual length. In other cities the “ring” has been found to be a
clique of gambling kings who ruled the situation. In Chicago the ring is extended
to the formation of a complete wheel. [Captain Michael] Ryan [of the 22nd Street
police station] is the hub. His plainclothes policemen, his “confidential men,” are
the spokes, and the sections of the rim are the “Big Four” or the “Big Five” as
conditions happen to be at the time, the dive owners and keepers controlling the
strings of saloons and resorts that travel along without interruption. But—more
important than any of all of these parts—the one thing without which the wheel
could not revolve—is the axle, and this axle is “the little fellow” [Alderman
Kenna] to every denizen of the district.128
The organized crime network from 1900 to 1919 did not have a “hub” and “spokes”
structure to it. There was one area of the network that somewhat resembled a hub and
spokes structure as part of the larger decentralized clustered pattern, but this was not the
part of the network where Aldermen Kenna and Coughlin and Captain Ryan were
situated. Aldermen Kenna and Coughlin resided in a dense part of the network with many
overlapping ties and no boss hierarchical structure.
Reporters and investigators occasionally attempted to identify the ambiguous
leadership with conflicting results, but their reports did have one thing in common—the
names provided for the Big Three through Seven were all men and all owners of large,
successful, and not always legitimate businesses in the Levees. Over time the list
included Roy Jones, George Little, Frank Wing, Ed Weiss, Jim Colosimo, Ferdinand
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Buxbaum, Ike Bloom, Samuel Hart, Samuel Harris, Ben Hyman, Tom Costello, Mike
Heitler, Mont Tennes, Solly Friedman, Jakey Adler, Harry Hopkins, Andy Craig, Louis
Weiss, Bob Gray, and John Jordan.129 Katie Adams, the vocal Progressive Era activist,
alleged that this group of men owned and managed 200 of the better-known brothels and
disorderly establishments of the Levee districts.130 For the most part, the reporters and
investigators’ lists that included these 23 “bosses” were congruous with the most central
criminals in the 1900 to 1919 organized crime network, but there were some
inconsistencies. Three of the names identified by reporters never connected to the
organized crime network. Of the remaining 20 bosses on the lists, all but 3 of them were
among the criminal elite in the organized crime network defined as the individuals with
the top 10 percent of all criminal ties. Aldermen Kenna and Coughlin’s Captain Michael
Ryan only had 5 ties in the organized crime network, when the average for the network
was 6 ties—so few ties would hardly establish him the “hub” of the vice “wheel.”
There were a few notable oversights from the reporters’ lists of bosses. Four men
in the organized crime network who were not named in the “bosses” lists were more
criminally central in the network than the 65 percent of the “bosses” on the reporters’
lists. These oversights included Maurice Van Bever and Johnny Torrio, two men who
worked for Jim Colosimo but had strong influence in organized crime. Johnny Torrio
would become an actual organized crime boss during Prohibition as measured by the
organized crime network and the historical record. The other two oversights were
Inspector Edward McCann and Frank Lewis who were co-conspirators in a large
protection ring on the West Side Levee around 1909.131 The exact qualities for making
reporters’ lists of bosses might have been based more on organizational roles, popularity
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of their local establishments, or details not otherwise preserved in the archives. The
organized crime network requires an aggregation and a cross section unavailable to the
reporters, but it does offer a bird’s-eye perspective of the decentralized and clustered
structure of organized crime—a structure that would be vastly different during
Prohibition.
Organized crime was decentralized with no clear leadership structure. There was
no core of individuals hoarding the resources contained within the network and no single
powerful individual controlling access to the resources. There were many brokers
connecting different sections of the network as organized crime was dominated by the
collection and distribution of graft and protection payments. These brokers were the
gatekeepers to organized crime often deciding which illicit entertainment businesses were
in and which were out. The diversity of gatekeepers and their localized territorial interests
increased women’s chances for connecting to the vice syndicate.
Shifting from the ambiguous and amorphous center of organized crime to the
margins reveals configurations of gambling den and brothel owners, thieves, sex workers,
housekeepers, and traffickers who all contributed to the size and structure of the
syndicate. The margins of the network contained individuals with fewer criminal ties who
were more weakly connected to organized crime. These were not the political bosses,
police officers, or the Big Five, but they were individuals coordinating and benefiting
from the organization of crime and protection in the Levees. What is often ignored in this
historical case is that the margins of organized crime included women.

69

	
  
The Women of the Syndicate
Dozens of women operated brothels, paid extortion fees, got arrested, posted bail,
trafficked other women, and attended political galas while embedded in Chicago’s
organized crime network from 1900 to 1919. Of the 267 organized crime individuals I
identified from 1900 to 1919, 47 of them (18 percent) were women. Nearly all of these 47
women (89 percent) were involved in the sex work economy either as brothel owners,
managers, operators, sex workers, clerks, or traffickers. Only one woman in the
organized crime network clearly had no connection to the sex work economy, and she
connected to organized crime through a co-arrest with her husband. The remaining four
women in the organized crime network were arrested by the police with four men while
at a saloon. These men and women were all regulars at the saloon, and they called upon
Frank Lewis to fix the judge in the case for them.132 It is possible that these four women
were sex workers, but police and morals inspectors often arrested unmarried women at
entertainment establishments incorrectly assuming that they were sex workers. With five
exceptions, women of the organized crime network in the first two decades of the
twentieth century were almost entirely within the sex work economy. It was the location
of their brothels and establishments within organized crime territories that facilitated their
entrée into organized crime.
As a point of comparison, 33 percent of the men in the organized crime network
were involved in the sex work economy, and 30 percent of men in the organized crime
network were involved in the gambling economy. Some men overlapped in both the sex
work and gambling economies. Organized crime individuals included those involved in
the gambling and sex work economies plus the positions of collectors, fixers, and corrupt
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police officers and local politicians. These were no women in these positions of collectors
or corrupt officials.
Women brothel owners could have been exploited by organized crime and forced
to pay into the protection market or face closing. This bittersweet arrangement exchanged
profits for protection from raids and prosecution, but both were expensive. May Ward
operated a brothel at 25 North Carpenter Street. She testified to the Civil Service
Commission in 1911 that Mike Heitler and Mike Fewer threatened to close her brothel on
multiple occasions unless she paid them $150.133 When May told collector Mike Fewer
that she would testify, he threatened her that if she testified, Chicago would not be a
pleasant place for her. She ran away to Michigan shortly after testifying, either by choice
or by force.134 May’s payments to Mike Fewer and Mike Heitler were the criminal
transactions that connected her to the organized crime network, but her case suggests
exploitation by members of organized crime rather than her seeking access to and
resources of organized crime.
Only 10 of the 47 women in organized crime also had marital and familial
relationships to men in organized crime. These marriage or family ties co-occurred with
criminal ties to the organized crime network—e.g., husbands and wives co-owning a
brothel or operating a trafficking ring together. It is remarkable that only 21 percent of
women from the early 1900s were connected to organized crime with their husbands or
male relatives. In predominantly male organizations, men are the gatekeepers to the
organization. A trusting relationship with a husband or male relative might be the only
way for women to access an organization that is largely closed to women. It appears,
however, that unmarried women could do just fine for themselves and married women
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did not necessarily need their husbands in organized crime in early twentieth century
Chicago. This pattern did not persist during Prohibition.
Not all ten of these women entered organized crime because of their husbands. At
least two women, Vic Shaw and Victoria Moresco, were brothel owners in the Levees
before their marriages to organized crime men. It was Vic and Victoria’s previous wealth
and Levee success before their marriages that arguably catapulted the organized crime
careers of their husbands, Roy Jones and Jim Colosimo. These husbands and wives might
have even met through organized crime. In the end, Vic and Victoria’s marriages to
organized crime men pushed both of the women out of organized crime upon their
divorces.
Husbands’ business failures entangled their wives in ways that husbands’
successes did not. Listings of brothels owned by men could have failed to acknowledge
wives contributions to the business, but when men failed at escaping prosecution often
their wives were also implicated in the legal cases. For example, Julia Van Bever worked
directly with her husband, Maurice, in trafficking and selling women to Jim Colosimo
and Victoria Moresco’s brothels. Julia’s success in the trafficking business was
dependent on her husband’s organized crime connections, but Maurice’s convictions also
implicated Julia. When police and prosecutors uncovered the Van Bever-Colosimo
trafficking operations, Jim and Victoria were insulted from prosecution because of their
legal ties and organized crime protection, whereas Maurice and Julia both received
sentences at Leavenworth prison.
No brothel in the Levee districts received as much positive and negative attention
as the Everleigh Club of 2131 South Dearborn Street. Owned and operated from 1900 to
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1911 by the mysterious, glamorous, and unmarried Everleigh sisters, Minna and Ada, the
Everleigh Club had the reputation as the most elite and luxurious brothel of Chicago.
Amid the gold piano, gold spittoons, gold plated room, and perfume fountain, on one
occasion German royalty and his entourage all drank champagne from the shoes of the
women working at the Everleigh Club.135
The Everleigh sisters were regular features of Aldermen Kenna and Coughlin’s
First Ward Democratic balls, and they escorted the Aldermen during the grand march.136
During the 1908 ball, Minna and Ada were spending $50 an hour on wine for their box,
when collector Ike Bloom called out to Minna “Keep it up, Minnie. You are the only live
one around here.”137 The Everleigh sisters funneled money to the Aldermen outside of the
balls as well. Minna testified that they contributed $3,000 to Aldermen Kenna and
Coughlin when the Alderman needed funds to defeat a legislative bill forbidding the sale
of liquor in brothels.138 Though competitors with many of the men business owners of the
Levee, the Everleigh sisters secured their position in the syndicate through a single tie to
Alderman Coughlin. Their criminal ties to organized crime were the privileged protection
their establishment received from Alderman Coughlin as thanks for their legitimate
political donations.
Their establishment was immune to raids and forced closings for almost 12
prosperous years, until 1911, when Mayor Harrison started to crack down on the Levees
and specifically ordered the closing of the Everleigh Club.139 The Levee was shocked by
the news, but the Everleigh sisters remained poised:
“I don’t worry about anything,” [Minna] continued… “You get everything in a
lifetime. Of course, if the mayor says we must close, that settles it. What the
mayor says go, so far as I am concerned. I’m not going to be sore about it either. I
never was a knocker, and nothing the police of this town can do to me will change
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my disposition. I’ll close up the shop and walk out of the place with a smile on
my face. Nobody else around here is worrying either,” she went on with a smile,
waving a hand literally coruscated with diamonds toward the parlor, from which
came sounds of music and bursts of laughter. “If the ship sinks we’re going down
with a cheer and a good drink under our belts, anyway.”140
There was a bit of a kerfuffle in the actual closing of the Everleigh Club. The official
orders were lost on someone’s desk for about 48 hours, but allegations were that the
Everleigh sisters paid a large sum of money for one final night of operation.141 By 1925,
the former Everleigh Club building on Dearborn Street had been converted into a
rooming house for black residents, which was demolished in 1933 by a wrecking ball.142
The Everleigh sisters and women like them were important and fascinating
figures in Chicago organized crime, but to say that women were part of organized crime
does not imply any sort of equal standing to men within the organization. Women were at
the margins of organized crime, making regular graft payments and arrangements with
fixers. In some cases like May Ward’s, organized crime men exploited women brothel
owners. Even in the decentralized structure of 1900 to 1919 organized crime, women
were not the collectors, fixers, or bosses, but rather they were paying members of the
protection syndicate.
The Closing of the Levees
The Levee districts were lightning rods for the large cultural debate around sex
work. On one side, the “segregationists” declared that the Levee districts were a
necessary evil in order to contain disease, enforce regulations, and keep sex work out of
residential neighborhoods.143 Segregationists even pressed the discipline of sociology into
service as the “practical proof” for their argument, though failing to offer any
sociological specifics.144 Their opponents, the “abolitionists,” wanted an end to sex work,
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which they equated to slavery, bondage, and the trafficking of women.145 Abolitionists
wanted the Levee districts shut down and the courts to go after brothels, madams, pimps,
and anyone profiting off of women’s bondage.146 In 1912, Chicago aldermen organized a
special aldermanic committee chaired by Alderman John Emerson in order to settle the
“vice question” regarding which position—segregation or abolition—was better for the
city. A five and a half hour debate between the segregationists and the abolitionists
transpired before the committee. The segregationists argued on the grounds of practicality
and history, “You can’t club morality into a person with a policeman’s club … There
always has been vice and there always will be. The thing to do is to place all those
women in a single district and force these illegal flats out of the residence sections. You
can’t drive out vice; you can only shift it.”147 The abolitionists rebutted with their own
counts of the number of women trafficked to the segregated red-light districts and argued
that segregation inflated the supply of sex workers beyond the demand:
Segregation creates a neglect on the part of the public. It fosters a ‘don’t care’
spirit toward the question, while scattering incites the public to attention, puts the
public on guard. … This ‘don’t care’ spirit on the part of the public allows the
vice interests to overestimate the demand and establish ways of recruiting the
supply by most obnoxious methods. This recruiting has given rise to the awful
white slavery of today.148
Abolitionists frequently incited fears of racial mixing between black and whites through
comments on white slavery and allegations that the majority of brothel workers were
black.149
The aldermanic special committee and debate did not resolve the “vice question”
for Chicago largely because city officials attempted to remain agnostic in the broader
cultural debate. Members of the Chicago Police Department argued that abolition would
scatter sex work around the city requiring ten times as many police officers to maintain
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similar levels of control.150 Mayor Harrison said that the matter should be left up to the
voters.151 Officials were more comfortable riding out the impassioned debates with a
neutral position than to risk upsetting the voters and disrupting the money of the red-light
districts.
Chicago abolitionists believed they had won when Illinois State’s Attorney John
Wayman officially closed the Levees in 1912.152 The closings occurred shortly after
Congress passed the Mann Act, officially the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910 which
prohibited crossing state lines with women for immoral purposes.153 Global forces also
shaped the sex work economy, as protecting soldiers from venereal disease during the
First World War became a major public health concern for the War Department.154 It was
also the case that segregationists and city officials had a harder time defending the Levees
against abolitionists as investigations continued to uncover the increasing control of
organized crime. Segregationists’ arguments faltered in the face of a new conception of
the problem—pimps and “male parasites” were no longer just profiting off of women,
they had organized a vice ring that was infiltrating and corrupting public offices.155
The Levees transformed in response to the closing. A 22nd Street Levee bartender
waxed philosophically, “The levee is on th’ bum for true. They’s no telling’ when
things’ll be opened up right again.”156 In 1916, Chicago Tribune writer Henry Hyde
walked the Levee for his series on the aftermath of their closing:
It is 1 o’clock in the morning. The trolley car stops at State and Twenty-second
streets. … This is the heart of the old red light district, the bad lands, the lava
beds, of international notoriety. At this hour, little more than three years ago, the
“line” was just waking up for its night’s work. … Tonight the district is dark and
silent. There are no lights of any color. It is like landing in some remote and
ruined city devastated by the plague. … Not only are the House of All Nations,
the Everleigh club, the California, Tokio, the Mecca, and all the other notorious
resorts tightly closed, but the buildings which they occupied are utterly deserted.
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Not only are they deserted, but many of them stand only as empty shells. They
have been looted and gutted until nothing but the outer walls and an occasional
stairway is left in place. In many of the buildings, which formerly rented for $200
or $300 a month, the front door swings open to the touch. One steps in and his
feet crunch an inch deep layer of plaster and glass. The very doors are gone. All
the lead pipe, plumbing fixtures, gaspipe, and hardware long ago disappeared.
The plastering has been ripped off the walls. An internal cyclone could have
wrought no more complete havoc.157
This abolitionist win was not a loss for organized crime. The closing of the Levee
districts forced brothels underground and scattered them throughout working-class
residential neighborhoods.158 With the brothels underground, the large dance clubs and
all-night saloons and cafes that coordinated meetings between sex workers and clients
had even less competition. This was not a new type of sex work in the Levees, but it was
more covert than the sex work of the former, large, and famous brothels.
In spite of reports like Henry Hyde’s about the destruction and abandonment of
the Levees, contradicting reports of raids and massive arrests suggested that the former
22nd Street Levee had remained under the rule of “vice kings.”159 These unnamed vice
kings had mention again in 1914 when a private detective and ex-police officer, Harry
Cullett, attempted to bribe the head of the Morals Inspection Bureau, W. C. Dannenberg
to permit the reopening of the 22nd Street Levee district.160 Cullett claimed to represent
ten times more resort owners than had been around in the old Levee district and promised
the inspectors up to $2,200 a month (about $52,000 a month in 2015 dollars).161 Cullett’s
claim of “ten times more resort owners” in the former 22nd Street Levee suggests that the
protection market had grown dramatically following the closing of the Levees.
Even with organized crime’s increasing protection market, the powers remained
scattered and largely undefined. Officer 666’s anonymous account in the Chicago
Tribune alleged that in 1914 there were three protection rings competing with each other:
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one led by Jim Colosimo with Maurice Van Bever and Johnny Torrio; one led by Julius
and Charles Maibaum, who took Ed Weiss’ places under their wing; and the third by
brothers Joe and Bill Marshall.162 Officer 666 was among the first to acknowledge
Johnny Torrio and Maurice Van Bever’s importance to organized crime. These two were
among the criminal elite of the organized crime network, but reporters and investigators
underestimated their roles when naming vice syndicate “bosses.” Julius and Charles
Maibaum were in the organized crime network each with five criminal ties, and the
Marshall brothers never connected to the organized crime network. From the perspective
of the organized crime network, the Marshall and Maibaum brothers were far from
competitors with Torrio and Van Bever who were among the most criminally connected.
In 1917, a big case for Illinois State’s Attorney Hoyne painted a centralized
organized crime triumvirate that appeared to be largely for prosecution purposes more so
than actually having cracked the decentralized clustered organized crime network.
Hoyne’s men raided a luxury office at 109 North Dearborn Street and discovered Tom
Costello, Mike Heitler, William Skidmore, and Lieutenant Martin White sorting through
packages of money secured by rubber bands.163 The raid also uncovered Lieutenant
White carrying a small Moroccan leather notebook that included lists of protected hotels,
brothels, and saloons. A page in the notebook contained the heading “Can be raided,” and
underneath the heading was a list of names and partial addresses.164 Hoyne submitted this
notebook as evidence of the police departments’ control and efficacy in the new
forbidden red-light districts.165 He argued that the “rulers of the vice world” were
Costello, Heitler, and Skidmore—names familiar from the days before the Levees closed
and all well connected members in the organized crime network. The “rulers of the vice

78

	
  
world” were protected by Chief of Police Charles Healey who personally netted about
$25,000 a year as beneficiary to the vice ring (about $460,000 in 2015 dollars).166 Hoyne
built his case only against the West Side vice ring, but he noted that the existence of a
second vice ring operating in Chicago about which he had nothing more to say.
Head of the West Side vice ring, Tom Costello turned state’s witness in the case
against Chief of Police Healey. In his testimony, Costello detailed how the Chicago
police department had become “a veritable bribe assessing and collection machine with
Healey the master grafter.”167 One of the details that got buried in Costello’s hours of
testimony against Chief Healey was an interaction that Costello had with Johnny
Torrio.168 Torrio knew that Costello had connections to Chief Healy and to members of
the prostitution fighting investigatory Committee of Fifteen, so Torrio went to Costello to
buy into the protection syndicate for his brothel and five brothels of his associates.
Costello agreed, and the next day Torrio took Costello and Harrison Streeter of the
Committee of Fifteen for a drive in his Studebaker to show them the six brothels
requiring protection. Torrio drove the men to the former 22nd Street Levee where the six
brothels were located. Near the Vestibule and the De Luxe were two women owned
brothels, Emily Marshall and Georgie Spencer’s places. Emily and Georgie’s envelopes
of cash to Johnny Torrio who passed them to Costello who passed them to Chief Healy
secured their positions in the organized crime network. Brothels were forced underground
when the Levees closed making the protection market even more lucrative. However,
territory still mattered to organized crime as demonstrated by Johnny Torrio’s Studebaker
tour of his establishments. Moreover, women’s brothels, even when underground and
covert, were still able to enter the organized crime network.
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The closing of the Levees was essentially the closing of the large, prosperous, and
most famous brothels of Chicago—brothels owned by men and women. Several
organized crime women, like the Everleigh sisters, closed up shop and left their Chicago
playground. Others, like Vic Shaw, moved to smaller and more discrete locations within
the former Levees or farther out into residential districts.169 Mayor Harrison closed Jim
Colosimo’s café and cabaret, but Jim transferred the title over to Victoria Moresco and
she was able to keep it open in the 22nd Street Levee.170 Georgie Spencer and Emily
Marshall accessed the protection of organized crime and the bawdy reputation of the
former Levees with their brothels five years after the closing. Organized crime women
continued to traffic women for the sex work rings running out of brothels, hotels, and
saloons.171 Sex workers even returned to their old Levee brothels according to a
Committee of Fifteen complaint to Mayor Harrison alleging that the old “vice kings” had
purchased the brothel buildings, converted them into hotels and saloons, and re-hired the
sex workers to solicit from the back rooms.172 Locations still mattered for women’s
entrée to the organized crime network.
Conclusion
Sex work was technically legal at the turn of the twentieth century, but shifting
and ambiguous laws and their enforcement made sex work risky and profitable business.
Chicago’s vices of gambling, sex work, and alcohol concentrated within the segregated
red-light districts known as the Levee districts. Organized crime developed in the Levees
as a loose protection market connecting illicit entertainment business owners with
corrupted ward politicians and police officers. Organized crime’s nearly exclusive focus
on protection forced organized crime to be territorial because the protection market
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required the concentrated locations of illicit businesses. Organized crime was also
decentralized at this time with no clear leadership core. Women had greater opportunities
of being in the organized crime network when the structure of the organized crime
network was small and decentralized and the market of organized crime was open and
territorial.
Women’s brothels were among the many illicit entertainment establishments
requiring protection in the Levees, and women connected to organized crime through
their payments into and their benefits from the protection market. There were 47 women
in the organized crime network from 1900 to 1919, and 89 percent of these women were
involved in the sex work economy. Women did not require marriage and family
relationships to organized crime men in order to connect to the organized crime network.
Much of what was to become of Chicago organized crime in the following years
of Prohibition was imprinted by a particular trajectory that began in the early 1900s: the
districts, the blocks, the illicit entertainment economies, and some of the men. The same
was not true for organized crime women. During Prohibition, women’s relationships to
organized crime became increasingly dependent on their marital and familial
relationships to organized crime men. Women brothel owners and other women
entrepreneurs no longer entered organized crime through their business locations alone.
Organized crime’s interest in the sex economy grew during Prohibition, but its interests
excluded the increasing percentage of women brothel owners across Chicago. Women
bootleggers and moonshiners operated on a small domestic scale in isolation from
organized crime. Relations trumped locations for women entrée to organized crime
during Prohibition when locations had served women well before Prohibition.
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CHAPTER 3
WOMEN IN CHICAGO ORGANIZED CRIME, 1920-1933
US Prohibition, from 1920 to 1933, was a law which banned the production,
transportation, and sale of intoxicating beverages, which essentially shifted legitimate
alcohol production and legitimate alcohol selling establishments into the criminal
economy. The societal changes introduced by Prohibition not only created the crime of
violating liquor laws, but these changes also mobilized and refashioned pre-existing
criminal organizations. Prohibition was an exogenous shock to the Chicago organized
crime network. Whereas organized crime before Prohibition revolved around the
protection and exploitation of illicit entertainment economies in Chicago’s Levee
districts, organized crime during Prohibition added the product of intoxicating beverages.
This new product required space, transportation, distribution, and protection. Operating
gambling and prostitution resorts during Prohibition required keeping the beer and liquor
flowing, and these original illicit entertainment economies of organized crime became
even more profitable when complimented by illegal booze. Speakeasies, gambling dens,
and brothels formed an important part of the distribution network that connected booze to
thirsty customers.
The organized crime network tripled in size and became more sparse and
centralized with a clearer leadership structure at the core. Powerful men at the center of
the network became even more powerful. Organized crime expanded its operations
beyond the protection market to large-scale production and distribution of booze. Rather
than the territorial concentration in the Levee districts, Chicago organized crime’s
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production and protection spread geographically across the city, into the villages outside
Chicago, and to some neighboring states.
The organizational restructuring of crime mobilized men and excluded women.
Women made up only 4 percent of the Prohibition organized crime network even as
women’s proportion of alcohol and sex work activities and properties around Chicago
were increasing. Women could no longer connect to organized crime solely through the
location of their illicit businesses in organized crime territory. Relations trumped
locations as the means of connecting to organized crime, and women could not access the
relationships to organized crime like men. Women of the Prohibition organized crime
network included silent wives, alibis, victims, entrappers, and public enemies. The
majority of women (66 percent) accessed organized crime through relationships with
their husbands, romantic partners, or male family members.
Chicago organized crime changed dramatically during Prohibition in terms of its
product, its geographic reach, scale, organizational centralization, and its power and
influence. Participating in the restructured form of organized crime required relations
more so than locations. Organized crime developed beyond its territorial focus of
scooping up illicit entertainment business of the Levee districts to include in its
protection market. During Prohibition, relationships became the main way to connect to
the organization that was growing in size and geographic reach. Clear criminalization of
the alcohol market required trusting relationships between criminal associates. In this
chapter, I argue that even as women made up a growing percentage of the alcohol and sex
work locations, they had less access to the types of relationships that would connect them
to organized crime. This lack of connection left women’s businesses vulnerable to raids
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and prosecution and minimized the profitability of their businesses. Essentially, the
shifting structures of Chicago organized crime left women behind.
The Amendments
Progressive Era activism achieved two constitutional amendments in 1919: the
Prohibition of alcohol and women’s right to vote. The anti-alcohol temperance movement
and women’s suffrage movement coincided temporally and overlapped in membership.1
Both were strong movements that had multiple successes at the state levels. The
temperance movement engaged in some of the largest and most aggressive lobbying
efforts the US had ever seen.2 The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union had more
members than entire suffragists’ movements, but there was considerable overlap between
the two.3 Elite and educated women organized around saving poor women from violent
drunk husbands who were squandering the household income at the local saloon.4 The
momentum of women’s increasing political involvement and influence in the temperance
movement motivated national brewers and distillers to lobby against women’s suffrage.5
States passing suffrage laws tended to be in the West and had increasing opportunity
structures for women in education, work, political organizing, and property ownership.6
In 1913, Illinois became the first state east of the Mississippi to grant women the right to
vote in municipal elections and presidential primaries, but women’s ballots were counted
separately from men’s ballots.7
The temperance movement gained momentum during WWI with increasing antiGerman sentiment, “bread, not beer” campaigns to support the soldiers abroad, and antiimmigrant alarm targeting the growing populations of urban poor.8 As a result, WWI
effectively silenced working-class and immigrant opponents to Prohibition. In 1919, both
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the temperance and suffrage movements achieved constitutional reform with the passing
of the 18th and 19th Amendments to the US Constitution. The 18th Amendment, or
Prohibition in the shorthand, banned the production, transportation, and sale of
intoxicating beverages. Prohibition went into effect on January 17, 1920. Congress
approved the 19th Amendment giving women the right to vote in 1919, but it was not
ratified by the states into law until August of 1920. Illinois was among the bulk of the
states that ratified the 18th Amendment in January 1919 and was among the first states to
ratify the 19th Amendment in June 1919.
From 1920 until 1933, the United States conducted the “noble experiment” of
Prohibition. The state of Illinois had largely ignored the Wartime Prohibition Act that
began in July 1919, so January 17, 1920 was the first day of major consequence
regarding the anti-alcohol legislation and prosecution.9 The eve of Prohibition was an
especially busy day for liquor sales as citizens of Chicago stocked their home supplies.10
The law permitted personal consumption and storage of alcohol—a Prohibition perk
available to the wealthy. At midnight, the Chicago drys (i.e., supporters of Prohibition)
sang songs to a symbolic John Barleycorn, Chicago’s head of Prohibition enforcement
discussed a 10-day grace period for saloon owners to register their alcohol stock with
federal agents, and police responded to 20 incidents of alcohol robbery.11 Prohibition
related crimes had begun.
The 18th Amendment was the first amendment to the Constitution that limited
rather than protected individual freedom.12 Prohibition’s controversial invasion of home
and leisure generated massive disregard for the law and, as a result, incredible
profitability for those who organized the production and sale of booze. Prohibition
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triggered unprecedented corruption: Chicago’s elite received alcohol home delivery,
politicians voted for dry laws while wetting their palates with bootleg booze, judges had
access to the best Canadian imports, law enforcement salaries multiplied through bribes,
and federal Prohibition agents engaged in graft.13 Short supply and high demand kept the
local bootleggers of Chicago busy. Four years into Prohibition, reporter Arthur Evans
wrote a three part series for the Chicago Tribune on the conditions in Chicago under
Prohibition; Evans and the unnamed politician he interviewed for the article accused
“alien” immigrants of supplying Chicago’s “Americans” with poisonous booze:
Homemade wine has no patrons for it is considered too tame, while beer is larded
as nothing more than a chaser. The call is for something with quick and fiery
action, something volcanic. … There are spots on the west side where at night
when the clouds are low, the streets reek with smells like a distillery in prewar
days. … Bootleggers with bottles in their pockets in black grips prowl the streets.
The hooch addict has no trouble in locating a source of supply. As fast as the
police hammer it down in one spot it rises in another. … The stuff goes at 25 or
50 cents a flask in the general run. … “And for the most part the moon is being
made and bootlegged by alien foreigners who are not citizens, but who are getting
rich poisoning Americans. There are some foreign districts in Chicago where half
the alien population seems to be moonshining and those who don’t make moon
are bootlegging the stuff.”14
Evans and the anonymous politician’s accusations against Chicago immigrants and their
“fiery” booze focused on domestic production in tenements and Chicago slums,
perpetuating the anti-immigrant sentiment that pushed forward the 18th Amendment.
However, Chicago’s alcohol production and distribution was not limited to the domestic
sphere, and residents from all walks of life were cashing in on Prohibition profits.
Soda shops, pharmacies, and cigar stores became fronts for booze peddling.
Doctors’ prescriptions, diluted industrial-grade alcohol, and homemade batches of wine,
beer, and moonshine could not keep up with the dry nation’s thirst. Hundreds of gallons
of Canadian whiskey arrived in Chicago via the railroad.15 Whatever the source, the
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profits of pouring beer and liquor in Chicago were unprecedented. Harry Harris of
Chicago organized crime elaborated on the Prohibition cash flow:
Good whiskey was just like gold and it was nothing to get $120 for a case of
whiskey them days. … It was nothing to see a fellow with a couple of grand in his
pocket when before prohibition a five dollar bill would have been lots of money
to him.16
As Harry Harris’s comments indicate, there was a scale to the production and
profits of Prohibition. On one side of the scale, anyone with access to an appliance store,
a screwdriver, and a set of pliers could build a profitable home still; any man with an
overcoat full of interior pockets could turn himself into a walking saloon; and any women
could sell individual shots from her moonshine jar hiding under her kitchen sink.17 These
were substantial profits for these individuals and their families, but they were localized
profits generated within neighborhoods and from acquaintances. Although bootlegging
income could help a struggling family, especially during the Depression of 1929, average
families were not walking around with a “couple of grand” in their pockets like Harry
Harrison.
On the other side of the scale, Harry Harrison and other members of organized
crime took over local breweries, divided the city into distribution territories, robbed
federal facilities where confiscated alcohol was stored, and coordinated the international
smuggling of imported alcohol.18 A family’s production of alcohol was no competition
for organized crime. Organized crime’s mass production, coordination, and distribution
ignored small batches of domestic product. However, domestic production and smallscale distribution were one of the few ways women took advantage of the mass profits
generated by the 18th Amendment.
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The Women of Prohibition
Historians have consistently documented women’s domestic roles in brewing and
distilling throughout history, dispelling popular notions that brewing was only men’s
work. In medieval England, women brewed and sold the majority of all the beer
consumed, as it was domestic work denoted by the gendered term “brewster.”19 During
US Reconstruction, the distillers of “mountain dew” in the southern Appalachian
Mountains were predominantly men, but in the rural mountain communities where
distilling was a family affair, some wives gave the tax collectors unreliable information
regarding the location of distilleries, warned the neighbors when government raiders were
approaching, or even fired shots at the raiders.20 Occasionally, widows and daughters
inherited the equipment, skills, and knowledge to continue producing moonshine after the
men in their families had died.21
Women were an important part of bootlegging and moonshining during
Prohibition across the US and especially in Chicago. Historical research on Prohibition in
the rural US found that women turned their kitchens into moneymaking machines with
home brewing and distilling.22 Chicago cases suggest a similar economy for urban
women when residents complained in letters to Mayor Dever that Italian women were
selling barrels of wine and booze from their apartments.23 Observers of Chicago
moonshine cases noted that even though few women were sent to Bridewell prison
compared to men, women’s cases were increasing.24 The Illinois Humane Society
handled 221 moonshine cases in 1922 and nearly 12 percent of them were women
defendants, a figure that was up from the previous year.25 However, for better or worse,
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Chicago women moonshiners operated in the domestic and family sphere in isolation
from organized crime.
There were two separate scales to Prohibition production and profits: the domestic
scale and organized crime’s scale. On the domestic scale, bootlegging and moonshining
were family affairs. According to the Chicago Tribune, “Little girls, daughters of
moonshiners whose dingy kitchens had been transformed into distilleries, delivered half
pints to customers of 35 cents.”26 Children lied to the police officers about their fathers’
employment. For example, when policemen in plainclothes asked a 7-year-old Italian boy
what his father did for a living, he demonstrated some quick thinking: “[I] told them that
he worked on the railroad and I told that he didn’t make moonshine when they asked
me.” One of the officers offered the boy some candy, saying they were friends and
customers of his father’s and they were there to buy a few cans of alcohol. “I stuck to my
story … and when my dad came back and I told him about the incident, he was so tickled
with me and so pleased that he took me down, and he gave me a dollar.”27
Converting the domestic sphere into a profit-generating enterprise meant having
and maintaining roofs over families’ heads. German families converted their homes into
beer flats where neighbors could spend the evening drinking beer and spending time with
the family for a small fee. The Mullers were one such family whose beer flat was an
important contributor to the family economy:
Their home was an old wooden shack. There were at least half dozen children
playing on the floor which was greasy and dirty. The family consisted of Mr. and
Mrs. [Muller] and about nine children some married who lived there with their
wives or husbands. On top of all this there were about seven fellows and girls who
lived with them and no one worked. Mrs. [Muller] was a tall slim woman who
loved to drink. The old man was a huge giant, he could hardly talk any English.
They were the typical German type. I looked over the place, the furniture was
scant. For a kitchen table they had an old wine barrel with a board over it. There
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were not enough chairs and many had to sit on the floor. … The old man loved his
beer. He bathed in it. The home as a whole looked more like a stable.
Nevertheless we went here quite often as a pretty nice bunch of fellows hung
here. … The old lady [Muller] was rocking one of the kids to sleep on her lap and
in one hand she had a drinking glass filled to the brim with whiskey of which she
occasionally took a drink now and then. This family could live on whiskey. Even
the children drank it.28
During Prohibition, family homes such as the Mullers became important social
institutions in Chicago neighborhoods. Men and women found these social connections in
these informal social spaces important for reasons beyond the alcohol and
companionship. Cigarette Mamie, for instance, was an Irish “short chubby woman with
coal black hair,” and she and her husband turned their home into an alehouse.29 They
made good money selling beer and whiskey, but Cigarette Mamie was also a matriarch of
the neighborhood: “Mamie could fight like a man and God help the one she hit. All the
women in the neighborhood went to her in time of need or whenever any difficulty arose,
she would always help them. The people looked upon her as a sort of advisor.”30
In many ways these informal beer flats and alehouses were not terribly different
than the informal brothels and disorderly flats scattered around the city, and homes could
function as both. Women continued to find criminal opportunities during Prohibition, but
their businesses and connections to organized crime only extended as far the walls of
their homes. Upon his release from prison, a young man returned to his mother’s brothel
where he knew he could also get a drink:
One of the girls my mother had staying with her came over and said, “Hello,
Baby. How are you?” I told her I was fine and asked her if I could buy a drink.
She said she did not know if Rose had any or not that she would go see. I knew
that mother always had it but she told the girls never to say she had whiskey until
she saw who wanted it. When my mother came in the front room to see if she
knew who wanted the drink she looked at me and started to say something. But
when she saw it was me tears stopped whatever she had in mind.31
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Rose’s home functioning as a brothel provided housing and employment for herself and
the women who worked for her, as well as a place to land for family and friends. Alcohol
sales increased their profits. Brothels were illegal spaces and because of the trust required
between clients and workers, brothels became a safe place to ask for a drink. Rose
controlled the pouring of whiskey at her establishment, so that liquor violations were not
flagrant.
Illicit domestic work meant a home by day and a workplace by night without the
additional expense of renting commercial spaces. The informality and small scale of the
enterprise made for a quick cover in case of a raid. However, when the raids did come,
there were no resources or protection for escaping prosecution. Women’s domestic
moonshining and bootlegging operated outside a protection market, and the legal
consequences and sentences were severe.
Moonshine Mary, 34 years old, was an immigrant from Poland and a mother of
three young children. Her husband was chronically ill, so in 1923 she turned their small
cottage into a blind pig (slang for an illegal saloon). She sold drinks at 15 cents apiece
poured from her bottle of home-brewed moonshine. The Chicago Tribune reported on
Mary because she was charged with manslaughter for selling the moonshine that
poisoned a man. The report from the coroner’s chemist stated that the man died from
wood alcohol poisoning. Moonshine Mary received a one-year to life sentence in Joliet
state prison and was the first woman (though certainly not the last) in the state of Illinois
convicted of manslaughter for selling poisonous moonshine. Moonshine Mary’s
ridiculously long jail sentence speaks to her complete lack of legal resources.32
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Considering the domestic scale of Prohibition production and profits, it is no
surprise that women turned moonshining and bootlegging into family or women’s work.
To examine women’s participation in the Prohibition economy, I identified 500 alcohol
related addresses in Chicago that included information on proprietors, co-proprietors,
operators, or managers from 1900 to 1933. Half of these addresses were from the first
decade, 1900 to 1909. Alcohol-related spaces included saloons, speakeasies, restaurants
serving alcohol illegally, and breweries, but also domestic spaces like blind pigs and beer
flats as well as domestic alcohol sales. Many of these addresses had no connection to
organized crime. The line graph in Figure 2 shows an overall increase in the percent of
addresses that involved women as proprietors, co-proprietors, operators, or managers
from 1900 to 1933.
Figure 2: Women’s percent of alcohol related addresses in Chicago, 1900-1933
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The percent of women’s alcohol locations increased steadily across all decades
with the biggest increase occurring between the 1910s and 1920s, when Prohibition

102

	
  
began. In the first decade of the twentieth century women were only involved in 3 percent
of alcohol-related locations. Before Prohibition, these were establishments that violated
local liquor laws such as closing hours and unaccompanied women in saloons. Women’s
involvement in alcohol-related locations increased to 12 percent the decade before
Prohibition, 26 percent in the first 10 years of Prohibition, and 29 percent in the last 4
years of Prohibition. In summary, women found increasing opportunity in alcohol-related
crime: Prohibition was not an economy that excluded women. This research corrects the
misconception that Prohibition was a men’s economy, only affecting men’s drinking and
men’s violations of liquor laws.
Women were a rather substantial part of the small-scale domestic bootlegging and
moonshining in Chicago. Families like the Mullers and individuals like Cigarette Mamie
and Moonshine Mary are examples of criminal relationships that were localized
interactions between sellers and buyers. In many of these cases, women produced their
own alcohol; in other cases, it was not clear where women bought their product.
Moreover, these were not syndicated criminal relationships connected to the larger and
more powerful organized crime network of Chicago; rather, women were operating in
isolation and separate from organized crime. Women’s earnings, like Cigarette Mamie’s
several dollars a night or Moonshine Mary’s 15 cents a glass, were not competition for
the larger beer barons of Chicago. Women’s profits were so small that they were either
not noticed by organized crime or organized crime tolerated this tiny cut into its market.
Before Prohibition, the bulk of the criminal relationships in Chicago’s organized
crime network was the coordination and graft in the protection market. Locations in
organized crime territories provided entrée into the protection market when men and
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women owners of illicit establishments connected to organized crime through payments.
During Prohibition, organized crime’s markets diversified beyond the protection market
to include large-scale bootlegging and eventually labor racketeering, racetracks, and
investments in legitimate businesses. Organized crime had moved outside of the Levee
districts, across Chicago, into the villages outside the city, and, occasionally, into
neighboring states. Organized crime and its restructured protection market largely
ignored women’s localized illicit establishments that produced and sold alcohol.
Organized crime still laid claim to the geographic space, but it did so without women
owners, even though women’s alcohol locations were increasing elsewhere in the city.
Locations no longer provided entrée to the organized crime network.
The Syndicate
Prohibition was an exogenous shock to the Chicago organized crime network, and
the organizational structures shifted dramatically over the 14 years of Prohibition. The
organized crime network grew to include three times more individuals and four times
more criminal relationships than before Prohibition. The restructuring of organized crime
resulted in a sparser and more centralized network, and the individuals in the powerful
core become even more powerful. Gone were the decentralized structure and ambiguous
leadership of organized crime’s protection market in Chicago’s Levee districts. However,
the Levees, the illicit entertainment economies, and some of the men from the preProhibition organized crime network imprinted the organizational restructuring during
Prohibition.
Among the ambiguous leadership of pre-Prohibition organized crime was Jim
Colosimo, who had been the most central individual in the organized crime network
104

	
  
before Prohibition because he had the highest number of criminal ties (n=43) in the
network. Most of his ties were to other members of Chicago’s underworld, but he
maintained a few close ties to local ward politicians. Jim’s famous Colosimo’s Café was
the property of his wife, Victoria Moresco. Notably, around 1917, Colosimo’s Café
began to feature cabaret singer Dale Winter.33 Jim Colosimo, smitten with his new singer,
hired his Italian professional singer friends to train her in opera.34 Eventually, Jim kicked
Victoria out of their house on Vernon Avenue, and invited Dale to move in with promises
of marrying her as soon as his divorce to Victoria was finalized.35 Upon their divorce in
1920, Victoria Moresco left Chicago and ultimately left the organized crime network.
On May 11, 1920, only one week after returning from his honeymoon with Dale
Winter and only several months after Prohibition had gone into effect, Jim Colosimo was
murdered at his own café at 2126-2128 South Wabash Avenue. He was shot in the head
by a single bullet. The theories of the Colosimo murder varied widely to include a Black
Hand vendetta, political fight, labor union conflict, a jealous ex-wife, a jealous admirer of
his new wife, or Johnny Torrio—Colosimo and Moresco’s right-hand man—wanting
greater control of organized crime’s direction under Prohibition. Colosimo’s murder was
never solved.36
The common narrative of organized crime was that with Colosimo gone, Johnny
Torrio was able to take over Colosimo’s empire. The Chicago Tribune reported this
narrative around 1925 when Torrio’s organized crime leadership was clear.37 Historical
sources such as Herbert Asbury’s 1940 Gem of the Prairie and John Landesco’s 1929
Organized Crime in Chicago preserved the narrative of Torrio’s succession to Colosimo,
and the narrative persists in contemporary popular nonfiction.38 The Colosimo-Torrio
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succession narrative is consistent with the organized crime networks. Colosimo was the
most central individual in the small and decentralized organized crime network before
Prohibition when Torrio was among the criminal elite. Colosimo’s death in the early
months of the 14-year Prohibition network left him with only 7 criminal ties within
organized crime compared to Torrio’s 68 criminal ties.
Torrio’s rise in organized crime began before Prohibition. Torrio took over
management of Colosimo’s brothels and expanded his own prostitution operations to the
Chicago suburb of Burnham around 1916, four years before Colosimo’s murder.39 By
1920, Torrio was well-established around Chicago as one of the “vice kings” of the
prostitution syndicate, and he continued to run his resorts during Prohibition, raking in
even greater profits. The dramatic shift for Torrio during Prohibition was his relentless
pursuit of flowing beer and liquor into the city of Chicago and its neighboring villages.40
By 1924, Chicago Tribune reporters wrote openly about Torrio’s leadership and control
of organized crime and organized crime’s geographic spread from the former 22nd Street
Levee to the suburb of Cicero:
Torrio, before prohibition, was a south side red light personage. With Al Brown
as his aid, he kept many a disorderly house running, sometimes with police on
guard to see that no stray copper interfered. But prohibition made that a piker
game and Johnny went to beer running. From that to Cicero and overlordship of
everything. His lieutenants have moved from the 22nd and Wabash neighborhood
to fine homes in Cicero, limousines, and complete power through control of
elections.41
The “Al Brown” mentioned in the quotation was none other than Torrio’s aid and
protégé, Al Capone. Arriving in Chicago from New York around 1919 by invitation from
his mentor Torrio, Al Capone worked as a bodyguard for Jim Colosimo and a bouncer for
Colosimo’s brothels and cabaret.42 Capone’s family, including his siblings, mother, and
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new wife and son, joined him in Chicago. Little did anyone know, Chicago had imported
a legend.
Capone’s earliest mentions in the Chicago Tribune appeared, under his
pseudonym Al Brown, in 1921 when he was arrested during a raid on suburban gambling
establishments.43 He pled guilty and paid $150 in fines for running two gambling and
prostitution houses in the suburban village of Burnham.44 Capone’s temper landed him
his next, and more famous, mention in the newspapers in 1922 when he was driving
while intoxicated and hit a taxicab requiring the hospitalization of the taxi driver.45
Aggravating the situation, Capone flashed a sheriff’s badge and waved around a revolver
while threatening to shoot one of the witnesses to the accident. According to the Chicago
Tribune report:
Taken to the Central station, Caponi [Al Capone] threatened the arresting officer
with immediate discharge and promised his “pull” would make things unhealthy
for his prosecutors. ‘I’ll fix this thing so easy you won’t know how it’s done,’ he
is alleged to have boasted. He was locked up and later bailed out.46
Over the next year or two, Al Capone was barely mentioned in Chicago press
except as the owner of the Four Deuces, the infamous bawdy house at 2222 South
Wabash Avenue, and as an assistant to Johnny Torrio.47 Torrio appeared in the
newspapers with much more regularity in the early years of Prohibition regarding his
takeover of area breweries and collusion with famous brewers.48 Meanwhile, Al Capone
was purchasing used delivery trucks for Torrio.49 Police and media attention on Al
Capone as a more serious member of Torrio’s crew began around 1923 when Capone was
one of many suspects in the murders of several bootleggers.50
Around this time, Torrio had also taken over the village of Cicero during a violent
election in April 1924. On election day, about 20 precinct workers were kidnapped, and
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Al Capone’s brother Salvatore (a.k.a. Frank) was killed during a shootout with police, but
Mayor Klenha won his re-election by 1,000 votes.51 Reports in the Chicago Tribune
described interviews with horrified judges who recognized organized crime’s control of
Cicero:
Judge Jarecki declared from his own personal observation and from testimony
before him the election was the worst in many years. Kidnapping, slugging,
intimidation, illegal voting and general terrorism were the order of the day, he
declared, with the spoils of victory being control of the booze, gambling, and the
vice business of that city. [Ten] or more gunmen entered the polling place … and
chased 75 voters out of the place. The sluggers even searched the policemen
stationed there, the judges and clerks said. … [According to Judge Jarecki,]
“Practically all the dirty work was done by Chicago gangsters hired to go there
and swing the election. The beer runners were all interested in the election, I am
told, and Chicago’s best gunmen were there to kill or terrorize whatever voters
and workers were opposed to whichever candidates were friends of the
gunmen.”52
That particular election day coined the phrase, “When you smell gunpowder, you’re in
Cicero.”53 Chicago politics and law enforcement did not extend to the western suburb of
Cicero, permitting organized crime more physical space and new police offices ripe for
corruption. There were 161 saloons operating in the village of Cicero in 1924, all
supplied with Torrio’s booze.54 For some unidentified reason, Torrio never permitted
brothels in Cicero; he only maintained brothels in the nearby villages of Stickney and
Burnham.55
What had become very clear by 1924 was that Chicago organized crime finally
had a boss. Torrio had been among the most central individuals in the pre-Prohibition
organized crime network, but he was the only individual who became even more central
in the Prohibition organized crime network. What Chicago Tribune reporters and
Progressive Era activists had occasionally called the “vice trust” or the “vice syndicate”
had become Torrio’s Syndicate.56
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Torrio organized distribution territories and ensured that buyers remained loyal.
As “overlord of the underworld,” Torrio charged $50 for a barrel of beer (about $700 in
2015 dollars), but his price included protection.57 Although there are no estimates of how
many people worked for him, Torrio’s weekly payroll was estimated at $25,000
(approximately $348,000 a week in 2015 dollars).58 If his payroll were divided equally
among his 68 criminal associates in the organized crime network, each associate would
have earned $19,000 a year or $264,000 in 2015 dollars. Torrio organized crime and
collected profits at levels that had been impossible in the Levee district protection market
before Prohibition. Five years into Prohibition, the Chicago Tribune attributed nearly all
of Chicago’s bootleg booze to Torrio:
It is a matter of common knowledge in the underworld that Torrio collects his
percentage on the sale of virtually every pint of illicit liquor sold in the city. It is
not necessary that he handle the liquor himself. The power of his organization of
thugs is so great that virtually every bootlegger who gets booze or beer into
Chicago does so by paying Torrio for not interfering with it. Torrio thus has a
position not unlike that of the medieval barons. He levies tribute on trade.59
In this quotation, the Chicago Tribune ignored the family economy of domestic
moonshine and beer; however, if the Chicago Tribune writer was correct about “virtually
every pint” controlled by Torrio, Torrio was intentionally ignoring the domestic
production as he was clearly operating on a different scale.
Prohibition needed urban and suburban space to manufacture and store
intoxicating beverages. These had to be large spaces to accommodate all of the
equipment required for brewing and distilling, and they had to be discreet spaces as
brewing and distilling vented strong smells. The Sicilian Genna brothers, close associates
of Torrio and Capone, rented an entire row of empty houses along Miller Street where
they installed nice curtains and blinds to face the street and used the back of the houses to
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store “barrels of mash and yeast and stuff.”60 Less discreetly, Torrio and his associates
just took control over multiple breweries in Chicago, including the Sieben Brewery at
1470 Larrabee Street, Hoffman Products Company at 2606 West Monroe Street, the Malt
Maid Brewery at 3901 Emerald Avenue, and the West Hammond Brewery—and these
were just Torrio’s breweries that were raided and made the papers.61 As brewers across
the country boarded up their businesses or converted equipment to soda production,
Torrio ignored Prohibition and just took over the breweries. His boldness got him far for
a couple of years, but eventually his protection and immunity expired.
The so-called “gangster’s politician,” Mayor William Hale “Big Bill” Thompson
had three terms as Mayor of Chicago: 1915 to 1919, 1919 to 1923, and 1927 to 1931.62
Mayor William Dever served during the 1923 to 1927 term, and this caused some
problems for organized crime. Mayor Thompson was in the organized crime network
before and during Prohibition. He only had one criminal tie to organized crime in the preProhibition network, but he had seven criminal ties to the Prohibition organized crime
network. Thompson accepted political campaign contributions from gangsters and gave
favors in return, such as ousting police chiefs and attempting to legalize dog track racing.
Mayor Dever was not a gangster’s politician, and Torrio could not influence
Mayor Dever like he had Mayor Thompson.63 Mayor Dever highlighted his incorrigibility
as a contrast to Mayor Thompson’s corruption for Chicago reporters:
When I came into office I found appalling conditions here in our city. I had to
decide, once and for all, whether Chicago would be run by the legally elected
element, or by Torrio and a bunch of men from New York and Philadelphia who
had come here and taken over the moonshine business where the old saloon men
left off.”64
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Mayor Dever’s comments specifically naming Torrio were in response to his
administration’s assistance to federal agents and prosecutors convicting Torrio.
In January 1925, two dramatic events affected Torrio’s Syndicate. First, Torrio
was found guilty of violating Prohibition based on evidence obtained during a raid on the
Sieben Brewery the year before. He received a nine-month sentence and a $5,000 fine.65
Torrio was given several days before his sentence began to get his affairs in order, during
which the second dramatic event occurred. Torrio was shot five times after returning
home from a shopping trip with his wife.66 Incredibly, Torrio survived the shooting.
While in his hospital bed, Torrio refused to identify his shooters to the police. Al Capone
was frequently at Torrio’s bedside standing guard in case of another attack, and Capone
also refused to tell police who shot Torrio.67 As his recovery progressed, Torrio
transferred from his hospital bed to Waukegan jail in early February 1925.68 Upon his
release later that year, Torrio briefly returned to Chicago before he and his wife moved
back to New York for retirement and years of tax trouble.69
Torrio’s 1925 departure facilitated Capone’s ascent into leadership of the
Syndicate. Capone was loyal to Torrio and never forgave Mayor Dever and his
administration. Mayor Dever did not win re-election in 1927; he lost to Capone and
Torrio’s friend Mayor Thompson. President of the Chicago Crime Commission Frank
Loesch accused Al Capone of donating $260,000 in 1927 to Mayor Thompson’s election
fund to oust Mayor Dever.70 Loesch might have inflated this number for his own political
purposes to establish the importance of his private crime fighting organization. If Loesch
was right, this approximately $3.5 million donation in 2015 dollars not only suggested
political corruption, it suggested incredible criminal financial success.71
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Capone was not deterred by Torrio’s conviction and kept Syndicate breweries
operating. For example, in 1929, Prohibition agents discovered a fully operational
brewery at 2340 South Wabash in a 3-story brick building, which they presumed to be
Capone’s. There, agents found about $10,000 worth of brewing equipment, including 23
60-gallon fermenting tanks full of beer. Agents noted that they were not dealing with
some “fly-by-night bootleggers.”72 Shortly after Prohibition agents took control of this
brewery, bootleggers returned and attempted to recover confiscated brewing equipment.73
In another instance, a raid in 1930 uncovered that the Wabash Automotive Corporation,
an automobile accessory shop at 2108 South Wabash Avenue, was actually a front for a
large Capone Syndicate brewery. Agents seized 50,000 gallons of beer and 150,000
gallons of mash—the largest seizure at that time in Chicago.74 These are just a few
examples of the scale of organized crime’s productions and profits under Capone.
Capone’s fame and notoriety quickly outpaced Torrio’s sensible temperament.
Much of Capone’s reputation could be attributed to his facial scar, his spending habits,
and his big, sometimes violent, personality. Chicago Tribune journalist Guy Murchie
wrote a three part series on Al Capone’s “Decade of Death” in which he alleged that
Capone instigated 33 murders during the Chicago Beer Wars.75 Police Chief Michael
Hughes accused Capone of being a Mussolini sympathizer.76 And if the verbal threats and
accusations were not enough, Capone was the target of several failed murder attempts.
Prosecutors and judges from Chicago, Philadelphia, and Miami hit Capone with charges
of gun-toting, perjury, vagrancy, murder, public nuisance, Prohibition violations, and jury
fixing; however, it was the Internal Revenue Service that eventually brought Capone
down in 1931 for failing to pay income taxes on his illegally generated income. When
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federal law enforcement finally found a charge that they could stick, they gave Capone
the longest federal sentence ever given at the time for tax evasion.
Al Capone was the center of the Prohibition organized crime network. He had 316
distinct criminal ties to 316 criminal associates in the network. Capone had five times
more criminal ties than the two individuals tied for second place: Johnny Torrio and
Syndicate accountant Jack Guzik, both of whom had 68 criminal ties. The Chicago
Tribune and the Chicago Crime Commission assumed and labeled Capone as the boss or
the kingpin of the Syndicate, but the day-to-day activities of organizing organized crime
were centralized among a small group of Capone’s closest associates, which included
Jack Guzik and Ralph Capone. Ralph Capone, Al’s elder brother, was not as central to
Prohibition organized crime as Jack Guzik, but he was the fourth most central person in
the organization with 57 criminal ties. Ralph’s nickname was “Bottles” because of his
role in organizing bootlegging for the Syndicate. The Internal Revenue Service was
aware of Al Capone’s closest associates, and it went after Jack Guzik and Ralph Capone
before Al. Jack and Ralph, as well as other members of the Syndicate, were separately
found guilty of tax evasion and served federal sentences.
The leadership center of organized crime was clear during Prohibition in a way
that was not before Prohibition. The men at the center of the Prohibition network had
been present in organized crime before Prohibition, and their pre-Prohibition activities
and connections set the stage for the restructured organization. Torrio, Al Capone, and
Guzik persisted in the organized crime network during both time periods. Only Ralph
Capone was in the leadership core during Prohibition but not in the pre-Prohibition
network. This is because Al Capone was the first in his family to arrive to Chicago
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around 1919. Jim Colosimo, who died in May 1920, survived the beginning of organized
crime’s restructuring but not long enough to matter as a central player during Prohibition.
In a large, sparse, and centralized network, individuals in the powerful core become even
more powerful where they hoard networked resources and control their associates’ access
to the resources.
The Associates
Criminal associates in organized crime were the individuals connected to the
network through their various activities and relationships. Associates contributed to the
size of the network, and their direct and indirect ties to the men in the center concentrated
relational power within the core. Becoming an associate of organized crime required
previous relationships with bosses or other associates or opportunities to form
relationships with bosses or other associates.
Associates of organized crime and their profits made even the low-level positions
appealing to some on the outside. There was also the assumption that getting in with the
right people would provide legal protection in case of a raid or an encounter with the
police. One incarcerated juvenile in describing his outsider status, pointed to the financial
and legal benefits of being an associate for “the right mob”:
The reason I never went into bootlegging was because the right chance never
came. It doesn’t really pay unless you can get in with the right mob and I never
cared to get in with any half ass bootleggers. The right guys never offered me any
jobs and the few that I know I never asked. … I could have ran beer for several of
the smaller guys and made a few dollars, but these guys don’t furnish protection,
by that I mean if you get knocked over, you got to get yourself out and they want
you to use your own machine [car] or truck and I never cared to try Leavenworth
and then maybe a state stir for having a hot wagon too.77
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This young man failed to know (or at least failed to ask) the right people to gain entrance
into what he perceived of as the relative safety of organized crime. Access to organized
crime was not available without the right relationships.
Harry Harris described himself as a con man with a history of thieving, gambling,
and conning in the Near North Side of Chicago.78 His friends were thieves, safe-blowers,
racketeers, addicts, “queers,” and sex workers who found unregistered housing for $1 a
day among the dirty bug-ridden hotels and rooming houses of the neighborhood. Harry
had been running from the police in Wisconsin for some time, and when he returned to
Chicago, his old friend Dion O’Banion, a close associate of Johnny Torrio, got in touch
with him. Harry and Dion’s previous relationships in the neighborhood and Harry’s
criminal background provided a foundation of trust through which Dion brought Harry
into organized crime:
Dion was starting to organize a gang of booze hustlers and hijackers. I fell in with
this mob and the money I made I didn’t believe there was that much in the whole
word. Everyone in the gang had been just like myself out stealing anything they
could lay their hands on, and a hundred dollar bill they would kill for. Dion knew
that I didn’t believe in the heavy stuff, that is I didn’t believe in slugging a fellow
for nothing at all or killing anyone. When you were in a racket like the booze
racket it was slug and kill or be slugged and killed. I was the contact man and
handled the giving out of graft dough. I, therefore, didn’t have to go out on some
of the dirty work the mob done. Right from the start the gang made money and
Dion was known all over the city as the leader of the gang that controlled
everything from the little girl on the street to the handling of elections. Whoever
Dion was for at an election everyone on the North Side voted for whether they
wanted to or not. … Bootleg booze was being made and sold all over the city but
on the North Side soon as we found out someone who was handling booze of any
kind he was told to buy from us or else.79
Dion and his crew pulled an armed robbery on a federal facility that stored confiscated
bonded whiskey. They each walked away from the robbery and the sale of their bounty
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with $2,000 in their pockets—approximately $28,000 in 2015 dollars for a night’s
work.80
Harry Harris’s narration of his organized crime entrée and exploits was a unique
find in the archives. The Institute for Juvenile Research recorded his life history
sometime in the 1920s or 1930s, and the Chicago History Museum houses the transcripts
today. Harris’s close relationship with O’Banion provided the trusting foundation needed
to connect to organized crime. O’Banion was not scooping up speakeasy and brothel
businesses in the Near North Side neighborhood to pay into organized crime, he was
relying on previous relationships that developed into organized crime associations.
The process of previous relationships is difficult to map out in the organized
crime networks because the events preserved in the archives tend to not include the dates
when friendships formed or previous relationships began, with the exception of family
relationships. Retrospective accounts in the archives, however, do include some details
on previous friendships and prior associations that suggest that Harry Harris’s entrée into
organized crime through a previous friendship was not atypical. Al Capone and Ralph
Capone were brothers, Johnny Torrio knew Al Capone from the street gangs in Brooklyn,
the Guzik brothers knew Colosimo through the Levee—all of these pairs had connections
before or outside of the criminal activities and associations recorded in the organized
crime network. Connecting to organized crime required some type of access to the
leadership core or to their associates either through opportunities to form relationships or
previous relationships, but forming these relationships was easier for men than for
women.
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The Women of Organized Crime
The case of Betty Ann Schwartz is fascinating and complicated; her story was
archived twice in the Capone files at the Chicago Crime Commission.81 In 1930, Florida
police arrested three men, Fred Eberhardt, Frank Ralls, and Henry Helsema, who were
suspects in a plot to assassinate Florida Governor Doyle Carlton. Police found one of the
suspects, Eberhardt, in a hotel room with 18-year-old Chicago native Betty Ann
Schwartz. She was taken in for questioning. Betty Ann Schwartz implicated Al Capone in
the plot to assassinate the Florida governor. Al Capone and his family had moved to
Miami Beach that year and had frequent appearances in local newspaper headlines.
During her questioning, Betty Ann Schwartz “intimated that she was affiliated with the
Capone gang in Chicago and Miami.”82 According to the Chicago Tribune’s reporting of
the Florida event, “Repeatedly questioned regarding what information she may have in
connection with the reported plot, the Schwartz girl finally retorted: ‘I have lots of
information, but try and get it.’ Questioned further she became so enraged that she
attacked the jail matron. Officers, however, placed little credence in her statements.”83
When investigators questioned Capone about the assassination plot, he denied his
involvement but was not surprised that he had been implicated. He was becoming more
and more familiar with his name being besmirched any time a scandal erupted in Illinois
or Florida. There was no mention as to whether he knew the three suspects, Fred
Eberhardt, Frank Ralls, and Henry Helsema, or Betty Ann Schwartz. A Chicago Tribune
reporter interviewed Schwartz’s mother, who lived in Chicago, about her daughter’s
involvement in the assassination attempt. Mrs. Schwartz doubted her daughter’s claims
and credibility:
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Pretty Betty Schwartz has run afoul of the law before in the course of her eighteen
years, her mother admitted yesterday…. But her claim to membership in the
Capone gang or knowledge of their activities is braggadocio intended to impress
the police, she added. Mrs. Schwartz explained that Betty, at sixteen, was
sentenced to the home for wayward girls at Geneva. Afterward she was
committed to an asylum in Wisconsin.84
If there was more to Betty Ann’s story, it is no longer available to us. As to why an 18year-old blonde woman from Chicago, spending time with the publisher of the
Tallahassee State News, would want to implicate Al Capone and claim to be part of the
Capone gang would be pure speculation. Betty Ann Schwartz was, however, the only
woman who ever claimed membership in Capone’s Syndicate during Prohibition when
organized crime largely excluded women. What is fascinating about this case is that Betty
Anne Schwartz was the only mention in the historical record of a woman as a possible
made member in the Capone Syndicate, and both Capone and her mother disputed her
membership.
The majority of associates in the organized crime network were not made
members of the Syndicate. The labels of “gangster” and “made members” were not
terribly meaningful to organized crime as newspapers and investigatory commissions
generated the labels rather than them coming from the organization. Outside of the core
of the organized crime network were criminal associates contributing their various
criminal activities and relationships to the organizational structure. The associates of
organized crime made up the day-to-day grind of informal, illicit, temporary, and behindthe-scenes work.85 Drivers, brewers, bouncers, saloon wait staff, sex workers, and
couriers were foundational to organized crime activities. These positions resided at the
boundaries of the organized crime network and they included a small number of women.
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Prohibition Era women organized crime associates were small in number and
diverse in activities. This group of 38 women included a cabaret dancer, cabaret singer,
cigarette girl, a waitress, a beer runner from Waterloo, Iowa, brothel owners and
managers, a trafficker, and a few sex workers. In addition, there was a municipal clerk,
police investigator, as well as a union racketeer and Chicago’s first woman bomber.
Women made up only 4 percent of the organized crime network. The majority of women
associates (20 out of 38, or 53 percent) connected to organized crime through activities
with their criminally involved husbands and boyfriends. Some of the women (5 out of 38,
or 13 percent) connected to organized crime through other male relatives. Women’s roles
in Prohibition organized crime included silent wives, alibis, victims, entrappers, and
public enemies.
The trope of the silent mobster wife is assumed to know either nothing or
everything, but would never tell.86 In truth, most wives never connected to Chicago
organized crime, or if they did, their activities went undetected by investigators. This was
the case with Mae Capone during Prohibition. Irish Catholic Mae Coughlin married Al
Capone around 1919, and shortly thereafter the newlyweds moved from New York to
Chicago. Mae’s involvement in organized crime was murky and likely very well-hidden.
She was arrested once with Al Capone in 1919 when Capone was a suspect in a murder,
but after that her connections to organized crime were financial, not criminal. The IRS
uncovered a trail of Western Union transactions documenting that Mae received money
from Chicago while in Miami, and the discovered a bank account in Mae’s name at West
Side Trust and Savings Bank.87 The investigators believed that the transactions and
account were dirty organized crime money, but their allegations were never substantiated.
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Similarly, in 1928, the Capones purchased their 25-room Miami Beach estate in Mae’s
name, which the IRS also tried, and failed, to link organized crime profits.88 Mae fought
the IRS for several years after Al’s incarceration, and made payments on Al’s unpaid
taxes.89 Mae Capone’s role as the silent mobster wife meant that she never connected to
the Prohibition organized crime network through criminal relationships—at least not in
way that was detected.
For most women associates, their romantic connections and marriages were
undoubtedly their entrée into organized crime activities. Often these women’s
connections to organized crime were rather mundane events, such as being in the
company of husbands and boyfriends during raids and arrests, but other organized crime
women’s connections were more purposeful than guilt by association. For example,
Louise Rolfe was a beautiful model and cabaret singer. She was also the girlfriend of
Jack McGurn, a Chicago gunman and suspect in the Valentine’s Day massacre of 1929.
During their investigation of the massacre, police found McGurn at the Stevens Hotel
with Rolfe. She provided McGurn’s alibi, telling police officers and reporters that he
spent all of Valentine’s Day with her and that they never left their hotel room.
Following her questioning at the police department, she talked with reporters
outside of the police station. Reporters fawned over her fashion and looks. The Chicago
Tribune article following Rolfe’s interview showed a reporter convinced of Jack
McGurn’s alibi because McGurn would have never left such beautiful woman’s side on
Valentine’s Day:
She drew the folds of her swanky gray squirrel coat suavely about her hips, tossed
back astounding yellow curls from a face Egyptianlike in lines and synthetic
coloring, and gazed steadily at the group before her. … “Of course, Jack had
nothing to do with the massacre. … He was in bed—all night and until noon.” …
120

	
  
She admitted that after St. Valentine’s Day neither she nor Jack left the room, but,
inferring that they had much to occupy them, “we read all the papers,” and “when
you’re with Jack you’re never bored.” … As she talked she smoked constantly,
lighting one cigaret from the tip of another. Her face was elaborately made up.
Her black dress of crepe over which hung long ropes of imitation pearls, hung
modishly beneath the draped fur coat. Dark eyes were heavily mascaraed and her
eyebrows were thinned down to the most extreme lines. On one curved ankle a
tiny gold bracelet made a line, “with my name on it, so they can’t lose me,” she
offered.90
Louise’s testimony earned her the nickname “the Blonde Alibi.” Louise’s alibi
apparently worked; the state was forced to release Jack and other suspects when
prosecutors were “not ready to proceed with the trials.”91 However, investigators and
prosecutors were hell-bent on hitting McGurn with something. Shortly after McGurn’s
release as a murder suspect, Assistant US District Attorney Daniel Anderson served the
couple with a warrant that alleged Jack had violated the Mann Act of 1910 when he
crossed state borders with Louise for immoral purposes and that Louise had conspired to
violate the Mann Act.92 The white slave charge was based on consensual lovers’ romantic
vacations that crossed state lines. Even though Jack and Louise got married in May 1931
just before their case went to trial and after he finalized the divorce from his previous
wife, they lost the Mann Act case in Illinois federal court—a ruling later overturned by
the US Supreme Court.93 Much like federal tax laws, the Mann Act gave federal
prosecutors loopholes to target gangsters when Prohibition cases failed to stick.94
Some women were victimized through their romantic relationships to organized
crime men when violence of organized crime spilled into the home. Intimate partners
murdered the only two women who died from their connections to the organized crime
network. The cases of Rosemary Sanborn and Maybelle Exley were strikingly similar,
even though they occurred eight years apart. The criminal activities that linked these two
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women to organized crime were co-offenses that most women would not have engaged in
without their gangster boyfriends. Rosemary Sanborn was a cigarette girl from Chicago
and associated with gangster Robert Newberry, also a suspect in the 1929 Valentine’s
Day Massacre. The couple was wanted in Chicago for defrauding a wealthy man of
$25,000, but in 1932 their bodies were found in a New York apartment. Investigators
believed that Newberry murdered Sanborn before killing himself.95
Maybelle Exley was a sex worker in Louisville, Kentucky when she met John
Duffy. Duffy trafficked booze and women and had ties to organized crime member Dion
O’Banion. Exley left the Louisville brothel with Duffy, and they worked together
peddling booze. In 1924, Exley was 21-years-old when Duffy drunkenly beat and
murdered her in their Chicago flat on Carmen Avenue. Police learned of Exley’s murder
when they found John Duffy’s corpse two days later dumped on a snow bank with three
bullets to the head; they traced his residence back to the apartment where they found
Exley. Duffy was last seen alive getting into a car near Capone’s Four Deuces on South
Wabash Avenue and was presumed to have been Chicago’s first instance of a gangster
being “taken for a ride,” wherein a victim is shot in a car and the body is dumped.
Maybelle’s murder was ruled a domestic violence case and John Duffy’s murder was
assumed to be gangland related though his was not solved.96 The violence against
girlfriends and wives by organized-crime-involved intimate partners is a theme that has
received some attention in contemporary research on women and mafias. Renate
Siebert’s research on Italian mafias highlighted the contradiction between the domestic
sphere as a refuge from the violent public space mafia husbands created and the violence
that mafia husbands brought into the domestic sphere.97
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Other research has shown the ways in which women and men use women’s
sexuality as a tool to complete particular crimes. For example, Jody Miller’s research on
the different ways men and women do gender in the completion of street robberies
included women flirting, convincing a mark that they want to have sex with him, getting
him in a vulnerable position, and then pulling the weapon to complete the robbery.98 Men
also utilize women’s sexuality for the completion of a crime, as was the case in
Prohibition Chicago. Helen Delmar, 19-years-old, worked at the Knickerbocker night
club in New York when two Chicago organized crime men offered her $1,000 to help
them ensnare rival gangster, Jack Zuta. Allegedly, they wanted to kidnap Zuta to get a
$50,000 ransom from him. All Helen needed to do was bump into Zuta and introduce
herself, get Zuta interested in her, and take him somewhere. The men paid for Helen’s
trip to Chicago, and while she was waiting for additional instructions the police found
her. She never even started the entrapment of Zuta. The bizarre thing about the Helen
Delmar case was that police suppressed the incident, and it became public only when a
copy of her police confession was found among Jack Zuta’s personal effects following
his murder.99 It is not clear how Zuta got the police report and what happened to Delmar
following her arrest.
Traditional patterns of gender and its relationship to victimization and sexuality
explain some of the cases of women associates in the organized crime network, but one
woman of the Dillinger gang, Pearl Elliot, defied these gendered patterns by not being
romantically involved with men of the Dillinger gang and shooting at police officers
during a getaway. Pearl Elliot and her Dillinger gang associate, Mary Kinder, were the
first two women in Chicago labeled as “public enemies.”
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The public enemy label has its own history concurrent with Prohibition Era
organized crime. Chicago business elite founded the Chicago Crime Commission (CCC)
in 1919 by with the purpose of protecting the business community from the business of
crime, alleging that the Chicago Police Department was too corrupt to be up to the
task.100 The CCC introduced the original public enemies list to Chicago in April 1930
with Al Capone listed as public enemy number 1.101 The CCC’s goal with the public
enemy list was to drive the criminal element out of Chicago, or in the words of CCC
President Loesch, “to keep the light of publicity on Chicago’s most prominent and
notorious gangsters to the end that they may be under constant observation by law
enforcing authorities.”102 By 1933, the CCC no longer controlled the distribution and
attention of public enemy lists, as police captains and Illinois states’ attorney’s offices
began compiling and releasing their own lists.103 The CCC’s public enemies lists never
included women, but the state’s attorney’s list did.
Weeks after the end of Prohibition in December 1933, the states’ attorney’s office
released their public enemy list with bank robber and jail breaker John Dillinger as public
enemy number 1. Among the 21 public enemies on this 1933 list were two women—
public enemy numbers 8 and 9 of December 1933 were Pearl Elliott and Mary Kinder of
the Dillinger gang.104 Less than a month before the end of Prohibition in November 1933,
Indiana state police and Chicago detectives set a trap for John Dillinger outside of a
doctor’s office following a tip they received regarding Dillinger’s doctor’s appointment.
Dillinger completed his appointment and got in his car when officers began firing at it.
Their gunfire had no effect because the car was armored. The armored car also had a
hidden person in the back of the car firing a machine gun in return. To assist with the
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getaway, Pearl Elliott rolled down her window slightly to fire her pistol at police. The
police halted their pursuit of Dillinger because of the gunfire.105 Pearl was described as a
friend of the Dillinger gang and not romantically involved with any of the men in the
gang.
Mary Kinder, the other woman on the public enemies list, was a sweetheart with
fellow gang member Harry Pierpont. Mary Kinder was indicted for harboring fugitives
and helping fugitives elude capture when members of the Dillinger gang escaped from
prison.106 She and some of the other women of the Dillinger gang were in charge of
renting new apartments each week while in Chicago so that the gang could remain on the
move and in hiding.107 Mary Kinder was caught and arrested with the Dillinger gang in
Tucson, Arizona, but it is unclear whatever happened to Pearl Elliott.108 There was no
mention of her in the Chicago Tribune after she made the public enemies list.
These cases of the silent wife, the alibi, the murder victim, the entrapper, and the
public enemy, point to the variety of ways women associates became entangled in the
organized crime network. This variety in entrée was quite different than women
associates of organized crime before Prohibition, when 89 percent of women associates
were connected to organized crime through the sex work economy. During Prohibition,
this percentage dropped to a little more than a third. According to my calculations, 14 of
the 38 women in the organized crime network during Prohibition were connected through
organized crime’s brothels. These women were brothel owners, managers, hostesses, sex
workers, and traffickers.
Prostitution resorts generated even greater profits under Prohibition when illegal
booze complimented sex work and drove up the price of both. As James Bennett wrote

125

	
  
for the Chicago Tribune in 1929, “There had been money in liquor and girls before
prohibition. But there are fortunes in liquor and girls under prohibition.” Brothels and
cabarets developed a greater relevance because, when paired with good booze, these
spaces became the “social center for gangsters.”109 In 1930, the prostitution fighting
Committee of Fifteen estimated that organized crime controlled 13 percent of all brothels
they had investigated.110 Unnamed police sources alleged that Syndicate brothels
generated $100,000 a week in revenue (approximately $1.3 million a week in 2015
dollars), which did not include the additional thousands earned in booze sales in the
brothels.111
There was nothing particularly special about Syndicate brothels except that they
all provided quality booze. Syndicate brothels certainly did not compare to the elite
brothels of the former Levee districts, which were costly to maintain. Nevertheless,
Torrio’s Harlem Inn in the village of Stickney could have up to 500 men waiting on a
Saturday night, “It is known as a $3 place, with the girls getting one-third of the three.
It’s a typical place—saloon in front, a back room full of women in virtually nothing, and
about 50 rooms upstairs. Blonde, brunette, short, tall, fat—all are there.”112
Al Capone’s infamous Four Deuces at 2222 South Wabash Avenue was one of
Chicago’s bawdiest of houses and a headquarters space for the Syndicate.113 The first
floor of the Four Deuces was a saloon, and in the back of the saloon was a corridor to a
stairway leading to the brothel on the second floor. Undercover Chicago Tribune
investigators in 1922 estimated 30 sex workers at the Four Deuces:
The “reception room” is a combination of two rooms in one, with a wide open
doorway in between. The place is brilliantly lighted, but otherwise harsh in
appearance. There is almost no furniture and the embellishment of the walls is nil.
Running practically entirely around the four walls are crude benches. Tribune
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investigators counted forty-three men—most of them young men—sitting on the
benches around the walls, and a dozen more stood or walked about. Four girls—
probably the least comely in the house—were among all these men; the remainder
of them were said to be “busy.” An obese, henna haired “madame” sat in a
rocking chair—one of the few pieces of furniture in the big room exhorting the
men in a shrill voice: “Come on, boys,” she piped again and again: “come on
boys; pick a girl.”114
In this article the undercover Chicago Tribune investigators failed to name the “henna
haired madame” and the 30 sex workers. Had these women been identified, I could have
included them in the organized crime network as criminal associates involved in the dayto-day labor at the margins of organized crime.
Either women were no longer managers or operators of the organized crime
brothels during Prohibition, or they were no longer under the investigative spotlight. Only
14 women involved in the sex economy had enough information in the archival sources
to reveal their organized crime relationships during Prohibition. For example, Emily
Marshall was protected by Johnny Torrio before Prohibition and during Prohibition was
protected by Jack Zuta. The Caldwell women, Audrey, Gladys, and Sara, were brothel
owners associated with their relative Mike Heitler of pre-Prohibition brothel fame. The
family men of brothels were brothers Jack and Harry Guzik. Harry ran a brothel with his
wife Alma, Harry purchased a brothel for his sister-in-law Rose to operate, and Jack’s
sister-in-law, Jeannette Keithly, was deeded the Harlem Inn brothel from one of Jack’s
associates. The group of organized crime women involved in the sex work economy also
included one black woman, Mary Brown, who worked as a brothel keeper for Abe
Weinstein at the Burr Oak Inn.
Outside of organized crime, however, was a growing prostitution economy that
did not leave women behind. The superintendent of the Illinois Vigilance Association
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estimated more than 2,000 brothels operating in Chicago in 1922.115 However, the police
chief said that the list given to him by the superintendent included only 13 addresses.116 I
identified 517 prostitution-related addresses inside and outside of organized crime from
1900 to 1933 that included information on proprietors, co-proprietors, operators, or
managers. Figure 3 plots the percent of address that included women for each decade. I
find that from the 1910s through 1933 women were associated with the management and
ownership of about half of the prostitution-related addresses. The decade when women
had the lowest percentage of addresses was 1900 to 1909—the period of the segregated
red-light districts in Chicago.
Figure 3: Women’s percent of prostitution related addresses in Chicago, 1900-1933
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This increase in women’s percentage is consistent with Walter Reckless’s 1933
research on prostitution in Chicago that showed an increase in the number of prostitution
resorts and an increase in prostitution related arrests during Prohibition.117 Reckless
described organized crime brothels as having poor working conditions, long hours, and
low pay compared to women’s independent brothels outside the central city.118 Whereas
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young men might have avoided bootlegging unless it was with a well-paid and protected
organized crime crew, women might have avoided working for or operating organized
crime brothels because of the poor working conditions.
During Prohibition, women’s entrée to organized crime was largely constrained
by romantic and familial relationships. These were trusting relationships that existed prior
to criminal activities in organized crime. Women owned, operated, or managed a
substantial portion of the sex work related locations in Chicago, but for the most part
these locations were not connected to the larger and more powerful organized crime
network of Chicago. Similar to women’s domestic distilling and brewing; women’s
brothels operated in isolation and separate from organized crime. The organized crime
brothels generating $100,000 a week had no mention of women as managers or operators.
Before Prohibition, locations in organized crime territories provided entrée into the
protection market when men and women owners of illicit establishments connected to
organized crime through payments. During Prohibition, organized crime’s markets
diversified beyond the protection market and reached geographically beyond the Levee
districts. Organized crime and its restructured protection market largely ignored women’s
localized brothels. Relations trumped locations in providing entrée to the organized crime
network, even when it came to prostitution under Prohibition.
The End of Prohibition
Mabel Walker Willebrandt, the second woman to serve as Assistant Attorney
General of the United States, handled federal Prohibition cases. She was often asked to
comment on women’s universal attitudes toward Prohibition, and she included her
perspective in her 1929 book, The Inside of Prohibition:
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The modern girl, whom makes no protest when her escort to dinner produces a
pocket flask and shares its contents with her, has no stake in prohibition
enforcement. But the moment that girl marries, she probably will, whether
consciously or not, become a supporter of prohibition, because she always will be
unwilling to share any part of her husband’s income with either a bootlegger or a
saloon-keeper operating legally. I am convinced that as far as the women of the
country are concerned, prohibition has come to stay.119
Willebrandt’s Prohibition predictions were wrong, as the law had not come to stay.
Women’s political organizing was as responsible for the repeal of Prohibition as it
was for its introduction. Chaired by Pauline Morton Sabine of the Morton salt family, the
Women’s Organization for Prohibition Reform (WOPR) was a national organization and
a powerful group of women. Many WOPR members had originally supported Prohibition
but eventually recognized that the law had failed on all four of its major promises:
eradicating the saloon, ceasing drinking, reducing crime, and saving children from
alcohol.120 WOPR gained political momentum by appealing to moral concerns,
Prohibition failures, as well as the classist implications of the Prohibition law, “If the
head of a corporation is free to drink intoxicants in his leisure hours, as and when he sees
fit, what right has he to determine what his employee shall do in his leisure hours for his
own enjoyment?”121 Ione Nicoll, secretary for WOPR, wrote an article “Should Women
Vote Wet?” in 1930 for the literary magazine The North American Review:
A heavy responsibility rests today on American women. The time has come when
they must face conditions as they are and not as a few fanatics would have us
believe they are. ...Women have had suffrage for ten years; what more
magnificent opportunity will ever present itself for an intelligent, constructive and
patriotic use of this power?122
More than 1.3 million racially and socioeconomically diverse members of WOPR defined
women’s first political issue since their suffrage.123
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During the 1932 presidential election, democratic candidate Franklin Delano
Roosevelt focused his campaign on the economy and recovery from the Great
Depression. However, the social issue of repealing Prohibition was dominating the
democratic political conversation, and Roosevelt had wavered as a moderate dry.124
Roosevelt finally took an ardent stand against Prohibition minutes before the Democratic
National Convention in order to secure the party’s nomination.125 In the end, Roosevelt
won by a landslide. Days after his inauguration, he called a special session of Congress to
legalize beer and wine as part of his New Deal strategy. On December 5, 1933, Utah
became the 36th and final state needed to ratify the 21st Amendment that repealed the 18th
Amendment.
At 4:32 PM on December 5, 1933, Chicago Loop hotels and the old favorite bars
began serving alcohol legally for the first time in 14 years.126 With talk of repeal, the
Palmer House built a new bar that the workmen did not finish until 4 PM. Hundreds of
men and women lined up outside the Palmer House anticipating the new bar’s opening.
By midnight, Palmer House officials estimated that “guests in the bar and the hotel dining
room had consumed 50 cases of bourbon and rye, 25 of Scotch, 50 of gin, 75 of wine,
including a sizable quantity of champagne, 10 of cordials, and 20 barrels of beer.”127
Hotels and bars around Chicago happily reported similar booms in the evening’s
business. Within two weeks following repeal, more than 1,500 applications for liquor
licenses along with the accompanying $250 fees were filed with the city of Chicago.128
Prohibition was over.
Some of the consequences of Prohibition and its repeal were for the better.
Alcohol quality went up and costs went down, although it was not as cheap as pre-
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Prohibition alcohol.129 Prohibition did actually cut down alcohol consumption in the
United States, and it took until the 1970s to return to pre-Prohibition levels of drinking.130
Perhaps one of the most interesting unintended consequences of Prohibition was that
Prohibition made women regulars at public drinking spaces. On the night of repeal,
women lined up at the bars and ordered their own drinks, which was not considered
proper before Prohibition.131 The new bar at the Palmer House was intended to be a
men’s oyster bar, but 30 percent of the patrons upon its opening were women.132
Organized crime still had pending Prohibition cases upon repeal. One judge
resolved pending alcohol violation cases against organized crime individuals by charging
them a total of $500 in fines, even though these cases had cost the government $100,000
to prepare.133 The IRS, however, continued attacking organized crime members and their
Prohibition profits for years to come.134 Chicago organized crime was about to enter a
new era focusing on labor racketeering—an illicit economy also requiring relations not
locations that would continue to exclude women.135
Conclusion
Prohibition was an exogenous shock to the organized crime network that not only
created a new type of crime (i.e., violating liquor laws), but also mobilized and
refashioned pre-existing criminal organizations. Whereas organized crime before
Prohibition revolved around the protection and exploitation of illicit entertainment
economies, organized crime during Prohibition added the product of intoxicating
beverages, which required space, transportation, distribution, and protection. The
Chicago organized crime network changed dramatically during Prohibition multiplying in
size, becoming more sparse and centralized, and spreading into territories outside of the
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Levee districts. Organized crime developed beyond its territorial focus of scooping up
illicit entertainment business of the Levee districts to include in its protection market.
During Prohibition, relationships became the main way to connect to an organization
growing in size and geographic reach. Clear criminalization of the alcohol market
required trusting relationships between criminal associates. One of the best ways to
establish trusting criminal relationships in organized crime was through prior
relationships.
The restructuring of organized crime mobilized men and excluded women.
Women made up only 4 percent of the Prohibition organized crime network even as
women’s proportion of alcohol and sex work activities and properties around Chicago
increased. Women could no longer connect to organized crime solely through the
location of their illicit businesses in organized crime territory; thus, relations trumped
locations as the means of connecting to organized crime, and women could not access the
relationships to organized crime like men.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SHIFTING STRUCTURES OF ORGANIZED CRIME
Organized crime from 1900 to 1919 was a loose coordination between the
protection of illicit businesses and the corruption of police officers and politicians
centering on the shifting locations of Chicago’s sex work and gambling districts.
Organized crime was territorial and without clear leadership during this time. Corruption
and scale grew in 1920 with the introduction of Prohibition and organized crime’s
takeover of new criminal markets. Particular individuals, especially Johnny Torrio and Al
Capone, formed some semblance of a leadership structure and their influence spread
beyond the red-light districts, across the city, and into Chicago’s neighboring villages.
This historical context establishes broad organizational change around the role of
locations when organized crime was geographically concentrated versus geographically
spread, the increasing importance and influence of bosses, and the expansion and
diversification of markets. In this chapter, I shift from the broad organizational changes I
identified using historical methods to precise calculations of change in the organized
crime network.
Using social network analysis, I map the shifting structures of organized crime
networks. These structures include size, connectedness, centrality, and brokerage. While
historical methods speak to some of these changes, such as the rise of Johnny Torrio and
Al Capone, social network methods measure the rise and influence of particular
individuals and their significance to the overall network structure. After mapping out the
structures of organized crime during the two points in time, I then measure women and
men’s positions in the networks. I find that women were a substantial part of the network
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when organized crime was relatively small and decentralized and that women were
almost entirely excluded when organized crime was large, sparse, and centralized.
Contemporary scholars have attributed women’s low participation in crime to
gendered differences in licit and illicit economic power within market conditions,
criminal men’s homosocial preferences, crime as a way of doing gender in certain spatial,
cultural, and historical contexts, and gender bias in law enforcement practices.1 A
possible takeaway from this criminological research could be that women have as
constrained of networks in crime as they have in business.2 Another vein of research
focusing on women’s entrée and persistence in crime has increasingly paid attention to
women’s access to crime as largely limited to and influenced by familial and romantic
relationships.3 The consistent finding of women committing crimes with their husbands
and boyfriends suggests that theories of relational inequality might be useful guides for
future research on the gender gap in crime.4 When men are women’s gatekeepers to
crime, men’s opinions and decisions about values, skills, work ethic, trust, and
concealment can exclude women from crime and in turn create masculine or maledominated criminal groups or organizations.
Sociological and criminological research also shows that particular organizational
forms constrain women’s opportunities more than other organizational forms. Flat teambased organizations provide better conditions for women’s careers than large, durable,
and hierarchical institutions.5 Somewhat similarly and not at all surprising, women have
more job options in drug markets that are open and entrepreneurial than drug markets that
are closed and hierarchical.6 There are other benefits to flat and decentralized criminal
organizations beyond women’s opportunities; decentralized criminal organizations
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privilege concealment over efficiency and coordination in the case of conspiracy
networks and smuggling networks.7 It is worth exploring the potential overlap between
these organizational logics of gendered organizations and criminal organizations as a way
to understand the gender crime gap.
Organized crime in early 1900s Chicago was not a clearly defined organization,
bureaucracy, or hierarchy. Rather organized crime was a loose network of friendships and
favors, strong ties and weak ties, and trust and concealment. Organized crime networks
contain and distribute resources, such as access to influential gangsters, politicians, police
officers, and fixers, but, as is the case in most networks, access to those resources is
unequal. In the case of Chicago organized crime, a category of difference produced the
network: men formed criminal relationships with connected men, and women failed to
form criminal relationships with connected men or with connected women. However, the
differences between men and women were not explained solely by the categorical
attribute of gender. I next show in this chapter how the network facilitated increased
relationships between men and further marginalization of women. Focusing on positional
inequality within networks provides a theoretical and empirical interrogation of
difference often presumed to be categorical, but which I suspect is more typically
relational.
This chapter contains the empirical foundation of my finding that gender
inequality increased as the structure of the organized crime network changed. To these
ends, I map out the network of organized crime at two points in time. Time 1 is the preProhibition Era of 1900 to1919 and Time 2 is the Prohibition Era of 1920 to 1933. With
this network at two points in time, I calculate and compare (a) the organizational
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structure, (b) gender gaps in network position, and (c) gender gaps in structural
importance. I replicate the gender gap analysis for both time periods while treating
criminal elite men as a separate group. The criminal elite were the top 10 percent most
criminally connected actors in the organized crime network, and all were men. As I
demonstrate in the following pages, the exogenous shock of Prohibition caused the
structures of organized crime to grow in size and increase in centrality, and these shifting
structures excluded women. I argue that women’s decreasing presence in Chicago
organized crime was a case of dynamic inequality generation within an organizational
network, and I identify the processes of how organizational settings produce, reproduce,
and alter inequality. I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the limitations and
robustness of this analysis and it implications for relational theories of inequality.
The analysis proceeds with the largest components described in Chapter 1 best
representing organized crime at two points in time: before and during Prohibition. I walk
the reader through a variety of descriptive statistics, comparisons, and examples to make
the case that before Prohibition women were an important part of organized crime, but
women’s positions got worse during Prohibition as the organization became larger,
sparser, and more centralized. To be clear, my analysis assumes that the organized crime
networks are as complete as possible. The descriptive analysis is appropriate because I
have uncovered the population of an organization and the relationships within the
organization, albeit admittedly with some missing data.

146

	
  
Chicago Organized Crime Network, 1900-1919
The criminal relationships from 1900 to 1919 of protection payments, barely
legitimate businesses, corruption scandals, gambling and trafficking rings, raids, and
arrests produced an organized crime network containing 267 individuals and their 789
criminal ties. The structure of the organized crime network during this time was small,
sparse, decentralized, and locally clustered as detailed in Table 4.
Table 4: Structural properties of Chicago organized crime network, 1900-1919
	
  
n of individuals
267
n of criminal ties
789
density
0.022
degree centralization
0.140
betweenness centralization
0.398
Organized crime was sparse as only 2.2 percent of all possible ties were present as
measured by network density. Organized crime was also decentralized during this time
period. The degree centralization score was 0.14 for this network, which is a score that
ranges from 0 when ties are equally distributed across the individuals to 1 when all ties
concentrate on a single individual. The centralization of 0.14 shows a more equal
distribution of ties than concentration of ties. Even though organized crime was
decentralized, there were individuals brokering sections of the network to other sections
of the network. The betweenness centralization score of about 0.4 should be interpreted
on the same scale of 0 to 1 as degree centralization, which means that brokerage was near
the middle of the scale between equal distribution and total concentration of brokerage.
Together these measures indicate that the organizational structure of organized crime was
small, sparse, decentralized, and locally clustered.
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Figure 4 displays this organizational structure in graphic form. Figure 4 shows
that there was not a clearly identifiable center of the organized crime network; rather the
network was flat and contained several clusters connected by brokers. Some individuals
looked powerful in terms of their number of ties, but the powerful individuals were
spread around the network and not concentrated in the center. Social network plotting
algorithms are designed to place the most central points of the network in the middle of
the plot, which was not possible with this decentralized and clustered network.

Criminal
Network
1900-1919
Figure 4: Chicago organized
crime network,
1900-1919
(n=267)
police and politicians
criminal men
criminal women
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Each dot or node in Figure 4 represents an individual, and each line between them
represents their various criminal relationships. I assigned nodes one of three colors in
Figure 4: red indicates criminal women (n=47), blue indicates criminal men (n=168), and
yellow indicates criminal men who were also police and politicians (n=52). There were
no women police officers or politicians in this network, so women only have one color
assignment compared to the two colors for men. The distinction between the two groups
of men is a bit arbitrary in that the law enforcers and lawmakers indicated by yellow were
also law breakers just like the criminal men indicated by blue, but the law enforcers and
lawmakers positions in the underworld came with positions of power in the upper world
that the regular criminal men did not have. The presence of the yellow nodes, thus,
represents the access to legal resources and corruption available within this organized
crime network.
Women made up 18 percent of the nodes and resided on 19 percent of the ties in
this organized crime network. As a proportion of the Chicago population, 18 percent is
not such an impressive figure. In 1909, Chicago Police Chief Steward estimated women
owned and operated about 75 percent of the brothels in Chicago, and a police captain
estimated that women owned and operated about half of the brothels in his precinct.8
According to my calculations of the sex work related addresses in the Capone Database,
28 percent of the addresses from 1900 to 1909 and 52 percent of the addresses from 1910
to 1919 had women involved as owners and/or managers. Given the importance of the
sex work economy to pre-Prohibition organized crime, women’s 18 percent of organized
crime seems low compared to the police estimates. However, organized crime was a
gendered organization with interests beyond just the brothels. Women were not involved
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in the gambling economies of organized crime, and women were not the corrupted police
officers and politicians, both of which made up substantial portions of the network.
During this same time period women made up only about 20 percent of the US labor
force.9 As a point of comparison, this suggests that organized crime was only as gender
segregated as the formal labor force during this period.
Women did not look like men in the organized crime network. It is visually
apparent in Figure 4 that women were not connected to organized crime in the same way
that men were. Entire clusters in the network have zero women, women were missing
from the center of the network, and women did not appear to connect clusters of
individuals to other parts of the network. Even though women made up 18 percent of the
network, their positions were not randomly distributed throughout the network. Because
of the relational nature of these data, I can calculate dozens of statistics from this network
to compare women and men’s positions. It is through these statistics of network
properties where the nuance of gendered processes and interactions in the forming and
not forming of relationships come to light.
I focus on the gender proportions of nodes and ties within the network as well as
five network measures for which I compare means for men and women. Table 5 presents
the first set of these comparisons. The middle columns of Table 5 show the counts,
percentages, or means for men and women across the five network properties. Stars
indicate statistically significant differences between the means based on a two-tailed ttest. The final column calculates the gender gap as a ratio of the mean for women divided
by the mean for men. A value of 1.0 in the gender gap column indicates that there was no
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gap between men and women for that measure. The closer the value is to 0, the greater
the gender gap.
Table 5: Organized crime network properties by gender, 1900-1919

nodes (people)
edges (criminal ties)

men only dyads

Men
220
(82.4%)
763
(96.8%)

Women
47
(17.6%)
148
(18.8%)

641
(81.2%)

--

Gender Gap
0.214
0.194

122
(15.5%)

man and woman dyads
woman only dyads

--

26
(3.3%)

degree (popularity)

6.382
(7.354)
0.0304
(0.059)
3.805
(0.619)
0.013
(0.042)
4.300
(3.075)

3.702*
(2.321)
0.011*
(0.019)
4.046*
(0.466)
0.001*
(0.002)
3.468*
(2.135)

eigenvector centrality (popular friends)
geodesic distance (distance)
normalized betweenness (brokering paths)
(completely connected cluster)

0.580
0.362
0.940
0.069
0.807

Notes: Standard deviations and percentages are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistically significant
differences between men and women’s means based on a two-tailed t-test. Gender gap ratios calculated as
the value for women divided by the value for men except for geodesic distance, which was reversed.

The top half of Table 5 includes the calculations of nodes and dyads. A node is an
individual (or in this case more specifically a criminal) positioned in the network. A dyad
is a pair of nodes connected by a relationship (also called an edge) and technically counts
each line in the network. The bottom half of Table 5 covers the five calculations of basic
foundational positions within networks, which I define briefly before discussing the
results.
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The five network measures included in Table 5 are node-level indices meaning
that the calculations come from each node’s position in the network. Degree is the
number of ties to each node and equals the number of people an individual is directly
connected to in the network. Degree can be thought of as measuring criminal popularity
or high criminal activity. Eigenvector centrality measures how connected individuals are
to the powerful individuals in the network. Even when individuals only have a few ties in
a network, those ties might be to the most popular person in the network producing a
higher eigenvector centrality score. Eigenvector centrality measures popular friends or
being connected to the criminally active. Geodesic distance is the shortest path between
two nodes when two nodes are within the same component. Small geodesic distances
indicate that individuals do not have far to travel to reach everyone else in the component
whereas a large geodesic distance indicates that individuals have far to travel. Distance is
the one measure considered here for which a high score indicates a less powerful and less
central position. Betweenness counts the number of geodesic paths on which an
individual sits, and a high betweenness score means that individuals are strategically
located between others in the network. A normalized betweenness score accounts for all
of the paths in a network. High betweenness scores identify the big brokers in the
network, as these are the individuals whom a large number of paths must go through to
connect to others. K-core is a measure that uses degree to identify dense pockets of
cohesion in a network often picking up the size of an individual’s largest totally
connected cluster. Given these definitions of network properties, I now turn to what the
results of these properties mean in the context of the organized crime network.
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Across every measure in Table 5, women were less structurally important than
men in the organized crime network. Women made up only 18 percent of the nodes and
resided on 19 percent of the ties. The means for women were lower than the means for
men for degree (popularity), eigenvector centrality (popular friends), betweenness
(brokering paths), and k-core (cluster size). The mean for women’s geodesic distance was
higher than the mean for men’s geodesic distance because women had overall longer
paths to traverse the network. Distance is the one measure in which a higher value
indicates a worse position. The differences between means for men and women were all
statistically significant.
Women formed criminal ties with other men in organized crime much more than
they formed criminal ties with women. Woman to woman dyads equaled only 3.3 percent
of ties in organized crime whereas woman to man dyads made up 15.5 percent of the
criminal ties. The reverse was true for men. Men formed criminal ties mostly with other
men (81.2 percent) and fewer of men’s ties were formed with women (the same 15.5
percent). Women’s connection to organized crime was almost entirely through their
connections to men. This finding of women’s offending through men is consistent with
contemporary research on women’s co-offending.10 However, given the role of brothels
and the sex work economy to early 1900s organized crime, it is remarkable that so few
ties were between women. Gender as a category was very much influencing who was
connected to whom in organized crime and this gendered process produced relational
inequalities in the network.
On average, women were connected to fewer individuals than men, meaning
women were less popular in the network overall. Degree in social networks tends to
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follow a power law distribution of many individuals with low degree and few individuals
with high degree, and this was also true for the 1900 to 1919 organized crime network as
shown in the histogram in Figure 5. The range for degree in the organized crime network
was a minimum of 1 criminal tie to a maximum of 43 criminal ties. Jim Colosimo,
brothel and restaurant owner, collector, and organizer for the red-light districts, had the
highest degree in this network. On average men had 6.4 criminal ties compared to
women’s 3.7 criminal ties. Women were connected to about half as many people as men
in the organized crime network. The final column in Table 5 shows that the gender gap
for degree was 0.58, so if social ties were dollars, women were making about 58 cents to
men’s dollar.
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Women were not as connected as men to central individuals in this network. The
gender gap in eigenvector centrality (popular friends), showed men’s connections to
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central individuals were almost 3 times higher than women’s connections to central
individuals. A high eigenvector centrality score means that a person’s immediate
connections have a lot of ties and a low score means that a person’s immediate
connections have few ties. Women had less popular neighbors in the organized crime
network. Among the top 10 percent of eigenvectors scores, which included 27 people
from the 267 total, there was only one woman, Julia Van Bever. Around 1909, Julia Van
Bever and her husband, Maurice, trafficked women to Chicago’s red-light districts and
sold women to Jim Colosimo’s brothels. Julia Van Bever’s high eigenvector centrality
score picked up her connections to two powerful actors in the network: Jim Colosimo, the
most central actor in the network and her husband, Maurice, who was also prominently
positioned in organized crime. With the exception of Julia Van Bever, when women
formed ties in organized crime, their ties tended to be to less central men or to only a
single powerful man in the network. Men were much more likely to connect to multiple
powerful men in the network than women were.
Women had slightly further to travel to connect to others in the network than men.
In this rather small organized crime network, men on average could reach all other
individuals in the network in 3.8 steps whereas women required 4.0 steps on average.
This difference in means was small, but it was significant. Each person’s average
distance required calculating the mean of geodesic means because each individual has a
geodesic distance to every other person in the network. I calculated column means within
a distance matrix to then compare means of means for men and women. The gender gap
for the mean of geodesic distance means is the smallest gender gap calculated from the
organized crime network and should be interpreted as men’s distance was 94 percent of
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women’s distance, since this is the one gender ratio that I reversed. The difference in
distance is significant but not terribly substantial. The implication for the small gender
gap in distance is that women did not have much farther to travel than men to access
organized crime resources. If women had been located at the farthest margins of
organized crime and men had not been, then a larger gender gap in distance would have
occurred. But, as was the case, women were not located much farther from the center of
the network than men, and women had similar distances to travel to reach all the
resources in the network. Access to resources is not the same as controlling resources, but
access is important for the success of marginalized groups because only then can
marginalized groups borrow social capital from the dominant group.
Women failed to reside on paths between individuals compared to men in the
organized crime network. Overall, women tended not to have brokerage positions in the
network. On average, men resided on 14.5 times more paths than women. Betweenness
calculates the number of geodesic distances that travel through an individual node’s
position. Normalizing the betweenness scores takes into account the actual number of
paths within the network. A high betweenness score is a powerful network position
because paths connecting nodes within the network require going through certain
individuals. If the network were to disseminate information or provide access to legal and
political protection, individuals with high betweenness would control those flows. In fact,
many of the individuals with high betweenness scores were actual brokers or middlemen
who collected graft money from business owners and delivered cash to their bosses or
paid off judges or police officers.

156

	
  
Betweenness also indicates a distinction between core and periphery. Individuals
in the core tend to have high betweenness scores because so many paths require going
through the center of the network whereas at the margins of the network the only paths
going through brokers are those directly in the local neighborhood. The normalized
betweenness score shows the largest gender gap ratio of all five network properties, 0.07.
If controlling paths were dollars, women were only making 7 cents to men’s brokering
path dollar.
Women’s clusters were smaller on average than men’s clusters. Women’s
connected clusters averaged 3.5 ties whereas men’s connected clusters averaged 4.3 ties.
Women tended to be connected in triads and men were connected in groups of four.
Though the k-core score is largely a function of degree, the gender gap ratio for mean kcore was 0.81, which is one of the smaller gaps in this network. This means that women’s
local cluster size was not so different than men’s, but the importance of the local cluster
largely depended on who else resided in that cluster.
To summarize the differences across Table 5, women were a substantial
percentage of the organized crime network before Prohibition, similar in size to the
percentage of women in the formal labor force. However, women’s structural positions
were much less central and critical to the organized crime network than men’s. On
average women were connected to fewer individuals, they were not connected to
important individuals, they had marginally further to travel to connect to others in the
network, they did not reside on paths between individuals in the network, and their
clusters were smaller. In other words, women were less powerful and less important
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within the criminal organization. Women had access to networked resources, but they did
not control networked resources.
Another way to look at gender differences in the 1900 to 1919 organized crime
network is to examine some of the graph-level indices. These calculations come from the
network in its entirety. Graph-level indices include measures such as the number of
components, density of the network, network centralization, the number of triangles, and
transitivity (or connectedness). Some of these measures were introduced earlier in this
chapter to describe the small, sparse (density = 0.022), decentralized (degree
centralization = 0.14), and clustered structure of the organization. Intentionally, the 1900
to 1919 organized crime network contained only a single component with no isolates or
smaller unconnected segments. There were 1,310 triangles in this network, and the
transitivity for this network was 0.391. Transitivity measures the total number of closed
triangles over the number of all open and closed triangles and essentially measures the
adage “a friend of a friend is a friend.”11 Because these measures focus on the entire
network rather than the nodes and create a single statistic for the entire network, parsing
out the gender differences requires a different set of techniques than comparing means
between men and women.
In order to examine the gender differences at the graph-level, I employed a set of
deletion techniques to generate additional networks for comparison. For this part of the
analysis, I created a network that dropped all 47 women and all of their edges, leaving
behind the network of only men and their edges. This resulting men-only network had a
different set of graph-level statistics that I could compare to the graph-level statistics of
the original network. Additionally, I randomly selected 47 men to delete from the original
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network to create a third network of men and women without the random 47 men and
their ties. The logic was to compare the structural changes across the networks when
entire groups were removed in order to identify how structurally important women were
to the overall network.
Figure 6 plots the change across six graph-level network measures. The red bars
indicate the change when deleting all 47 of the women from the network, and the blue
bars indicate that change when deleting the random 47 men from the network. I measured
all of the changes as percent change with the exception of components, which I left as a
count in order to bracket the maximum value in the y-axis.
Figure 6: Change in structural properties of the Chicago organized crime network after
deletion techniques, 1900-1919
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The change in nodes for both deletions was -17.6 percent because this was the
fixed count of 47 to create a random group of men to compare to all 47 women. Moving
right from the first set of bars in Figure 6 shows the variation and gender differences in
the deletion techniques. Deleting women from the network removed 18.8 percent of the
edges, and deleting 47 random men from the network removed 34.9 percent of the edges.
Even though I fixed the number of nodes to 47, the gender difference in the percent
change of edges was about 15 percent.
One of the ways in which individuals can be structurally important to a network is
when they connect other individuals to the component. This is similar to the idea of
brokering paths discussed above as betweenness centrality. Removing brokers from a
network can break the network into multiple parts or components. The third set of bars in
Figure 6 shows the change in the number of components when I deleted the 47 nodes
from the original network. Removing all women from the network produced 2
components for a change of 1 plotted in the red bar and removing the random 47 men
produced 9 components for a change of 8 plotted in the blue bar. The second component
in the women-removed network was a single isolate whereas the 47 random men
removed network produced 1 component of 9, 1 triad, and 6 isolates in addition to what
was left of the largest component.
Removing all of the women from the original network actually improved the
overall network density by 18 percent. What this means is that women had so few ties in
the original network that removing the women actually increased the proportion of
present ties to possible ties. The original network had a density of 2.2 percent of ties
present, and after deleting the women, 2.6 percent of ties were present. This was not the
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case when deleting the random 47 men. The density of the network decreased by 4.7
percent when 47 random men and their ties were removed from the original network.
Included in the random 47 men, were some men with many ties creating dense areas of
the network.
The network also became more centralized when deleting the women. The degree
centralization score increased by 19 percent. Degree centralization also increased when
removing the random men, but not so drastically. Removing the random men increased
degree centralization by 6 percent. The interpretation of this increase is that the ties that
remained in the organized crime network were more concentrated on fewer powerful
individuals rather than spread out across individuals. There was more equity in the
distribution of ties with the women in the network because in total women did not have as
many ties as men.
At the overall network level, counts of triangles and scores of transitivity reveal
the connectedness of the network. Deleting women from the network decreased the
number of triangles by 17 percent but increased the transitivity score by 7 percent. This
pattern shows why it is important to consider both measures. Even though women do
matter in the overall count of triangles, removing the women increased the tendency for
the pattern of closed triangles overall. Women tended to not close the triangles with their
friends’ friends. The random group of 47 men had a very substantial impact of the
number of triangles, and deleting them decreased the number of triangles by 52 percent.
However, transitivity only decreased by 4 percent without these triangles. The 47 random
men contained and closed many triangles and were well connected in the network.
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To summarize these deletion techniques, women were structurally important to
the organized crime network but not as structurally important as 47 randomly selected
men. Removing each group altered the network, but men’s effects were much more
dramatic than women’s effects. I measured a gender gap of structural importance as the
absolute difference between the women and random men’s percent change, which ranged
from a minimum of 11 percent difference in transitivity to a 35 percent difference in
triangles. In two cases, removing the women improved the connectivity of network in
terms of density and transitivity, and removing women increased the centralization of the
network. Because women were not powerful actors in the network, their presence in the
network interfered with the concentration of resources. Mathematically, this is not
terribly interesting as a larger number of individuals changes the concentration.
Substantively, it suggests that women did not add much to organized crime in terms of
relational resources rather women had to borrow relational resources from men.
These two analytic methods, the calculations of gender gaps based on network
position and deletion comparisons, are unique to the study of criminal networks and
gender and crime. The logic comes from an organizational perspective that views social
networks as containing and distributing resources and assumes that individuals want to be
connected to those resources. The organizational structure of organized crime from 1900
to 1919 was small, sparse, decentralized, and clustered. My analysis shows that women
did have access to the resources of the organization, but they did not control the
resources. Women were marginal actors who were able to participate and hang on to a
lucrative and dynamic economy through their connections to slightly less marginal men
or through a single tie to a powerfully connected man. The structure of the network was
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not dependent on the women as women tended to contribute individuals rather than
robust relationships within organized crime. Women’s participation and position in
organized crime changed dramatically when organized crime responded and reacted to
Prohibition.
Chicago Organized Crime Network, 1920-1933
The exogenous shock of Prohibition dramatically shifted organized crime from a
loose syndication around the urban illicit entertainment economies to a large centralized
organization with diverse financial interests. In addition to large-scale brewing, distilling,
storing, and distributing of booze, organized crime’s earning portfolios diversified across
licit and illicit economies to include dog racetracks, dry cleaning establishments, political
campaigns, and union racketeering. Organized crime swelled in size, strength, profits,
and influence. Growth was explosive, and those in positions of power became more
powerful. During Prohibition, the organized crime network grew to include three times
more people and four times more relationships: 937 individuals and 3,250 ties between
them. Table 6 presents the shifts in network structure from pre-Prohibition organized
crime to Prohibition organized crime by listing several properties of the overall networks
and calculating the percent change from the first time period to the second time period.
Organized crime became even sparser as only 0.7 percent of the total possible ties
were present during Prohibition—a 68 percent decrease from before Prohibition. With
decreasing density also came increasing centralization. Degree centralization for
Prohibition organized crime was 0.33, which was an increase of 136 percent the
centralization before Prohibition. Brokerage became more concentrated during
Prohibition with a 78 percent increase in betweenness centralization. Whereas before

163

	
  
Prohibition, the structure of organized crime was relatively small and decentralized, these
measures indicate that the organizational structure of organized crime during Prohibition
was large, sparse, and centralized.
Table 6: Structural properties of Chicago organized crime networks compared, 19001919 and 1920-1933

n of individuals
n of criminal ties
density
degree centralization
betweenness centralization

Time 1
1900-1919
267
789
0.022
0.14
0.398

Time 2
1920-1933
937
3,250
0.007
0.331
0.707

Percent
Change
+250.9%
+311.9%
-68.20%
+136.4%
+77.60%

The organizational restructuring of growth, decreased density, and increased
centralization and brokerage is apparent in Figure 7. Similar to Figure 4, each node in
Figure 7 represents an individual and each line between them represents a criminal
relationship during Prohibition. I assigned nodes the same three colors for this figure: red
indicates criminal women (n=37), blue indicates criminal men (n=825), and yellow
indicates criminal men who were also state actors such as attorneys, police officers, and
politicians (n=74). I added one more color assignment to Figure 7 for the one green node
to indicate the one criminal woman who was a state actor. Shirley Kub worked as a
female investigator for the police commissioner and was also part of organized crime.

164

	
  

Criminal Network 1920-1933

Figure 7: Chicago organized crime network, 1920-1933 (n=937)

police and politicians men
police woman
criminal men
criminal women

Before Prohibition, 18 percent of the organized crime network was women and 19
percent of the relationships included women, but during Prohibition women made up
only 4 percent of the individuals in the organized crime network and resided on only 4
percent of the relationships. Even in raw numbers there were more women and more
dyads that included women before Prohibition than during Prohibition. Similar to the preProhibition network, women’s criminal ties included group arrests, owning and operating
brothels, and trafficking women, but there were fewer of these relationships than before.
Women also entered the Prohibition network as moles in murder plots or members of
bootlegging or bombing crews. There was much more diversity in the types of criminal
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relationships women had during Prohibition. Table 7 presents the same descriptive
statistics shown in Table 5 that compare men and women’s network position.
Table 7: Organized crime network properties by gender, 1920-1933

nodes (people)
edges (criminal ties)

men only dyads

Men
899
(95.9%)
3243
(99.8%)

Women
38
(4.1%)
116
(3.6%)

3134
(96.4%)

--

man and woman dyads

Gender Gap
0.042
0.036

109
(3.4%)

woman only dyads

--

7
(0.2%)

degree (popularity)

7.093
(12.952)
0.016
(0.029)
3.684
(0.847)
0.003
(0.025)
4.859
(4.341)

3.237*
(2.823)
0.003*
(0.006)
4.270*
(0.928)
0.0002*
(0.001)
3.105*
(2.826)

eigenvector centrality (popular friends)
geodesic distance (distance)
normalized betweenness (brokering paths)
k-core (completely connected cluster)

0.456
0.188
0.863
0.067
0.639

Notes: Standard deviations and percentages are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistically significant
differences between men and women’s means based on a two-tailed t-test. Gender gap ratios calculated as
the value for women divided by the value for men except for distance, which was reversed.

The gap between women only dyads and men and women dyads was even more
pronounced during Prohibition than before Prohibition. There were only 7 relationships
between two women in this entire organized crime network of 3,250 criminal ties. Men
only dyads were 500 times greater than women only dyads. Women to women dyads
made up only 0.2 percent of ties in the network, and dyads connecting one woman and
166

	
  
one man made up 3.6 percent of the criminal ties. Woman to woman dyads decreased by
73 percent during Prohibition. Similar to the pre-Prohibition network, women’s
connection to organized crime was almost entirely through their connection to men even
though men’s ties were predominantly to other men. Men were the gatekeepers of
organized crime relationships, and they tended to form relationships with other men
rather than women.
Most of the variation in dyads was due to the sheer number of men in this network
compared to women. The gender gaps for the proportion of nodes (0.04) and the
proportion of relationships (0.04) were some of the largest gaps across all my
calculations. There were 25 times more men than women in the organized crime network
during Prohibition, and men resided on 25 times more relationships than the women.
These large gender gaps persisted during Prohibition across all five of the network
structural properties. Women were connected to fewer individuals, they were not
connected to important individuals, they had farther to travel to connect to others in the
network, they did not reside on paths between individuals in the network, and their
clusters were smaller. Indeed, these calculations are due to the small proportion of
women in this network, but small proportions do not always equal inferior network
positions.
During Prohibition, women on average had 3.24 ties compared to men’s 7 ties,
which was a gender gap of 0.46. While women’s mean degree decreased by 13 percent
from Time 1 to Time 2, men’s mean degree increased by 11 percent. The skew in the
degree distribution, shown in Figure 8, was much greater during Prohibition in large part
due to the very different sizes of the networks and the increased importance of particular
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individuals within the network during the process of centralization and growth. The
degree distribution continued to follow a power law, the minimum degree was 1, and the
maximum degree was 316. Recall that before Prohibition the degree scores ranged from 1
to 43, so the maximum degree increased by 635 percent over time.
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Figure 8: Histogram of degree distribution in Chicago organized crime, 1920-1933
Degree Distribution of Largest Component, 1920-1933
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Truncated to remove Al Capone's degree of 316.

Note: The x-axis in Figure 8 was truncated at 70 to display clearly the distribution on the left. This
truncation drops only Al Capone’s extreme degree of 316.

Al Capone had the highest degree score of 316 criminal ties during Prohibition.
Compare Al Capone to Kathryn Perkins who had the highest degree score for women
with her 13 criminal ties. The historical record on Kathryn Perkins is very thin, and all I
know is that she was a member of a group of booze runners bootlegging between
Chicago and Iowa. Kathryn Perkins had ties to all the other 13 booze runners in this
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group, and her highest degree score was a result of the rather large size of the group.
Compared to Al Capone’s 316 criminal ties, Kathryn Perkins’s degree score as the most
criminally connected woman is quite unimpressive. Whereas Al Capone’s maximum
degree included criminal ties spread across the diverse activities and investments of
organized crime, Kathryn Perkin’s maximum criminal degree was localized within a
single enterprise or event.
Women were not connected to central individuals in the Prohibition network as
shown by the gender gap in eigenvector centrality in which men’s connections to central
individuals was 5.3 times higher than women’s connections to central individuals.
Women experienced a decrease of 73 percent in mean eigenvector centrality from Time 1
to Time 2. Men also experienced a decrease in mean eigenvector centrality from Time 1
to Time 2 of 47 percent. Much of this change can be explained by the differences in the
sizes and densities of the two organized crime networks, but the gender gap in popular
neighbors suggests that this change was categorically unequal.
The woman with the highest eigenvector centrality score during Prohibition was
Alma Guzik, who was connected to more central and powerful individuals than any other
women. However, even with her highest eigenvector centrality score among women,
Alma Guzik was not among the top 10 percent of eigenvector centrality scores in this
network. Alma was married to Harry Guzik and together they operated brothels for
Torrio and Capone’s Syndicate. The couple had ties to both Al Capone and Johnny
Torrio, the top two crime bosses in the Prohibition network. Additionally, Harry Guzik
was the brother of Jake Guzik, who was one of Al Capone’s top lieutenants. Likely Alma
would not have been connected to central people in this network without her husband’s
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connections, and all of Alma’s criminal ties during Prohibition were entirely within the
sex work economy.
Distance continued to be the smallest gender gap, though during Prohibition the
gap was larger than it had been before Prohibition. Men’s distance was 86 percent of
women’s distance during Prohibition. Women’s distance increased slightly to 4.27 paths
to reach everyone else in the network on average compared to men’s distance of 3.68
paths. Men’s average distance decreased slightly from Time 1 to Time 2. Considering
that the network grew during Prohibition to include three times more people and four
times more ties, it is noteworthy that women’s average distance slightly increased while
men’s average distance slightly decreased. A network with the majority of individuals
only a step or two away from a centralized core would explain this change, which was
exactly what changed in the large, sparse, and centralized Prohibition organization. The
implication of the small gender gap in distance before Prohibition was that women did
not have much farther to travel to access organized crime resources than men, but during
Prohibition women had even less access to resources.
The gender gap for betweenness (0.07) continues to be one of the largest gaps in
network properties. Women were not in brokerage positions connecting individuals to
other parts of the network like men were. Women’s brokering paths positions were 93
percent lower than men’s. In other words, the shortest paths connecting individuals across
the network were through men rather than women. There were many more paths to
broker during Prohibition because of the size of the network; however, normalizing the
betweenness score by controlling for the total number of paths, showed dramatic
decreases in brokerage for both men and women. Women’s brokerage positions
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decreased by 78 percent from Time 1 to Time 2, and men’s brokerage positions
decreased by 77 percent from Time 1 to Time 2. These similarities in the percent
decreases in betweenness suggest a categorical similarity rather than difference, but the
distribution of maximum and minimum betweenness scores varied much more by gender.
Betweenness is sensitive to the number of individuals on the periphery of the
networks who have a single tie. These individuals have a betweenness score of zero
because they do not reside on any paths connecting others. Before Prohibition, 63 percent
of men and 79 percent of women had a betweenness score of zero, and during Prohibition
64 percent of men and 87 percent of women had a betweenness score of zero. Whereas
the percent of men with a betweenness score of zero remained about the same across the
two networks, women with a betweenness score of zero increased by 10 percent.
Additionally, the distribution for the maximum betweenness score changed
dramatically over the two time periods for both men and women: the value of the
maximum betweenness increased by 74 percent for men but decreased by 56 percent for
women. A decreasing maximum and increasing minimum explains women’s 78 percent
decrease in betweenness from Time 1 to Time 2. However, these same mechanisms do
not explain men’s 77 percent decrease in betweenness. Men’s maximum betweenness
increased and the percent with the minimum betweenness of zero remained similar. The
remaining plausible explanation for men is once again the story of network centralization
and density. Men continued to be the brokers in organized crime, but as organized
crime’s core became more centralized and the network overall became more sparse, paths
became shorter and required fewer brokers. Powerful men became more powerful.
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The final network position in Table 7 is the k-core measure for cluster size.
Women’s cluster size got slightly smaller during Prohibition and men’s cluster size got
slightly larger. Women’s cluster size was about 64 percent of men’s cluster size. Though
the difference between men and women’s cluster size is statistically different, it is
awkward to divide individuals up into decimals. Substantively women remained in
maximum groups of 3 during Prohibition as they had before Prohibition. Men, however,
had a cluster size of about 4 before Prohibition and this increased to almost 5 during
Prohibition, suggesting an increase in the coordination required for particular crimes, the
size of groups caught in organized crime activities, and also substantial overlap in the
powerful core of the network.
Moving from the node-level indices to the graph-level indices requires employing
the deletion techniques introduced with the 1900 to 1919 network. This part of the
analysis required me to delete the 38 women and all of their ties from the 1920 to 1933
network, and, for a comparison, delete a set of 38 random men and all of their ties from
the 1920 to 1933 network. Figure 9 presents the structural changes from these deletions
across the graph-level indices for the Prohibition networks.
Deleting women from the Prohibition organized crime network had very little
consequence on the overall network structure. I fixed the y-axis in Figure 9 to match the
y-axis of change used for the first time period in Figure 6. Doing so reveals that the
change was much less dramatic in Time 2 than in Time 1. The lower percent of women
deleted from the Time 2 network explains the smaller effects. Whereas in Time 1, I
deleted 18 percent of the nodes from the comparison networks, in Time 2 I deleted only 4
percent of the nodes. Deleting women and their ties produced a men-only remaining

172

	
  
network that had 3.6 percent fewer edges, 1 additional component that was an isolate, a
4.1 percent increase in density, a 3.3 percent increase in centralization, 3.4 percent fewer
triangles, and a 1.3 percent decrease in transitivity. Unlike Time 1, removing women
from the Time 2 network did not increase the network transitivity, but like Time 1 it did
increase the network density and centralization.
Figure 9: Change in structural properties of Chicago organized crime network after
deletion techniques, 1920-1933
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The network without 38 random men and their ties had 8.6 percent fewer edges, 9
more components, a 1.4 percent decrease in density, a 0.3 percent increase in
centralization, 17.3 percent fewer triangles, and an 8 percent decrease in transitivity. The
two properties for which deleting 38 random men had little to no effect on, density and
centralization, were properties that increased when deleting the 38 women. The gender
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gap measured as the absolute difference between the percent change ranged from a 3
percent difference in centralization to a 14 percent difference in triangles. This range was
much smaller than the range from Time 1, so the gender gap for structural importance to
the overall network actually decreased over time but only because there were so few
nodes deleted from the networks in the second time period. Even a small matched sized
group of 38 random men contributed more to the Prohibition organized crime structure
than all of the women as a group. The takeaway from the deletion technique is that
women were less structurally important to the organized crime network during
Prohibition than before Prohibition. The Prohibition organized crime network would have
looked about the same without all of the women.
Increasing Inequality
Women’s structural positions in organized crime got worse across every single
measure during Prohibition. Figure 10 compares the gender gaps (the final column in
Table 5) from before Prohibition when the organization was small, decentralized, and
clustered to the gender gaps (the final column in Table 7) during Prohibition when the
organization was large, sparse, and centralized. The blue bars plot the gender gap from
before Prohibition and the black bars plot the gender gap from Prohibition. Across every
single measure the black bars were shorter than the blue bars. The black bars were closer
to zero and farther from one in every instance indicating an increase in the gender gap.
Increasing gender gaps were especially dramatic for the number of nodes, the number of
ties, and popular friends (eigenvector centrality). The gender gap for brokering paths
(betweenness) was the one of the biggest gaps before Prohibition and showed the
smallest change, but the gender gap did get worse during Prohibition by 0.01.
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Figure 10: Bar chart comparing the gender gaps, 1900-1919 and 1920-1933
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The substantial and persistent gender gap in brokering paths warrants additional
comment. Betweenness scores dropped for both men and women from the preProhibition network to the Prohibition network because the network grew in size while
becoming more sparse and centralized. There were more paths, and those paths
concentrated through a smaller group of powerful brokering individuals. This was
structurally a story of centralization. Powerful people became more powerful and central,
and people on the margins became more marginalized. The examples of the top men
brokers compared to the top women brokers reveal a sharp gendered contrast in this
network position.
The distribution of betweenness scores became more dramatic between the two
networks. Before Prohibition, Mike Heitler, was the biggest broker in the network;
14,367 paths or 41 percent of all the paths in the network went through Mike. Mike’s
betweenness score was consistent with his biography in organized crime. He was a boss
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and property owner in the red-light districts, tribute payments were made to him, and he
had political connections. Illicit business owners wanting legal and political protection
had to go through Mike. But, Mike Heitler was not the most popular criminal before
Prohibition in terms of criminal ties. Heitler had 35 criminal ties in the pre-Prohibition
network, but there were three people in the organized crime network with more criminal
ties than him: brothel king Jim Colosimo (degree of 43), gambling king Mont Tennes
(degree of 42), and collector and informant Louis Frank (degree of 39). Compare Mike
Heitler to Al Capone during Prohibition. Unlike Mike Heitler, Al Capone had the highest
degree in the network (316 criminal ties) and the highest betweenness score. Al Capone
was on 310,348 paths meaning 71 percent of all paths in the network passed through Al.
The normalized betweenness scores show that during Prohibition the biggest broker in
the network resided on nearly 2 times as many paths as the biggest broker before
Prohibition.
In stark contrast, women were just not brokers in organized crime. Women did
not collect tribute or graft payments. When women were connected to central figures,
their associates were also connected to those same central figures. Another way of
thinking about brokerage is through the visualization of open triangles. One of the nodes
in an open triangle connects the other two nodes indirectly, which is a brokerage position.
A closed triangle, however, has no broker because the two associates are connected to the
same person. This was the case for brothel owner Alma Guzik and her husband, Harry.
They were criminal associates, and everyone whom Alma was connected to Harry was
also connected to including bosses Al Capone and Johnny Torrio, so Alma never
brokered paths for Harry. The reverse was not true. Harry was connected to at least a
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dozen additional associates whom Alma had no connection to, and in these cases Harry
brokered the indirect relationships between Alma and his other associates.
Jennie “Diamond” Kirch had the highest brokerage score of all the women before
Prohibition. She resided on 331 paths or 0.9 percent of all paths in the organized crime
network. Compared to Mike Heitler, her brokerage position was unimpressive, and, in
fact, it was her tie to Mike Heitler through which she brokered several women’s paths.
Jennie ran one of Mike Heitler’s brothels at 9 Carpenter Street. She was arrested in 1911
with a group of five other women and two men at a train station en route to Pittsburgh.12
The group was accused of violating the Mann Act, or the White Slavery Act, of 1910 that
prohibited crossing state lines with women for immoral purposes. Joseph Heitler, Mike
Heitler’s brother, was one of the men in this co-arrest. Together Joseph and Jennie
indirectly connected their co-arrestees to Mike Heitler, but they competed for this
brokerage position to Mike Heitler statistically splitting the betweenness score. Joseph,
however, had a much higher overall brokerage score than Jennie because he had many
additional associates beyond the 1911 co-arrest that Jennie did not. Nevertheless, Jennie
“Diamond” Kirch was doing better as a broker than Emily Marshall, who was the top
broker for women during Prohibition.
Emily “the Immune” Marshall resided on 1,868 paths, which was only 0.4 percent
of the paths in the total organized crime network during Prohibition. During Prohibition,
Emily Marshall ran a brothel at 18 North Curtis Street, which eventually came under the
control of Jack Zuta’s syndicate.13 A raid on Emily’s brothel in 1920 and resulting coarrest revealed the names of two of the sex workers at her brothel, Ethel Rosenheim and
Peggy O’Malley.14 As sex workers these two women had no other criminal ties in
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organized crime except to Emily Marshall, who indirectly connected them to Jack Zuta,
who then connected them to the rest of the organized crime network. The similarities
between Jennie “Diamond” Kirsch and Emily “the Immune” Marshall were that they both
were heads of their brothels, both brothels were protected by organized crime, and they
both brokered other women to the organized crime network through their
managerial/owner positions. However, Jennie’s brokerage score was more than two times
higher than Emily’s score when controlling for the number of the total paths. Brokers
control the flow of resources in social networks. In organized crime men were brokers,
and women were brokered.
Prohibition changed the structure of organized crime in a way that generated more
gender inequality. The structures shifted from a small decentralized network of clusters to
a large, sparse, and centralized organization. The first organizational structure was decent
for women’s criminal opportunities. Women were a substantial and structurally important
part of organized crime before Prohibition. Women did not add much in terms of
relational resources to the organized crime network, but they could access networked
resources through men. The organizational structure during Prohibition limited
opportunities for women. Women were not structurally important to the network during
Prohibition because they were too small of a group with too few relationships in
proportion to the large network. Failure to connect in the first place meant failure to
increase social capital from within the organization.
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The Criminal Elite
Women did not look like men in organized crime; however, average men did not
look like certain men in organized crime either. As there is within most formal and
informal organizations, there was an elite group of men within organized crime who were
categorically distinct from all others in the network. Elites require special analytic
attention when making comparisons because they drive the bulk of the difference. For
example, calculating gendered wage differences in a firm will show dramatic gender gaps
if all of the CEOs are men. Given general processes of inequality in organizations, it is
worth thinking about the elite as a separate analytic category. The goal of an elite
sensitivity analysis is to truncate the variance within the groups to increase the chance of
identifying similarity rather than just difference.
The clearest mark of criminal elite within the organized crime networks was
around the number of criminal ties certain individuals had compared to the majority. Al
Capone alone had 316 criminal relationships during Prohibition. Women did not look like
Al Capone in terms of position within the organization but neither did the majority of
men. The criminal elite resided in the right tail of the power law distributions of criminal
ties shown in Figures 5 and 8. I analyzed the criminal elite in these networks as the
individuals near the top 10 percent of criminal ties. These were the most popular and
well-connected individuals in the organizations, and they happened to all be men.
I identified 25 criminal elite men in Time 1 of the 267 nodes and 86 criminal elite
men in Time 2 of the 937 nodes based on criminal degree in each network. Elites were
not exactly 10 percent of the total nodes because degree scores are whole numbers, and I
did not want to slice up a group in which all members had the same degree score. I chose
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the bin closest to 10 percent that would not require me to divide up individuals with the
same degree. Technically, this was the top 9.4 percent for Time 1 and the top 9.2 percent
for Time 2. As a group, elite men had a minimum degree of 13 and a maximum degree of
43 in Time 1 and a minimum degree of 17 and a maximum degree of 316 in Time 2.
Given this distinction, the result was three categories for comparison: elite men, non-elite
men, and women. Sensitivity to elites showed that non-elite men had a degree more
similar to women than to elite men during both time periods as shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Degree for elite men, non-elite men, and women in Chicago organized crime,
1900-1919 and 1920-1933

mean degree
(standard deviation)
maximum degree
minimum degree

Elite
Men
23.32
(9.017)
43
13

1900-1919
Non-elite
Men
4.21
(3.046)
12
1

Women
3.702
(2.321)
11
1

1920-1933
Elite
Non-elite
Men
Men
29.209
4.754
(32.742)
(4.004)
316
16
17
1

Women
3.237
(2.823)
13
1

Employing this new category of elites, I replicated the entire gender inequality
analysis. Figure 11 presents the elite gaps between criminal elite men and non-elite men
from pre-Prohibition and Prohibition. The closer the bar is to 1 the smaller the elite gap,
and the closer the bar is to 0 the greater the elite gap. The blue bars for Time 1 compare
25 criminal elite men to 195 non-elite men. The black bars for Time 2 compare 86
criminal elite men to 813 non-elite men.
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Figure 11: Bar chart comparing the elite gaps between elite and non-elite men, 1900-1919
and 1920-1933
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All of the differences between means for criminal elite men and non-elite men
were statistically significant using two-tailed t-tests. Even though criminal elite men
made up only about 10 percent of the nodes, they resided on almost as many criminal ties
as non-elite men. Criminal elite men had 80 percent of non-elite men’s ties before
Prohibition and 73 percent of non-elite men’s ties during Prohibition. The criminal nonelite had about 20 percent of the elite’s popularity and 10 percent of the elite’s popular
friends. Criminal elite and non-elite had similar distances within the network. Before
Prohibition the non-elite actually had a shorter average distance than the elite and this
flipped during Prohibition. The largest elite gap was in the brokering of paths or
betweenness measure. Non-elite men only had 5 percent of the betweenness score of elite
men in Time 1 and Time 2, or in other words elite men were on 20 times more paths than
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non-elite men. Elite men were on average in connected clusters of 10 in Time 1 and
connected clusters of 13 in Time 2, whereas non-elite men were in connected clusters of
4 in both time periods. This produced the final elite gap in Figure 11 showing a gap of 65
to 70 percent for cluster size.
None of the elite gaps in the bar chart was terribly surprising given that I defined
the elite by their unique and powerful structural position. I expected large elite gaps in
order to control for the variance within the group of men. Considering these large elite
gaps, it is possible that women’s absence from the elite criminal group was driving the
gender gaps in organized crime. To test the sensitivity of the gender gaps presented
earlier in this chapter, Figure 12 compares women to only non-elite men.
Figure 12: Bar chart comparing the gender gaps between non-elite men and women,
1900-1919 and 1920-1933
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In Figure 12, some of the bars are striped rather than solid, and all of the striped
bars are equal to 1. These striped bars indicate no statistically significant differences
between non-elite men and women’s means and, thus, no gender gap. The majority of
these striped bars, however, are blue showing more gender parity before Prohibition than
during Prohibition.
Before Prohibition, non-elite men had four times more individuals and
relationships than women in organized crime, but there was no significant difference in
means across 4 of the 5 structural properties. Non-elite men and women had structural
equality in the Time 1 organized crime network in terms of popularity, popular friends,
distance, and clusters. The brokering paths or betweenness measure, however, maintained
a persistent and substantial gender gap even when removing elite men from the
comparison group. Non-elite men were on 4 times as many paths as women, and elite
men were on 92 times (gender gap not shown) more paths than women.
The structural parity between women and non-elite men nearly eroded during
Prohibition. A wider gulf occurred between women and non-elite men suggesting that
non-elite men connected to the organized crime network of Prohibition in ways that
women could not. There were 20 times more non-elite men than women who resided on
20 times more ties than women during Prohibition. During Prohibition, only 1 of the 5
structural properties did not have a gender gap. Women and non-elite men’s connected
cluster size was statistically similar during Prohibition—between 3 and 4 people in the
connected group.
The significant gender gaps during Prohibition were not as extreme as the gender
gaps from the analysis presented earlier in this chapter that included the criminal elite
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men, but the gaps did persist. Women’s average degree or popularity score was 68
percent of non-elite men’s degree score and only 30 percent of non-elite men’s popular
friends score. The distance measure continued to be a small gender gap, women’s
average distance was only 13 percent longer than men’s average distance in terms of
number of steps required to reach everyone in the network. Once again, the betweenness
measure, indicating brokering paths, was the largest gap in structural position. Non-elite
men were on 5 times more paths than women, and elite men were on 100 times more
paths than women (gap not shown).
Another way non-elite men improved their position in comparison to women
during Prohibition had to do with who was forming ties with whom. Recall that in the
first time period, women resided on about 19 percent of ties and only 3 percent of all ties
were between women. About half of women’s remaining ties were to criminal elite men
(63 ties, 8 percent of the total) and the other half were to the non-elite men (59 ties, 7
percent of the total). A slight majority of women’s ties before Prohibition were to the
criminal elite men, mostly the elite men of the Levee districts. During Prohibition,
women had fewer ties overall, residing on only 4 percent of the total ties in the network.
Only 7 ties were between two women, accounting for 0.2 percent of the total. Women
had 26 ties (1 percent of the total) to criminal elite men and 83 ties (3 percent of the total)
to non-elite men during Prohibition. During Prohibition, then, the majority of women’s
ties were to non-elite men whereas before Prohibition a slight majority of women’s ties
were to criminally elite men. During Prohibition, women were connected to Al Capone’s
bootleggers and distributors, rather than Capone himself or his inner circle.
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To summarize the analysis controlling for the elite, before Prohibition 89 percent
of the men in the organized crime network were similar in power and importance as 100
percent of the women with the exception of brokering paths. Women were situated in the
organized crime network similarly to the majority of their male counterparts. Sensitivity
to the skew produced by the criminal elites within the network revealed a moment and a
location of greater gender equality within the organization, at least during the first time
period. However, Prohibition generated gender inequality in organized crime networks
beyond the elite. The black bars in Figure 12 show that even regular non-elite men were
mobilized and connected to organized crime in ways that women were not. Structurally,
non-elite men secured better positions than women in the centralized network during
Prohibition. In periods of centralization, a single tie to a member of the criminal elite
becomes more valuable than periods of decentralization. Women were categorically
excluded almost entirely from that single valuable tie.
In the deletion technique employed earlier in this chapter that removed women
from the networks and a comparable group of random men, the random groups of men
did include criminal elite men. Of the 47 random men deleted from the 1900 to 1919
network, 6 were elite (13 percent), and of the 38 random men deleted from the 1920 to
1933 network, 4 were elite (11 percent). At the graph-level, the criminal elite were
certainly driving much of the gender difference in structural change. Using a random
number generator, I identified two comparably sized groups of random non-elite men,
and I replicated the deletion analysis across the graph-level indices. Figures 13 and 14
replicate the analysis of the earlier deletion technique and add black bars to show the
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change when removing 47 random non-elite men from the 1900 to 1919 network and 38
random non-elite men from the 1920 to 1933 network.
Figure 13: Change in structural properties of the Chicago organized crime network after
deletion techniques, 1900-1919
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Figure 14: Change in structural properties of the Chicago organized crime network after
deletion techniques, 1920-1933
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Not surprisingly, deleting a random sample of non-elite men and their ties did not
have as dramatic of effects on the network as deleting a random sample of men that
included the criminal elite, but the effects were more dramatic than deleting all of the
women. Over all of the measures and across both time periods, the change indicated by
the black bars was between the red and the blue bars. The one exception was deleting
non-elite random men from the first network, which had almost no effect on degree
centralization whereas deleting the random men did. What is notable in these results is
that deleting the non-elite sample followed the same axis pattern in terms of percent
increase or percent decrease as the women’s sample rather than the random men
including the elite’s sample. For example, removing women and random non-elite men
increased the density and transitivity of the first network when random men including the
elite decreased these measures. This was also the case for density in the second network.
In other words, in terms of overall impact on the networks, deleting the random sample of
only non-elite men had a similar effect on the overall network structure in both time
periods as deleting the women, but the size of the effect varied. These deletion technique
results imply once again that non-elite men looked more like women than they did
criminally elite men. Removing a small group of non-elite men from the Prohibition
network had the almost the same minimal effect on the overall network as removing all
of the women.
Sensitivity to the criminal elites revealed instances of gender equality in the
decentralized clustered organization but not in the larger centralized organization. Even
though as a proportion there were substantially fewer women than non-elite men in
organized crime before Prohibition, women and non-elite men were equally situated
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within the resource-laden structure with the exception of brokering paths. In large
centralized organizations, a single tie to an elite is increasingly more important. Non-elite
men were able to form ties to the criminal elite and secure their network position in ways
that women were not.
Discussion
One alternative explanation to my finding of the shifting structures of organized
crime excluding women could be that the finding is an artifact of my timeline, and I fail
to account for other events that excluded women from organized crime. A way to test the
robustness of my finding and to counter this alternative explanation would be to shorten
the time span around the exogenous shock of Prohibition. For example, Emily Owens’
research on violence and Prohibition uses a shifting five years before and five years after
Prohibition laws were passed to account for the state and local variation when alcohol
became illegal as some states banned alcohol as early as 1914.15 My analysis does not
include state variation, but there were other shifts occurring within Chicago during my
specified timeline that affected women in organized crime, especially the formal closing
of the red-light districts. Shortening the timeline to the five years before and the five
years after Prohibition, could possibly demonstrate how much of a shock Prohibition was
to the structure of organized crime.
There is one serious limitation in my data that renders a shorter timeline analysis
ineffective. The majority of criminal ties in the Capone Database capture events
contained within the historical record. Criminal events are seldom the beginning or the
end of criminal relationships. An arrest in 1917 does not imply that two individuals began
their criminal relationship on that day in 1917, but rather it implies that on a certain day
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in 1917 the two individuals had a relationship for some period of time that lead them to
the co-arrest. Additionally, a brewery raid in 1924 does not mean the end of a criminal
relationship. Folks paid fines, took care of some paperwork and some snitches, and
returned to business as usual. The distribution of events is not the same as a distribution
of relationships. The recording and archiving of aggressive police and federal
investigations, intensive moments of Chicago Tribune reporting, and ambitious
investigator notes all bias the distribution of events. Broadly, I bring these events together
as organized crime networks. Specifically, Figure 15 shows the distribution of the percent
of criminal ties per year that aggregated into the larger organized crime networks.
The height of each bar in Figure 15 shows a percentage of organized crime. I
calculated each percent as the number of criminal ties per year by the total number of ties
in the organized crime network during that time period, which were 267 for the first time
period and 937 for the second time period. The orange section of each bar indicates the
percent of organized crime ties that included women during that year. I could not identify
an exact year for the dyads in the “Other Time 1” and “Other Time 2” bars, but I was able
to situate these dyads in the broader time periods. The same two people could have had a
criminal tie in multiple years, but the organized crime network aggregated the ties per
year.
Figure 15 shows a long period of sparse data from 1900 to 1906 and short bursts
of data making up the majority of the networks in 1909, 1930, 1931, and “Other Time 2.”
The burst in 1930 actually captures nearly 91 percent of the total of organized crime ties,
10 years after Prohibition began. To return to my larger point, these relationships did not
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begin and end in 1930; rather 1930 was a big year in the archival records when many of
the tax fraud cases began.
Figure 15: Percent of organized crime dyads per year, 1900-1933
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These peaks and valleys in the data make robustness checks to the timeline
difficult to test and solid conclusions about exogenous shocks difficult to reach. Based on
Figure 15, one could argue that the closing of the red-light districts pushed women out of
organized crime, and the Prohibition was not a shock but a more gradual transition
leading to 1930. To the contrary, I argue that that would be too simplistic of a reading of
these data. The weight of my evidence of Prohibition as the exogenous shock radically
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restructuring organized crime comes from the historical narrative more than the
distribution of dyads. Relationships begin and endure beyond events, and a record of
events is only a proxy for the dynamics of relationships. The stricter the time boundaries
on evaluating static events, the more likely we are to miss the organizational structure
resting on the evolution of dynamic relationships. Without more precise data about the
beginning and ending of relationships, broad temporal strokes are needed to represent the
actual distribution of relationships.
Conclusion
Chicago organized crime at the turn of the twentieth century revolved around the
illicit entertainment economies of sex work and gambling and their legal protection and
political corruption. Above and beyond the women sex workers and gamblers, was a
loosely connected network of men and women, police officers and politicians, husbands
and wives, and graft collectors and bosses, whose criminal relationships made up the
small, decentralized, clustered structure of pre-Prohibition organized crime. Organized
crime was similar to the formal labor market with women making up almost 20 percent
of the total. Although women made up a rather substantial portion of the organized crime
network from 1900 to 1919, their structural position and importance were unequal to
men’s overall. However, sensitivity to the role of criminal elites on the network showed
that women and non-elite men were roughly equivalent in structural positions before
Prohibition. Women and non-elite men accessed but did not control networked resources.
The 1920 federal prohibition on the manufacturing, selling, and transporting of
intoxicating beverages was an exogenous shock to the organized crime network. During
Prohibition, organized crime swelled in size, strength, profits, and influence. The network
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included three times more people, four times more criminal relationships, became less
dense, and more centralized. Gender inequality got worse during Prohibition across every
single measure within the organized crime network. Non-elite men and women diverged
in positions when non-elite men formed ties with the criminal elite, and women did not.
The exogenous shock of Prohibition caused the structures of organized crime to grow in
size and increase in centrality, and these shifting structures excluded women. If gender
inequality of the early 1900s Chicago organized crime world were to fit neatly into a twoby-two table, it would look something like Table 9 below.
Table 9: Gender inequality in two organizational structures
	
  
Decentralized
Large Centralized
Clustered
Organization
Organization
Men
82%
96%
Women
18%
4%
This was a case of dynamic gender inequality within an organization. The
centralization and opportunity-hoarding of organized crime during Prohibition excluded
women from profitable markets and networked resources. As organizations change and
adapt to exogenous shocks so too do categorical inequalities within the organizations
because particular organizational forms produce greater gender inequality than others.
Distinct from traditional organizational and criminological studies, however, is that
categorical inequality is perpetuated through relationships. Relationships form unequally
upon entering the organization, and once within the organization relationships continue to
form and dissolve unequally. Who connects to the elite and who does not, is one such
example.
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In Chicago organized crime, a category of difference produced the network: men
formed criminal relationships with connected men, and women struggled to form
criminal relationships with connected men or with connected women. But the differences
between men and women were not explained solely by the categorical attribute of gender.
The network facilitated increased relationships between men and further marginalization
of women when men’s triangles closed, when men controlled brokerage, and when men
connected to more centrally powerful men. These are some of the internal processes of
social networks that in general generate greater inequality.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Organizations, whether formal, informal, licit, or illicit, unequally distribute
relationships and resources. Organizational inequality is dynamic and can worsen when
exogenous shocks force restructuring and redistribution. Combining social network
analysis and historical research methods to examine the case of organized crime in
Chicago, I uncovered a group of women who made up 18 percent of the organized crime
network from 1900 to 1919 but only 4 percent of the network from 1920 to 1933. I
examined how the structure of Chicago’s organized crime network shifted to increase
gender inequality.
This dissertation posed three research questions: (1) What was the structure of
Chicago organized crime before Prohibition, and how did women fit into the structure?
(2) How did the shock of Prohibition change the structure of organized crime in Chicago,
and how did women fit into the revised structure? (3) Why did gender inequality increase
so dramatically in organized crime?
To the first research question, I found that from 1900 to 1919 the structure of the
Chicago organized crime network was small, sparse, and decentralized. The bulk of the
relationships in the network coordinated the protection of illegitimate gambling,
prostitution, and alcohol establishments alongside the corruption of law enforcement and
local political offices. The protection market was territorial gathering and exploiting
properties in the red-light districts where Chicago’s vices condensed. I argued that this
organizational structure was better for women. Women were 18 percent of the organized
crime network when they could connect to organized crime based on the geographic
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location of their illicit businesses. I documented gender gaps in network positions
between men and women, but when I compared women to only other men outside the
organized crime core, whom I called the criminal non-elite, the gender gap nearly
disappeared. This result pointed to an important analytic insight of comparing elites to
non-elites when the elites were exclusively men. All women in pre-Prohibition organized
crime were structurally similar to the majority of their men counterparts.
To the second research question, I found that Prohibition was an exogenous shock
that dramatically restructured the organized crime network. Organized crime shifted from
a territorial protection market to a product-based market of intoxicating beverages.
Bootleg booze required production, storage, transportation, distribution, sales, and
protection. From 1920 through 1933, the Chicago organized crime network multiplied in
size, centralized around a leadership core, and spread its geographical reach across the
city, into the neighboring villages, and to some neighboring states. I argued that this
organizational structure excluded women. Women were only 4 percent of the organized
crime network when women had to connect to organized crime through relationships with
male family members or romantic partners and had more diverse roles in organized
crime. The gender gap between men and women increased across every single structural
position in the organized crime network, and removing women from the network had
minimal effects on the overall network structure. Women were no longer structurally
similar to criminal non-elite men. Non-elite men formed ties to elite men in the
centralized structure that women did not.
The third research question asked why gender inequality increased so
dramatically in organized crime. I argued that gender inequality got worse when relations
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trumped locations as entrée to organized crime. The first organizational structure and its
territorial focus provided increased organized crime connections for women when
entrepreneurial women could access the protection market through the locations of their
brothels. Organized crime scooped up the local addresses to increase its protection
market and did not discriminate against women owning illicit businesses, especially
brothel businesses. The second organizational structure of the larger, more centralized,
and less territorial network constrained women’s organized crime connections when
access was obtained through prior trusting relationships to organized crime leaders or
their associates. Women could not form these relationships like men, and women of
organized crime became increasingly dependent on their relationships to their male
relatives and romantic associates to include them in organized crime activities. The
gatekeepers of organized crime largely discriminated against women.
Organized crime’s exclusion of women occurred when the larger sex work and
booze economies of Chicago increasingly included women. Women’s proportion of
ownership or management of illicit establishments in booze and prostitution were
increasing around Chicago from 1900 to 1933. Women turned moonshining and
bootlegging into family or women’s work. Women involved in the ownership or
management of alcohol and sex work establishments operated on a smaller scale during
Prohibition and in isolation from organized crime. Organized crime had gotten too big
and the market too spread out for small-scale entrepreneurial women in the domestic
sphere to be included. When the raids came, women had no resources or protection for
escaping prosecution, and the legal consequences and sentences were severe.
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Limitations
This research faced the same challenges and limitations that arise in all social
network analysis studies dealing with crime data and dark networks. Dark networks refer
to networks that are hidden and cannot be seen by researchers and sometimes the
members of the networks themselves. Networks are not dark because they are criminal;
they are dark when they are clandestine and members prefer to conceal their identities
and their activities. The main challenge in the analysis of dark networks is incomplete
data. Incomplete data on Chicago historical organized crime networks for the Capone
Database occurred two ways: (a) when investigators and reporters did not record and
archive events and relationships because the events and relationships were either
unremarkable or hidden, and (b) when investigators and reported recorded and archived
events incorrectly, either intentionally because of lying and cover-ups or unintentionally
because they did not know the full story.
The main consequence for analyses using dark criminal networks is that some
data on nodes and relationships are likely missing and sections of the network are
underestimated. I coded thousands of publicly known relationships, but these were
relationships notable enough to be documented and preserved in newspaper articles and
archival documents. Undocumented and unremarkable relationships and remarkable
relationships that escaped documentation are missing from the Capone Database. This
means that the missing nodes and ties are not random—an issue that is generally the case
in criminology of dark networks.1
It is worth recognizing the implication that non-random missing individuals and
relationships have on my analysis because I assume women and women’s relationships
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are some of the most likely to be missing. Decades of feminist criminology have
unpacked the various ways in which gender assumptions minimize women’s crime,
which contribute to the lack of documentation in the organized crime archives.
Intersections of gender, race, and class mask women’s criminal activities when law
enforcement and criminally involved men perceive women’s criminal contributions as
inconsequential.2 Women also employ gender as a strategy to avoid criminal consequence
appealing to law enforcement and judges paternalistic assumptions.3 When women are
involved in criminal activities they tend to be in support roles and receive lower profits
from the crime.4 In the case of the Chicago organized crime network, individuals, and
especially women, involved in the day-to-day grind at the margins of organized crime
were the most likely to escape documentation.
The Chicago Tribune reporter never named the “henna-haired madam” working at
the Four Deuces in 1922.5 I never found one mention in the archives of a sex worker’s
name connected to a Torrio or Capone brothel during Prohibition. I found no mention in
the archives of waitresses or barmaids connected to organized crime even though urban
workingwomen formed the class of waitresses in all the major Chicago restaurants where
they performed similar labor required in speakeasies and parlors.6 Meridel Le Sueur’s
novel, The Girl, detailed this gendered behind-the-scenes work of Midwest speakeasies
where young women found jobs and formed romantic relationships with men
bootleggers.7 Chicago Tribune reporters, Chicago Crime Commission investigators, and
federal Prohibition and IRS agents had a special interest in uncovering and prosecuting a
particular version of organized crime that went after a few high-profile men and largely
ignored the associates at the margins.
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I assume that this gap in the historical record underestimates the organized crime
networks especially at the margins where women tended to reside. I am similarly
convinced, however, that marginal men, such as bartenders, drivers, plumbers, are also
likely to be underestimated in the networks. As long as men at the margins were just as
likely to be missing from the archives as women, then missing data on the associates at
the margins would not have consequence on the overall results of my gender gap
analysis.
I am less convinced of a different side of women’s missing information in the
archives, which is wives’ involvement in organized crime. The case of Mae Capone
especially makes me question the gaps in the historical record and their implications for
my analysis. Reporters and investigators documented gangsters’ wives as notable
individuals and occasionally documented their financial connections to organized crime,
but there were so few cases of wives connected to Prohibition organized crime that I
suspect other influences on women’s missing information in the archives.
Perhaps the trope of the silent wife, who either knows everything or nothing but
will never say, clouded journalists and investigators’ accounts.8 Perhaps law
enforcement, investigators, and journalists’ gender bias assumed that women were
innocent, less capable of crimes, or inconsequential as criminals. Perhaps husbands
involved in high-risk organized crime activities went to greater lengths to protect their
home and families from investigation. All three of these explanations would be
fascinating pieces to this historical case, but I lack the sources to name one with more
certainty just as I lack the sources for a more detailed investigation of the organized
crime wives.
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It is clear to me that the organized crime focus of the archives pushed my analysis
toward an organizational change framework. During moments of this project I tried to
imagine the costs and the benefits of the organized crime lens on my research because at
times I felt like I had found competing stories of women in Prohibition Era Chicago. On
one hand, I found hundreds of cases of women and men operating and managing
prostitution and booze establishments during the Prohibition boom. On the other hand,
seldom did these cases overlap with the larger organized crime sources and story. In my
searches for women in Prohibition Era organized crime, I found women bootlegging and
running brothels during Prohibition with no clear connection to organized crime. I was
not expecting this level of disconnect when I began this research as I had identified a
small group of women connected to organized crime. In the end, while I am enthusiastic
about the organizational change story and its contributions to the study of gender
inequality especially in criminal markets, I feel that I do not do justice to the history of
Prohibition Era women outside of organized crime. This is a direction for future, related
research.
The Capone Database is just one possible iteration of a social world during a
particular historical moment. Data on offenders often feels partial and flawed, and I
would argue that this is even truer for historical offenders. Political scientist Peter
Andreas and author of Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America, advises:
[I]t is better to tell the story with admittedly imperfect and incomplete data than to
simply throw up one’s hands and pretend that the world of smuggling doesn’t
exist because it cannot be precisely measured. After all, that would be the
equivalent of a drunkard looking for his keys under the lightpost because it is the
only place he can see.9
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I agree with Andreas. It is better to pursue the analysis while acknowledging the
limitations of incomplete data than to leave dominant narratives unchallenged.
Contributions
There is no shortage of popular non-fiction books on Prohibition Era Chicago
organized crime. Al Capone’s grandniece, Deirdre Capone, published her account in
2011 and has since been a guest of honor at the Chicago History Museum’s Prohibition
Era themed events.10 On February 14, 2009, I took The Untouchables bus tour of Chicago
during which I won a prize for correctly answering a trivia question. My prize was a free
copy of a book written by my tour guide and gangster enthusiast Don “Al Dente”
Fielding.11 Mario Gomes, a self-proclaimed “Capone-aholic,” hosts a website called “My
Al Capone Museum” with various photos of artifacts from his collection and summaries
of people and places connected to Al Capone.12 Even in this rather saturated genre, nonfiction writers continue to recast the story with new attention to previously neglected
actors and angles, such as Jonathan Eig’s correction that US Attorney George E.Q.
Johnson took down Al Capone rather than Eliot Ness.13
These popular non-fiction books are fun and focus on the sensational events and
infamous celebrities from Chicago organized crime. I accessed these books to generate
exhaustive lists of high-profile gangsters and potential archival sources. The public
fascination with the Chicago gangster era by “Capone-aholics” and other enthusiasts has
encouraged institutions, such as the IRS, to digitize their Capone related documents and
make them publicly available. In my sociological study of Chicago organized crime, I did
not uncover some hidden gem of the Capone era, nor was that my goal. Rather the goal of
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this project was to use Chicago organized crime as a case to explore relational and
organizational theories of gender and crime.
Social networks are abstractions—images of dots and lines that can be reduced to
a table of statistical properties. Yet, the birds-eye perspective illuminates networks
beyond the local and reveals patterns that might have otherwise been hidden, hidden even
to the members of the networks themselves.14 Organized crime associates are no longer
hidden in boxes and folders full of crumbling pages when information on their
relationships to others can be organized in a networked way. Social network analysis
provided me with a means to organize historical data and the tools to analyze the data
statistically. Most importantly, from the Capone Database of 3,321 individuals and
15,861 relationships I could filter out the noise within some of the archival sources to
reveal the structure of organized crime at two points in time. Not every organized crime
individual mentioned in the archives was connected to organized crime, but when the
connection to organized crime was not clear in the source it became clear in the
extraction of the networks.
The organized crime network from the Capone Database challenges theories of
organized crime as familial or ethnic hierarchies or Chicago organized crime as an ethnic
feud between the Irish and the Italians. The networks reveal changes in the structure of
organized crime that have not been previously analyzed or discussed in non-fiction and
historical accounts. These changes include the move from a decentralized network to a
more centralized network, the move for a rather sparse network to an even sparser
network, the change in territorial focus, and the rising importance of leaders. Social
network tools permit these precise calculations and comparisons over time.
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My calculation of gender gaps and elite gaps in structural positions are an
important addition to social network and organization research. They require
acknowledging the relevance of categories in forming relationships. Following research
on gender gaps in wages in the formal workplace, I utilized the only statistics available to
measure gender gaps in organized crime: location in the network. These are not gaps of
dollars and cents, but they are gaps in access to networked resources in the abstract.
Recognizing the elites within an organization, or those most in control of networked
resources, revealed moments when the elite gap explained away most of the gender gap
and moments when the gender gap was robust even when controlling for elites. Without
social network analysis, I could not calculate the gender and elite gaps in these
organizations. This unique method of calculating inequality in network position is
applicable to future network studies of formal, informal, licit, and illicit organizations.
Social network analysis requires a level of abstraction that limits explanation
beyond the processes of the network. Interpreting the social network results through
historical narrative methods contextualizes the networks and brings the power of
temporal ordering and causality back to the analysis. It was only by zooming in on small
sections of the work and investigating the historical detail of women’s ties to organized
crime where I was able to discover the importance of location and location based ties for
women in the first time period and their near absence in the second time period.
Identifying the various processes behind women’s criminal ties to organized crime
required historical methods. The narratives are often not flattering, but they reconstruct a
historical moment to correct misconceptions about women’s locations in history and
render women, even criminal women, visible and relevant.
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Implications & Future Directions
This research speaks most directly to the gender and crime literature but is also
relevant to research on gender and organizations. The motivation of a relational
inequality framework is the potential to explain categorical differences (e.g., race, age,
gender, socioeconomic status, neighborhood) as products and consequences of various
configurations of relationships. Criminology lacks a coherent and cogent theory to
explain how a group that makes up 51 percent of the population (i.e., women) makes up
only 25 percent of all arrests and 7 percent of the prison population. The gender
socialization theories of the 1980s and 1990s are not enough to understand these dramatic
gender and crime gaps. Legal scholars Malcolm Feeley and Deborah Little’s research on
the shifting gender gap in crime over 226 years in Britain showed that it was not until the
1800s that the gender gap began increasing to its present rates, arguing that the gender
gap in crime is a product of historical and cultural shifts around the ideals of
womanhood.15 My analysis of a criminal organization over 34 years cannot speak to
broader cultural shifts around gender norms, but it does contribute evidence to the
importance of studying shifts. Gender inequality is dynamic and influence by shifting
organizational structures.
Feely and Little’s research on the changing gender gap in crime convinces me that
incorporating criminal relationships into criminological analysis in an important direction
for theory. If the gender gap in crime is rooted in women’s unequal access to criminal
relationships, then the theory is not about some categorical difference between men and
women: it is about production and consequence of relational inequality. Moving to the
roots of unequal relationships is a shift in the theoretical conversation. Future research on
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drug and sex work markets over time would contribute to this theoretical shift in the
gender and crime gap. Studies on smaller co-offending groups should consider the
benefits of mapping out the dynamics of relational gender inequality in the face of
exogenous shocks such as arrests, residential mobility, market shifts, new competition, or
influxes of weapons.
I argue along with other criminologists and sociologists that crime and criminals
need to be studied relationally.16 Offending and incarceration are not distributed evenly
and randomly across the population, and we need social network analysis tools to study
the interdependent non-random aspect of social life. Relational approaches illuminate the
group nature of offenders, map out configurations of relationships within opportunity
structures, and measure inequalities that occur through criminal relationships.
Unfortunately, relational data on offenders are rare. Scholars have successfully
transformed police department records and official court records into relational co-arrest
and co-offending databases, but the formation, duration, and alteration of relationships is
usually beyond the scope of institutional records.17 Relational data can be difficult to
collect, but they are where we are most likely to understand criminal entrance, process,
and persistence.
The logic and theory of relational inequality that guided this research has broader
applications to other moral crusades as well. The legalization of marijuana in some states
has opened previously criminalized markets, and might show a reverse of gender
inequality. Anecdotal evidence of women’s roles in recently legalized marijuana sales,
especially in the market of baking marijuana infused treats, introduces a new gendered
dimension to the market that may be more accessible to women than during marijuana
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prohibition. A relational inequality framework could be used to study women’s access to
the marijuana market during criminalization and after legalization.
Another example of a moral crusade that would benefit from a relational
inequality framework is abortion restriction in the US As some states increasingly restrict
access to abortions, women needing access to abortionists will likely require connections
through men to gain the necessary information and contacts. Nancy Howell Lee’s
research shows that this was certainly the case before the Roe v. Wade decision of 1973
when contacts in the flow of information on abortionists were 2.5 men for every 1
woman.18
Organizations, whether formal, informal, licit, or illicit, unequally distribute
relationships and the resources contained within those relationships. Organizational
inequality is dynamic and can worsen when exogenous shocks force restructuring and
redistribution. As was the case with Chicago organized crime, at times these shifting
structures leave women behind.
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